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CHAPTER I 
IN TRODUC TI ON 
The purpose of this dissertation is to analyze and inter-
'\ pret the unique relation of the contact of mind with mind in the 
I 
communication situation in order to discover and evaluate the 
underlying presuppositions which make communication significant 
in epistemology. A conscious effort is made to avoid discussing 
metaphysical implications. There is need for a rational and, 
at the same time, an empirical investigation of communication, 
for communication, since it is the sign of shared experience or 
the intelligible result of the interaction of persons in a 
social world, will become increasingly important as civilization 
advances and life becomes more and more complex. An understand-
ing of the concept is ne.eded, for the problems of communication 
touch all the fields of thought --the physical sciences, the 
social sciences (religion, aesthetics, and ethics), and the 
philosophies of society. 
Any theory of communication, in its relationship with the 
physical sciences, must analyze the nature and ultimacy of 
energy; with the social sciences, it must consider the objecti-
vity and subjectivity of values; with philosophies of society, 
it must criticize propaganda, which can be either a powerful 
integrating or disintegrating force in social life, and through 
-
--------- -
II 
II 
jl 
II 
I 
I 
the critical interpretation of the demands of society, it must 
reach a rational conclusion as to the place of the individual 
in society; with epistemology, it must be aware of the funda-
mental issues raised by monism and dualism, and the privacy a.rrl 
publicity of experience. 
It is obvious that the scope of a discussion of communi-
cation is far-reaching, and that all phases cannot be adequate-
ly handled within the limits of a single dissertation. And 
since the problems falling under the field of epistemology 
are empirical and basic, and touch on the other fields of 
thought, we shall primarily be concerned with them. Once they 
are clarified, they will lead the way, in the future, to an 
adequate discussion of the remaining problems. 
In view of our aim to avoid metaphysical considerations 
in dealing with the relation between two or more minds1 , we 
shall assume the hypothesis that persons exist in a uni-
verse of physical objects. Communication is the coordinating 
factor in the behavior of the individual members of a social 
group, and because it presupposes a social pattern, we can-
· not overlook the sienificance of the term 'social' nor the 
problem: What constitutes social experience~ Hence, we shall 
approach the study of the concept of communication first, 
from the point of view of social experience; then, individ-
1. Price, Art. 8, 425-456. The key to the references will be 
found in the bibliography at the end of the dissertation. 
2 
3 
--·--- -·------·-·-----··--·----- -------· 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
li 
I 
I 
I 
I 
ual experience so as to understand the role of the individ- I 
ual in t.he social scheme; next, attempt to discover the II I' 
presuppositions of intelligible intercourse in order to show 1! 
I' how communication is possible, and finally, endeavor to 
correlate our findings with a val-id theory of .ep.1stemologJ 
hoping thus to reduce the age~worn conflict between epis.temo-
logical monism and dualism by synthesizing the sound claims 
of each into a coherent whole. 
Strangely enough, considering the relevaney of the 
subJect, very little is found on the subject in philosophical 
1 literature. There are books primarily dealing with language 1 
in terms of grammatical relatio·ns, morphology and syntax, 
which as a science of semantics shows the significance of 
the life of words, 2and there are excellent material on J 
-3 I linguistic studies from the aesthetic points · of view, but 
for purposes of this paper, we are not interested in these / 
aspects of the problem of communication. We want to develop il 
a theory which will not only show the importance of commun-
ication. in the social progress of man, but also explain 
the value o·f communication in the knowing situation. 
In order to give a brief resume· of the articles and 
books which-have bean written specifically on the subject 
of communication, we shall at this time summarize conc.isely 
' 
2. Cf. Jesperso·n, LNDO. Also, De· Laguna, SFD. 
3 • C:f • Croce , AS:iGL. =-=~----11 ------
1 
I 
II 
the available material. A more detailed account of them will 
be given :tn the course of the discussion. 
The Contact Between Minds by Cecil Delisle Burns is the 
only book we have seen which makes a systematic approach to 
the problem of communication. The author says the purpose of 
the book ls limited, for it does not attempt to establish a 
theory of being, but rather 
••• to determine the character of only one element 
in reality, namely the relation between minds which 
is referred to in common speech as communication or 
co-operation.4 · 
In the course of his treatment, he shows that joint conation 
is the essence of communication. From the start, he assumes 
the hypothesis of the plurality of minds, for cooperation, 
the ultimate end of communication, would have no meaning unless 
in reference to more than one mind. 5 Mind for Burns is an 
"empirical reality"6 and is defined as the "psychic energy in 
man"7 or " spirit" connected w:+th a human body or "percipient 
event."8 Throughout the book there is shown the active inter-
action of what he terms "enjoyed reality" and "contemplated 
4. Burnsj, CM, v. 
5. Ibid, 66. 
6. Ibid, 5. 
7. Ibid, 4. 
8. Loc. cit. 
4 
reality."9 Mental processes come under the first, and parti-
culars of sense, under the second. Closely connected with 
this idea is the interaction of the universal and the particu-
lar. Each exists by means of the other. He stresses the dis-
tinctness and yet the interdependence of the various aspects 
of experience in order to show that in a coherent theory of 
communication, we need both transcendent minds and transcend-
ent objects. 1° Communication is the relation of the two and 
presupposes a social group. It becomes the tie which binds 
the members of the group together. In communication there is 
not only an interchange of ideas, but also an interchange of . 
desires and emotions. 
Within the last few months, Urban has published an import-
ant book which treats of communication as an aspect of the 
problem of language. The book, Language and Reality, is divid-
ed into two parts. Part I deals with an extended study of lan-
guage from the point of view of linguistic sciences and philo-
sophy, particularly concerned with language as related to 
knowledge or cognition. Communication and intelligibility are 
the leading concepts around which the discussion centers, for 
the conditions of intelligible communication, he thinks, are 
the basal problems of philosophy because the meaningfulness of 
our assertions is bound up with v erifiability. This in turn 
9. Burns, CM, 17. 
10. Urban, Art. 14, 591. 
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is "condi--tioned by confi-rmation. "11 Ji 
In Part II, he de-velops a science of symbolism which I 
t shows the close relationship between verification and eonfir-
mation. Language, he says, is a purely rational activity grow-
ing out of the intellectual progress of man~ Meaning, the 
/, 
I 
sine qua non of language, ev-olves out of the communication 
situation, and reveals the public character Of the data of 
experience. Confirmation, a social act, becomes a necessary 
condition of verification, and confirmation is ultimately a 
matter of co~unication. 12rf the 'universe of discourse in-
volves a physical context, verification is possible through 
reference and observable entity. On the other hand ver1ficat1o 
'by authentication c-an be used for a large number of meaning-
ful propos! tiona where assertions are mad·e about universes jl 
of discourse which have no observable entities for referential II 
thinking. Verification by authentication rests upon realms of 
values whose truths are self-evident.l3 
One section of the book: was ·pub-lished previously as an 
article called "Intelligible Communication: Its Nature and 
Co·ndi t-ion. "14 H~re he shows the difference between behavioral 
11. Urban, LR, 14. 
12. Ibid, 384. 
13. Ibid, 213-214. 
14 • Urban, Art • 14 • 
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communicatio-n, communication which indicates the here and now 
and is merely a cue to behavior, and intel-ligible communi-
cation, which involves understanding and intentionality and 
goes beyond the here and now. Intelligible communication is 
the communication of the rational self capable of transc·end-
ing its own immediacy and becoming a person experiencing 
values and having ideals. 
I. A. Richards in a chapter in Principles of Literary 
· 15 I ~Cr~i~t=i~c=i=sm= describes the naturali~tic theory of communication. 
- ,, 
'I He says that communication takes place when one- mind so acts 1 
in its environment that it influences another mind. In the 
other mind an experience occurs which is like the· experience 
in the first and c-aused in part by the first . 
Clarence I. Lewis in Mind and the World Order16 gives 
substantially the same theory as I. A. Richards in clearer 
and more scientific terms. He adds that we can communicate 
because we are creatures fundamentally alike and are confront-
ed by a common reality. /I 
James B:issett Pratt devotes a chapter to the subJect in /1 
~5. Richards, PLO, Chapter IV, 25-33. 
16. Lewis, MWO, Chapters IV-V, 90-153. 'ihese chapters are 
not specifically on communication, but Pratt gives· more 
space here to the sub~eot than anywhere else in the bqok. 
j 
! 
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his Personal Realism. 17 He accepts communication as the inter-
relationship between "finite mindS" in order to break down the 
theory of solipsism which he think~ is affir.med by absolute 
idealists. 
H. H. Price in like manner in "Our EVidence for the Exis-
tence of Other Minds"18 thinks that through communication we 
have evidence, if not conclusive proof, of the existence of 
other minds. He says that genuine communication is carried on 
by "means of intelligible symbols nl9 \Vhich furnish new infor-
mation and which can subsequently be verified. 
David Rynin, on the other hand, emphasizes the uniqueness 
of individual experience in "The Nature of Co~unication1120 
and makes a clear-cut distinction between the form and the 
fact of communication. He says that we cannot communicate 
facts, for facts are given in the content of private experi-
ence. ~Vhat is communicated is the form of a fact. Form is 
the type or 
17. 
18. 
19. 
20. 
21. 
••• set of entities falling within certain defined 
limits--the limits being generally defined by a 
similarity of the members of a set.21 
Pratt, PR, Chapter IX, 105-115. 
Price, Art. s. 
Ibid, 4~7. 
Rynin, Art. 9. 
Ibid, 515. 
8 
Words, the elements of language, express for.m alone and refer 
to types and not to specific content. Identity of content is 
not necessary for communication. Communication is possible 
when "following certain acts of one person, another responds 
in certain ways. 1122 Verification is important and can be ob-
tained by the observation of the behavior of the recipient. 
Several philosophers have emphasized the social value of 
communication. Edward Sapir has written the article on the 
subject in the Encyclopedia of Social Sciences. 23 He says 
that communication is a necessary factor for social process 
because society is the 
••• highly intricate network of partial or complete 
understandings between members of organizational units 
of every degree.24 
Thus every 
cultural pattern and every single act of social be-
havior involves communication in either an implicit 
or explicit sense.25 
Communication may take place by language, by the imitation of 
overt behavior (by acquiescing with the ways of society, 
one unconsciously is accepting the meaning inherent in cus-
22. Rynin, Art. 9, 512. 
23. Sapir, Art. 17. 
24. Ibid, 78. 
25. Loc. cit. 
9 
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toms), and by social suggestibili ty. Social suggestibili ty I 
is , subtle communication for by conventional modes of behavior , I 
I 
society is imposing meanings. 1 
Spaulding, in The World of Chance2~ gives a peculiar 
social i mpor tance to communication. He says that communica-
tion is the means of discovering a realm of common meanings 
independent of knowing minds. Words, spoken or heard, written 
and read , disclose the meanings. Consciousness is not abso-
lutely necessary to communication, but if not consciousness 
t hen, some sort of awareness or something to which meanings 
can be d isclosed. In every communication situation there are 
four elements: (1) Words or symbols which represent mean-
ings; (2) meanings or propositions. (Proposition is defined 
as a kind of entity t hat nconsistently allowsn a subject to 
"make" or "discover~ other propositions about them.)27 (3) 
Facts or events, and (4) consciousness or awareness of (a) 
symbols, (b) meani ngs, and (c) facts.28 
Dewey's theory of communication in both Experience and 
Nature29 and hi s new book Logic -- The Theory of Inguiry3o 
is much like Spaulding's. He, too, says that communication 
26. Spaulding, woe, Chapter I, 1-21. 
27. Ibid, 17. 
28. Loc· cit. 
29. Dewey, EN, Chapter V, 166-208. 
3o. Devrey, LOG. ChapteK_L, 1-22. 
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reveals a common reality, but he differs from Spaulding in 
making communication a condition of consciousness.31 Without 
consciousness communication would be impossible for communi-
OZ.2 cation is the noperational force ·ttu in social process . 
Language is the tool of communication and. through it culture 
is preserved and perpetuated.33 Man is distinguished from 
other animals by his ability to use organized, articulate 
speecn. 34 The common elements in language promote a community 
of action. 35co-operation becomes synonymous with communica-
tion. His theory is really summarized in the three-fold 
function which he attributes to language. First, language is 
the agency for the transmission of acquired habits and 
cultural institutions; second, it permeates both the form and 
content of social activity; and third, it develops a unique 
structure of its own which can be abstracted as form from the 
content of comm~ication.36 
Turning from these specifically philosophical accounts 
of communication, we are aware that more and more material is 
31. Dewey, EN, 187. 
32. Dewey, LOG, 48. 
33. Ibid, 2o. 
34. Dewey, EN, 168. 
35~ Ibid, 185. 
36. Ibid, 187. 
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written by p~chologists based on the results of experiments 
in the field of telepathy as a form of transferende of mean-
- ings from minds to minds. Though the conclusions of such ex-
• periments will be pertinent to a comprehensive study of com-
munication,we shall consciously omit any discussion of the 
subject in this paper. Enough solid and scientific work bas 
not been done to warrant acceptance or r e jection of t elepathy. 
We need more conclusive and positive evidence to establish an 
hypothesis. Work on the subject is in the experimental stage, 
and time is needed to sift the wheat from the chaff. At this 
time it will suffice to mention a few leading treatises to 
show the directions thought is taking on the subject. 
I 
i 
One of the most imposing and impartial works on telepathy I 
is that of John Edgar Coover who has summarized the results I 
of a research on thought transference conducted at Leland 
Stanford Junior University in 1917~7In this study he has 
given quotations by eminent scholars38 who think that there 
is some ground for believing the possibility of telepathy. 
At the same time he cites other equally .f .amous people39 who 
·say that the results of the experiments they have conducted 
37. Coover, EPR, 3-167. 
38. He lists such men as William James, Theodore Flournoy, 
James H. Hyslop, and Frank Podmore, to mention only a few. 
39. This group includes the following names, among others, 
Ivor Tuckett, J. Milne Bramwell, Simon Newcomb, G. Stanley 
Hall, and James R. Angell. 
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or witnessed do not warrant the acceptance or telepathy as an 
undeniable fact at the present time. 
In more recent times, the most signiricant and scientiric 
work on the subject has been done by J. B. Rhine and William 
McDouga1140 at Duke University. Upton Sinclair has done some 
rather convincing experiments with his wife. 41 He comes to the 
conclusion that telepathy is possible. On the other hand, 
Cox, who describes experiments conducted at Princeton Univer-
sity, says that the tabulated records show that nthere is no 
evidence of 42 extra-sensory perception." Professor Kellog, 
also, in an article in Scientiric Monthly43 , lists several 
reasons why he is doubtful about the positive results or the 
Duke experiments. He thinks that Proressor Rhine (1) under-
estimates the chances for high scores; (2) pays no attention 
to internal inconsistencies; (3) draws conclusions from select-
ed portions, and (4) does not realize that chances for a 
40. Rhine, NFM. This book gives the story or the Duke Univer-
sity experiments in rather popular language. In it are incor-
porated the substance of articles which appeared rrom time to 
time in recognizes scientiric and literary magazines. The ex-
periments have proved to be of such wide interest · that Prores-
sors McDougall and Rhine have rounded a quarterly, The Journal 
of Parapsychology, as an organ ror their rindings. 
41. Sinclair, MR. The book describes the experiments. 
42. Cox, Art. 1, 429-455. 
43. Kellog, Art. 4, 331-341. 
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tabulation of telepathy are not known, and therefore no sup-
posed evidence can be used. 
We wish to take no sides in the issue, but rather to 
leave the field open for further investigation, for 
Periculosum est credere et non credere ••• Erep 
exploranda est"veritas multum prius guam stulta 
praue iudicet sententia.44 
Another topic vitally connected with the subject of 
communication is that ·Of an analysis of the concept of 'mean-
ing', a growing interest among the logical positivists. Under 
the influence of the "Viennese Circle" lead by such men as 
Moritz Schlick, Rud_olph Carnap, Hans Hahn, and others, they 
are trying to establish a science of symbols through language~5 
as the instrument of interpretation. Such a science, once 
established, they think will do away with the ambiguity of 
the· term 9r:1eaning. •46 They have rejected all rationalism and 
metaphysics and have tried to rearrange empirical data 
mathematically so as to obtain more exact meanings. Although ; 
they are opposed to Kant, they have tried to unite form and 
conte.t;lt because they believe like Kant that "Gedanken ohne 
44. Phaedrus, Fables, III, 10:1, 5, 6. Paraphrase: It is 
dangerous either to believe or not to believe. Therefore truth 
must be sought di1igently; otherwise, loose thinking will make 
us judge falsely. 
45~ Ayer, LTL. This is a typical work of the logical positi-
vists. 
46. Infra, Chapter IV of this dissertation. Also, Ayer, LTL, 
85. 
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Inhalt sind leer, Anschauungen ohne Begriffe sind blind.n47 
The logical positivists have tried to combine the 
positivism of Ernst Mach, Boltzmann, and Br.entano with the 
mathemat~cal logic developed by Frege~ Russell, vVhitehead, 
Wittgenstein et al. However commendable their efforts .may 
be, they have not touched adequately the wide and inclusive 
term communication. They have talked a great deal about pro-
positions, predications, verifiabilty, symbol.s, language, but 
said very little about persons for whom the science is needed. 
They have attempted to avoi~ intellectualism, but in reality 
have produced an abstract theo17 that is intellectual par 
excellence. Logic alone cannot deal with the concept of 
meaning, for meaning cannot be abstracted from personality. 
If meaning does not inhere ·in persons (This is a mooted 
question), it is valid only for persons. What anything means 
depends upon who means it and for what purpose. As Urban 11 
has said: 
••••• language is not a piece of nature full-blown 
from the forehead of Zeus but rather an expression 
or embodiment of s pirit, not the product of mechani-
cal development but of creative activity.48 
47. Kant, KrV, B75, A5l. Cf • .Ayf3r~ 247. n ••• If science may 
be said to be blind v,ri thout philosophy, it is also true that 
philosophy is virtually empty without science. 11 
48. Urban, LR, 94. 
15 
Heretofore~ the discussion of language Qy philosophers 
has been too abstract and theoretical. We need a theory of 
communication which will integrate mind, symbols, meaning, 
and interpretation into a coherent whole. Ducasse has taken 
a lead in this direction by his theory of the tetratic re-
lation of meaning, where in every communication situation 
he shows the relationship of mind, symbols, symbols acting 
as cause, and symbols producing effe~t.49 More work needs to 
be done in the field. Perhaps the idealists will regain the 
foreground of philosophical criticism by putting persons into 
the pattern of symbolic logic developed by the logical posi-
tivists. 
49, Ducasse, Art. 23, 42-43. 
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CHAPTER II 
SOCIAL EXPERIENCE 
Communication is ~ social activity, and results rrom man's 
need for COoperation in the realization of Values. Therefore, 
our primary task in this chapter will be an analysis or the 
concept of social experience. To do this, we shall discuss 
first, some typical definitions or society; second, the causes 
underlying social cohesion--including the genetic progress of 
society; and third, the correlation of the steps of social 
evolution with the corresponding stages or the development or 
communication. 
Sociality is a natural state or life, not only because 
of the biological necessity of man to preserve his race, 1 
but also because of man's desire for mutual aid in the attain-
ment of the good life. 2 Aristotle has said that to be a man 
is to be social, 3 for "a social instinct is implanted to all 
1. Aristotle, Pol. I, 2:3. 
2. Loc. cit. 
3. Whitehead, RM, 108. Cf. "Every entity is in its essence 
social and requires society in order to exist." Individual 
man for Wbitehead is an entity, a concrete universal, a 
society, and hence a. real thing in exist·ence. He has said 
over and over again that "the real actual things that endure 
are all societies." AI, 262. 
men by nature."4 Royce and Whitehead have followed him in 
this. Note the similarity of ideas. Royce: 
All experience must be at least individual experience; 
but unless it is also social experience, and unless 
the whole ••• community which is in question unites 
to share it, this experience is but as sounding brass, 
and tinkling cymbal ••• It must be my Community, that 
in the end, saves me.5 
The deep-seated unity among all actual entities which is 
brought out by Whitehead in the following quotation may be 
taken as applying to sociality: 
••• Each actual entity is itself oply describable 
as in organic process. It repeats in microcosm what 
the universal is in macrocosm. It is a process pro-
ceeding from phase to phase, each phase being the 
real basis which its successor proceeds towards the 
completion of the thing in question.6 
Now communication is the instrument which shows the 
underlying unity of sociality. With it man makes his wants 
and ideals known to others in his social group.7 As Aristotle 
has said: 
The power of speech is intended to set forth the 
expedient and tge inexpedient, and likewise the just 
and the unjust. 
Communication is an effective tool in advancing the ends and 
4. Aristotle, M· I, 2:15. 
5. Royce, POC, I, xv1. 
6. Whitehead, PR, 327. 
7. cr. Hegel, ENG (POM), 486. 
8. Aristotle, Pol. I, 2:10. 
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aims of life. Man must live with o~hers in order to gain his 
interests -- protection, security, and pleasure. It is through 
communication that the many activities of men in social groups 
are coordinated and correlated, and the .need for cooperation 
expressed. Through communication man awakens in his fellow 
men a response for the achievement of reciprocal ends in an 
external, common world. Therefore, in order to understand man' 
relation to man which is manifested in communication, we must 
investigate the meaning of society, so as to consider the 
problems: What constitutes social experience~ · How does com- _ 
municati on arise"l 
It will be impossible obviously to exhaust the definitions 
advanced by all the thinkers in the various fields of thought. 
At best we can ' give some, chiefly from philosophical writers, 
to warrant a working hypothesis for our discussion of an 
epistemology of communication. 
The authorities consulted vary slightly in their defini-
tions of society; some stress the social aspects of group co-
operation, and others, the individual. Those who tend to 
make the group prior to the individual, such:" as : Aristo-tle·,. 
. 
Giddings, Baldwin, Hegel, Royce, Parsons, et al. emphasize the 
ethical implications of social life; while those whose primary 
interests center around the individual, like Sapir, Price, 
Dewey, etc., stress the communicational element of the con-
tact between minds. 
The most famous historical definition is perhaps that of 
19 
Aristotle. He says that "man is by nature a political9 ani-
mal," and by political animal he means a biological organism, 
possessing reason and living as an integral part of a group 
of others like him, the group being called a society. Each 
member of the group hopes, through participation of activity, 
to facilitate the attainment of happiness. 
Franklin Henry Giddings, the sociologist, emphasizes, 
like Aristotle, the pleasureable aspect of social cooperation. 
He defines society as a 
••• number of like-minded individuals who know and 
enjoy their lik e-mindedness, and are therefore able 
to work together for common ends.lO 
His definition is one which would suit the naturalistic phil-
osophers, but wer question the meaning of like-minded. Does he 
mean similar from a structural, or functional, or valuational 
point of view1 He would undoubtedly reply, From all points of 
view. Yet we wonder if like-minded can mean more than bio-
logical similarity. If so, many problems from the valuational 
point of view can be raised. The word is too ambiguous to be 
used in a definition without a great deal of ·explanation. 
9. Aristotle, f21· I , 2:9-10. In the Greek language there is 
no equivalent for the English word society. To Aristotle, 
the poli t ical man was one who participated in the life of a 
polis, or city-state. It was this which constituted his so-
ciality or humanity. (Cf. Parsons, Art. 18, in Seligman, 
ESS, Vol. I, 225-232.} 
10. Giddings, ECS, 6. 
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Baldwin, in the Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology, 
defines the word in several ways, one of which is particularly 
I a pplicable to t his study. He says that society is "a social 
I 
II 
I group characterized by some degree of r eflective and voluntary 1 
I co-operation. nil The emphasis in this is on t he vo~untary 
1
1 
I aspec~ of social life, an idea found 1n Rousseau, Mill, Royce, ~ 
·j and others. Parsons in the Encyclopedia of Social Science 
says that he cannot be too specific in his definition- Soci-
ety, for him, is nthe whole complex of the relation of man to 
his fellows.n12 Then he proceeds to talk about types of soci-
. 
ety. 
Hegel, one of the most phenomenal minds of all times, 
takes several volumes to define or evaluate society. All the 
phases of the dial ectic movement of the universe must be 
understood before it can be said t hat a definition has been 
given. ~n order to show his views of man. in s ociety, we shall 
attempt a brief summary of his ideas on the subject.13 For 
Hegel, man, the organic atom of society, is essent i ally mind 
struggling for consciousness and freedom. In his native 
egoism, he is mind-subjective, governed by animal passions 
~ 11. Baldwin, D~P, .543. 
~ 12. Pa:r;sons, Art. 181 in .~ Selfgman, Ess, Vol.XIV, 225-232~ 
13. Cf • . Hegel, ENC (POM), 483ff. 
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and instincts. At this time there is little consciousness of 
self or othe~, only mere blind, but necessary groping for 
I objectivity. Gradually, through evolutionary processes, man 
I 
I 
gains consciousness, and realizes that there is reason and 
value in the universe. As consciousness increases, he di~--
covers that value is the common property of all, and in order !/ 
II !· to gain freedom, for him-self, he must limit his own action 
for the welfare of others.14 The law of freedom is a law for 
I 
I 
all. He must lose himseLf to find himself. Through self-im- l1 
posed limitations of reason, man begins to become mind-object- / 
ive, the highest empirical attainment, the social mind. The 
The absolute mind is the space and time representation of the 
' II 
IDEE., the ultimate goal of the dialectic process. The object- I 
15 
ive mind is "die absolute Idee, aber nur an sic h seiend." 
When the objective mind is attained, duty is born. "Die Ges-
sellschaft ist dagegen vielmehr der zustand, in welchem allein 
das Recht seine Wirklichkeit hat.nl6 And right for Hegel has 
the force of duty or obligation. Thus, he makes man's mind 
irreducibly social, and shows that the whole movement of life 
is a ceaseless effort to establish a connecting link between 
14. Note that here we have the voluntary aspect of social 
mentioned und.er Baldwin. 
15. Hegel, ENC (POM), 483. 
16. Ibid, 5o2. 
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the self and the other, or the self and the universe. For him, 
intelligible communication is the visible sign of this effort}? 
Turning to those who have defined society from the point 
of view of the individual, we find that they are more concern-
ed with meanings, and ideas, than with the ethical problems 
of gr oup life or the dialectic necessity of social progress. 
This is very evident in Price and Dewey who make communication 
a prerequisite of society. Price says that " ••• Society is a 
set of minds which talk to one another."l8 "All human exper-
ience", continues Dewey in the same vein, "is ultimately 
social; that is it involves contact and communication. nl9 In 
another place he writes: 
Even if 1 society 1 was as much as some writers have 
held, it would not on that account be society. In-
teraction, transactions, occur de facto and the re-
sults ' of interdependence follow. But participation 
in activities and sharing in results from additive 
concerns. They demand communication ••• 20 
The definition given by Sapir is perhaps the most com-
prehensive of those cited, for in it he unites the elements 
stressed by the others, at the same time adding the idea of 
'organization'. He says that society is the "highly intricate 
1?. C:f. Babcock, .MSA, 80-82. 
18. Price, Art. 6, 451. 
19. Dewey, EE, 32. 
20. Dewey, PIP, 152. 
23 
ll l 
I 
I 
II 
I 
I 
----- - -··----·-----·----·-------------·-·-
network of partial or complete understanding bet~een members 
of organizational units of every degree. n 2'- Combined in this 
is the fact of will, suggested by the concept 'understanding' 
rl 
and the vwrd 'organization,' presented by Baldwin and others, 1 
and the idea of meaning, advanced by Dewey and Price. 
The definitions given indicate sociality to be an unde-
niable faet of experience, but there is some differences of 
I 
I 
I' 
I 
opinion as to the ultimate causes of social cohesion. Some, 
like Aristotle and Giddings, stress the psychological factors; ! 
others, like Hegel, the logical, and still others, like Royce, ! 
the religious and ethical. On the whole, however, the dialect~ I! 
icians, Hegel, Royce, and Baldwin, though they nmy be partial 
to one particular aspect, yet, when they have developed their 
ideas of society, have in reality combined all three forms. 
We shall discuss each type of factors in turn; emphasizing 
the evolutionary or genetic aspect of social progress, be-
lieving that to be the most coherent. 
/! 
Alexander is one of the chief exponents of psychological j 
I factors as the underlying grounds for social activity. He 
says tha t sociality is an emotion arising out of the grega-
rious li1stinct. The emotional feeling acts as a pointer, and 
makes us see other people as like ourselves; the feeling is 
reciprocated. Note his statement on the matter: 
21. Sapir, Art. 17, 78. 
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••••• We do not experience the satisfaction of the 
instinct of sociality till we have the experience 
that the creatures towards vrhich we act socially 
reciprocate our action, either by co-operation or 
rivalry. The emotion of sociality is a double-
sided one; it tal~:es two p.ersons to make friends or 
t wo persons to make a quarr el. \Vi thout the in-
stinctive response we should seek nothing from the 
other; without t he co-operation, we should not be 
aware of him in the fullest sense as our f ellow ••• 
Without this reciprocation, our instinctive action 
would not have its peculiar flavour. Our social 
feeling towards him is the divination that he is 
like ourselves; his ~eciprocation confirms it and 
makes it assurance.2 
II 
To carry his point, he gives several examples which sound 
convincing. He says that we feel more tenderness to·ward a 
child than a soft cushion; we t end to show mor e affection 
toward people who seem warm in their sympathies, t han toward 
cold, unres ponsive ones. Grasping a hand tha t r esponds is a 
more vital experience than gras ping an unresponsive piece of 
clay. 23 The reaction is found even in animals •. If a bone rolls 
away from a dog, he runs after it and picks it up; but when 
another dog , or a man, takes the bone, the dog growls.24 I 
At the same time, Dr. Bronislaw Malinowski, Profe ssor of II 
Anthropology in the London School of Economics, thinks that 
this desire for reciprocated social action is so necessary in 
22. Alexander, STD, II, 33-36. 
23. Loc cit. 
24. Loc. cit. 
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11 life, that man has built up a sphere of communication, which 
I' is more or less meaningless except to give assurance of the 
I 
I 
presences of other persons. For example such expressions as: 
~~ere are you? Oh, there you are. Hello. How are you? What 
are you doing? Are you there? spring from man's desire for 
sociality. Pr0fessor Malinowski terms them "phatic communi-
cations.n25 Out .of the breaking of silence the first bonds 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
II I, 
of fellowship are established and become a mode for action--- /1 
the g:::f:::o:~:D:~:::v::~::sg::::r::~s:::::::ski that the j 
gregarious instinct is the foundation of sociality, 27 but he tJ 
I 
does not think that the instinct is the whole cause. He says 
I 
II 
sympathy, suggestibility, and imita.tion.28 Sympathy binds the 1/ 
that sociality is a highly complex development involving 
'i 
members of a group tog.ether, and renders the action of all ,, 
ttharmonious and allows them to reap some of the prime advan- II 
I 
I! 
!I 
tages of social life in spite of lack of intelligence.n29 
Suggestibility and imitation are correlates; imitation is the 
25. Ogden and Richards, MOM, 296-336. Supplement I, written 
by Professor Malinowski. 
26. Loc. cit. 
27. McDougall, SP, 90. 
28. Ibid, 96. 
29. Loc • cit. · 
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process by which the ideas coming through suggestion are 
assimilated and copied. 30 
The three elements of social life, sympathy, suggestibi-
lity, and imitation, cannot in a strict sense be called in-
stincts, says Prof~ssor McDougall. They are emotions arising 
I from instincts and closely allied with them. 31 :z'he definitions /j 
of the terms show the close relationship. 
And: 
When an affective or emotional excitement of the 
agent induces a similar affective excitement in the 
patient, the process is~~ne of sympathetic induction 
of emotion and feeling.'-' 
VVhen some presentation, idea or belief of the agent 
directly induces a similar presentation or idea or 
b~lie~3in the patient, the process is one of sugges-tJ.on. 
Again: 
Sugges.tion is a process of collimunication resulting 
in the acceptance with conviction of the communicated 
proposition in the absence g! logically adequate 
grounds for its acceptance. · 
we feel that there should be some distinction made between 
30. M~Dougall, SP, 105-106. 
31. Ibid, 93-94. 
32. Ibid, 94. It is interesting to note that Alexander uses 
the term 'appreciation' in a similar way. Cf. Alexander STD, 
II, 239ff. 
33. Loc. cit. 
34. Ibid, 100. 
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emotions and instincts, particularly in the face of the fact 11 
I! 
that the existence of instincts is questioned today. 1! 
II We have given, perhaps, enough evidence, to indicate the Jl 
trend which the discussion of psychological factors in social I 
experience takes. More will be said on the subjec t in t he 
section on the genetic development of social life, for the J 
evolutionary theory accepts the psychological factors as valid I 
ground for the early stages of socia l progress. /1 
Before turning to our next topic , i -t v..'i ll be interesting / 
to mention i ncidently the theory of Gerald Heard, whose crit-
-
icisms of social suggestibility and religion as the causes of 
social cohesion are pertinent at this point. In brief, he 
rejects the idea of social suggestibility, which he t h inks is 
the result of habit and custom, because experience shows that 
society is always in a flux. Social suggestibility could only 
keep society together provided that society made no changes, 
for only then can the "unquestioned, and indeed untaught mon-
ition of custom •• mould each i ndividual without his being 
conscious he was being moulded.n35 
We question the meaning of "untaught monition," but let 
us go on. He- gives a less plausible reason for rejecting 
religion as the ultimate cause f or gr oup association. 
· That religion has a very large social substance and 
that one of the chief reasons for the survival of 
religions, whose cosmology and theology have been 
I 
II 
I' 
I 
i! I 
--~=+ 35. Heard, SOC, 194. 
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discredited, is the social satisfaction the coming I 
together of a congregation can give ••• is, I think 
now accepted by most sociologists. Further, the ' 
more modern sociologists allow, and I feel sure are 
right in allowing, that this satisfaction is not 
rational but arises from the assuaging of psycholo-
gical needs which exist now in the subc onsciousness. 
Part of the spirit of self-conscious i ndividual is 
neither self-conscious nor individual but requires 
a lineage with his fellows in order that be may be 1 
whole •••••• Nevertheless religion--the meeting to-
gether of individuals to r ecite formularies and share / 
traditional r ites--is not itself suffieient cause 
for social cohesion, though it may assist such co-
hesion. Formularies increasingly either effect, or 
perhaps worse, are f elt to be completely irrelevant 
to modern emotional needs and intellectual opinions.36 
At this point his criticism is not sound; his definition 
of religion is too narrow. Religion is something more than 
the reciting of "certain common formularies." To be sure 
reciting may be done, but beyond the reciting there is sig-
nificant meaning for each individual which is of aid in mak-
ing him"whole." The religious experience is something more 
than the mere habit of sound; it is a conscious and cognitive 
experience37 embracing the elements found in all experience--
feeling, wi~~ing, thinking , and doing ~8 The essence of r e~ig- ~ 
ion is fellmvship and in many churches t hi s aspect is so j 
I 
I 
.clearly recognized that actually more time is spent illl dis- / 
cussing social problems than purely religious· ones .. In such 
I 
i 
churches a minimum time, therefore-., is allowed for nform~ 
36. Heard, SOC, 15-16. 
37. Knudson, VRE, 56. 
38. Ibid, 25. 
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I ulariesn which "either increasingly offend or perhapsworse 
are felt to be completely irrelevant" because of the growing 
interest in present world problems. Nevertheless, in spite of 
our critid:.ism of Mr. Heard's theory, v.;e assent that religion 
is not the ultimate cause for social cohesion, despite its 
social nature; religion is an effect rather than a cause. It 
is a result of man's need for values and society rather than 
the s pring of that need. God is another problem and in view 
I of the vastness of the scope, must be considered apart from 1 
purely empirical considerations. This does not, however, mean I 
to imply that God cannot be approached from· .an empirical 
point of view, nor that the problem of God does not have 
social implications. To continue, after rejecting both re-
ligious and social suggestibility, Heard advances a unique 
theory, which, though supposedly psychological, reaches a 
metaphysical status. He says that the subconscious of each 
individual is a part of a larger whole or self, and is the 
common meeting ground of all minds. In the recognition of this 
larger self, we are united and made one with the universe and 
with our fellow men. 39 ~ 
Heard's treatment coupled with the consideration of socia 
unity from a purely psychological point of view, shows that 
I 
I 
something more than a bare abstraction such as a subconscious, 
39. Heard, SOC, 17. 
I' 
30 
I 
or instincts giving rise to emotions~ or social suggestibility, 
or imitation, is needed to account for all forms of group liv-
ing. We find throughout life, various levels of social co-
operation, and we must, therefore, look for a theory of the 
grounds for group activity which will explain these group 
!I 31 
II 
1 levels. Perhaps there are several types of causes underlying 
I 
.I 
the structure of society? We get a clue of this from the soci-
ure of society and present an evolutionary or genetic view of 
in philosophy embodying the principles of the genetic theory of 
social development in their systems. Baldwin has, perhaps, giv- I 
en the clearest and most rational treatment of the genetic 
development of society.40 We shall attempt to give a brief 
outline of ·his theory and then to show the logical i mplication 
through references to the social dialectic found in Hegel, and 
finally to correlate the problem of communication with the 
various stages of social -evolution. 
In any generic discussion of social groupings, we must 
keep in mind the distinction between the word solidarity41 
and the word community. 42 Up to now, we have used them inter-
40. Baldwin, IS, Chapter II, 33-58. 
41. Ibid, 33. 
42. Ibid, 34. 
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changeably. Solidarity refer s to the external and objective 
factors of social relationshi ps.43 Community has a more psy-
chological and logical connotation and denotes the "mutuality 
and commonness of knowledge and acti on in the minds of t he 
i nd i viduals concerned." 44The first ter m refer s to a social-
ity which arises from the heredity which is "the product of 
biological laws;n45 the second, to the solidarity which comes 
from social heredity46 and individual evaluationa l thinking . 
In t he process of civilization there is a "progressive 
develo pment in actual social organization,u47 and in this 
development, we find three types48 of social cohesion; t he 
first is primarily physical, and results in social solidarity; 
11 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
,I 
II 
I' I 
the l ast t wo are chiefly psy chological, and resul t in community 
.I 
These three types ar e not isolated phases of life, but are 1 
intrinsically "related to one another.n49 For purposes of 
43. Baldwin, IS, 2?4. 
44. Ibid, 35. 
45. Ibid, 38. 
46. I bid, 42. 
47. Ibid, 35. 
48. Ibid, 36. 
49. Ibid, 35. I ,, 
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analysis, we shall distinguish them, and thus show the con-
tribution of each to social life as a whole. 
Fir st, there is the instinctive or what might be called 
the gregarious mode of association which springs from the bio-
logical functions of life and is "innate, rmintelligent, un-
progressive, but deep-seated and very uniform in action."&> 
Family, sexual, maternal, and racial instincts are classified 
in this group. 51Because of these instincts, people show the 
tendency to seek fellowship and to pursue activities in asso-
ciation with others. Activities resulting from-these instincts 
do not have to be learned; experience is not -necessary; habits 
do not have to be acquired. Vfuen the necessary environmental 
conditions are present the mode of action is supplied.52 
The second type is mainly psychological and is called the / 
plastic or spontaneous mode. This includes the "processes of 
imitation, suggestion, contagion, s pontaneous union in common 
experience and action. "53 In this type we get collective ac.tio 
50. Baldwin, IS, 40. I 
51. We are aware that modern psychol~gists tend to eliminate 
1
1 
many of the instincts from- man's nature, -but we will accept 
Baldwin's idea until much more convincing_ work has been done. 
Anyvvay, the word tendency which is usually adopted in place of 
instincts in contemporary psychological thought, functions in 
much the same way as instincts. 
52. Baldwin~37. 
53. Ibid, 44. 
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which must be learned through trial and error, and from which 
arise . "quasi-social impulses" of play, rivalry, competition, , 
and i mitation. 54 Plastic action has t vvo effects on individuals· ' 
. , 
jj it furnishes them the stimulation which comes from competition 
,, 
II 
with other individuals, and also acts as a stabilizing force 
through social demands for conformity • 
• • • • • This .plastic learni ng is an agency of conformity, 
conservation, stability, and solidarity. The i ndividu-
al does not go by this method beyond what the group 
life has al ready acquired; his learning is limited to 
tradition ••••• Other individuals enter directly i n to 
the psychological and social situation, in the mi nd of 
each; and these others furni sh the essential stimulu-
lation. Each responds to each through their mental 
part.55 
The third type or mode is called the reflective, which is 
the truly social form. It is in thi s type that community is 
achieved because of "intelligent acts of co-operation.n56 In-
stinct and f eeling are supplanted by a real unity of the in-
dividual with society through reflective, r esponsible think-
ing. 
54. 
55. 
56. 
57. 
As the individuals grow more compet~nt personally, 
they also become more intimately organized socially. 
The growth of the individual 11 ego 11 involves the rec-
ognition of the social "alter," and establishes a 
conscious relation between them. The resulting 
solidarity is that o~7conscious intention and voi-untary co-operation. 
Baldwin, IS, 41. 
Ibid, 43-44. 
Ibid, 46. 
Ibid, 49. 
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Here we have a picture of the concrete universal of Hegel, 
of Royce, of Whitehead which was pointed out in the earlier 
part of the chapter. To repeat, a concrete universal is a 
whole composed of parts which are inter-related, and actively 
engaged in fulfilling a common purpose; the activity is carried 
on with the help of the principle of negativity which unites 
being and non-being; the unity, however, is not complete as-
similation; there is always a tension of duality which pre-
serves the difference in the like. "It must be my Community 
which in the end saves me", 58 says Royce. And Whitehead, 
"Every entity is in its essence social and requires society 
in order to exist." 59 It is in this stage of activity that 
the impulses of altruism-- generosity and sympathy-- are 
born. 
Whitehead, though he does not admit it, and Royce, are 
both undoubtedly influenced by Hegel who might be called the 
father of social dialectics. All three essentially hold to 
the s~ne theo~J that society is process, is organic, and is 
purposive. The following typical passage from Hegel can be 
duplicated in the writings of the others, and shows that 
••• Alles Wirkliche, in sofern es ein Wa.hres ist, 
ist die Idee, und hat seine Wa.hrheit allein durch 
und kraft der Idee. Das einzelne Sein ist irgend 
eine Seite der Idee ••• "60 
58. Royce, POC, I, xvi. 
59. Whitehead, RM, 108. 
60. Hegel, ENC (Logic), 213. 
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Der realisierte Zweck 1st so die gesetzte Einheit 
des Subjektiven und Objektiven. Diese Einheit 1st 
aber wesentlich so bestimmt, dass das Subjektive und 
Objektive nur nach ihrer Einaeitigkeit neutralisiert 
und aufgehoben, aber das Objektive dem Zwecke ala dem 
freien Begriffe und dadtU~ch der Macht uber dasselbe 
unte~vorfen und gemass gemacht 1st. Der Zweek erha~t 
sich gegen und in dem Objektiven, well, ausserdem 
dass er das einseitige Subjektive, das Besondere 1st, 
er auch das konkrete Allgemeine, die an sich seiende 
Identitat beider 1st.61 
It is this unity of the individual with society on a high 
place of "common intelligence and joint volition1162 that forms 
the bond for social cooperation.63 
To us, the reflective social consciousness is the basis 
of social interaction. The first, the gregarious instinctive 
type cannot be called a real social bond because the instincts 
will not necessarily promote cooperation. In cooperation the 
action of will is basic. In the first type of group solidari- I 
ty, the element of will is missing. In this stage associations 
arise only from blind feeling. Each individual acts as "his 
nervous structure dictates.n64 
61. Hegel, ENC (Logic), 210. 
62. Baldwin, IS, 49. 
63. Loc. cit. F'ootnote. Baldwin says that the idea of the 
reflective social consciousness is not "widely accepted." He 
cites as an example of its rejection "the very learned auth-
oritative work in Spanish by Posada, Introduction to Sociolo-
~~ Vol. I of Princi£les of Sociology. 
64. Ibid, 60. 
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The second, the plastic type is, also, inadequate for 
i ntelligent group associa tion. Unl ess there is self-limitaton 
and self-control through rational thinking, the i ndividuals 
in this second group are likely to waver from one value to 
another, or to be "hypnotized by a demagogue,u65 or to accept 
the hit. or miss suggestions given to them by an unthinking 
social group. Only in the reflecti ve type is ther e real unity / 
because of the critical judgements of intelligent individuals. I 
However, as we have sa i d before, we must not conclude that 
these three types are separa te unities. In every instance of 
social groupings, we find a·n three forms in existence al thouglbl 
in some historical periods one type may predominate over the I 
others. Nevertheless in all social movements: 
••••• The play of brute biological forces, the in-
fluence of convention and social habit, as well as 
intelligent self-control ·is seldom quite lacking.o6 
Even in individual develvpment, we find all three to-
gether. Each individual has a body with more or less strong 
instinctive tendencies, and each individual at times acts 
from the impulse of emotions arising through social suggestion 1 
I and ·each individual is in a sense a society, a concrete uni-
versal, a person, whos e highest thoughts are governed by 
reason and who pursues worthwhile objectives in the course of / 
65. Baldwin, IS, 61. 
66. Ibid, 53. 
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his life. The power of reas on is the cohering force in a re-
flective society. Religion, morality, and government, the end 
results of social processes, are brought about through the 
activity of reason. 
Now the soundness of these three different stages of 
social progress, the instinctive or gregarious, the plastic 
or spontaneous, and the reflective, is exemplified by the three 
similar stages of the development of communication, the imi-
tative or behavioral, the plastic or lower intelligible, and 
the reflective or higher intelligible. 67 Before discussing 
67. Cf. Urban, Art. 16, for a view of the development of com-
munication which closely correlates with this theory of the 
genetic development of society, though Urban himself would 
hesitate to align his theory with the sociological development. 
He says that community to him is more of a metaphysical con-
cept than a sociological one, and he criticizes Royce for not 
making a clearer distinction between them. " ••• It was a dis- , 
tinct disservice to philosophy when Royce, under the influence 
of the Psychologismus and Sociologismus of his time over-
emphasized the sociological in his description ••• ~~~~01 There 
is a confusion in Urban's theory between a metaphysical con-
cept of community as a transcendental whole, similar to the 
theory of those who speak of the Absolute (Hegel, Royce) or 
the Oversoul (Spaulding), and the transcendental unity of the 
self as individual. identity. Note the following quotations: 
"··· It is impossible to understand speech or intelligible com-
munication in all its significance, without widening the 
notion of community and communication into a metaphysical con-
ception." [585] "The miracle of language, as we have come to 
understand it, has precisely in the fact that it is elliptical-
that so much more is understood than is expressed. It is pre-
cisely the range of this mutual understanding, of this a priori 
mutuality of mind, that ne cessitates some transcendental 
theory." (578) It is jus:t :this desire for a transcendental 
unity to account for the mutuality of minds that makes Gerald 
Heard posit the subconscious as the bond of unity. Toward the 
end Urban says that communication is possible because the self 
is capable of transcending its own immediate experiences, of 
bridging gaps, such as those found in elliptical language. We 
38 
this aspect of the J. roblem, we must consider the questi on, 
How is social experience revealed?, the answer to which will 
show the nec essary relationship of communication to social 
experi ence. 
A clue to the answer to the problem is g iven in the defi-
ni tion of langu age. Language is the ou vuard and visible s i c,n 
of shared experience and gives evidenc e of sociality . It is 
the bridge between what might b e called existence and essence 
or meanings found in experience. Throue;h language, the flux 
of experience is turned into ob jective and operative meanings, 
ob j ective in the sense that meanings are made common to both 
s peaker and rearer, and refer to thing s which can be socially 
useful for a community of action to vard a cmmnon enct. 68 
Ess enc e in tbis coP~ection is the vocalized meaning. 69 
Sapir defines language as a "purely human and non-instinc-
tive method of communicating ideas, emotions, and desires by 
means of voluntarily produced symbols."70 Language, thus, 
is shown to grow out of soci al needs, and once a language is 
think that Urban intends to accept both a transcendental unity 
of the universe as a whole , and also the idea of the trans-
cendental perception of the self, but he has not clearly dis-
tinguished between the t wo. 
68. Dewey , EN, 167. 
69. Ibid, 182. 
70. Sapir, LAN, 7. 
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formed, the way is opened for new possibilities of gaining 
value~ Language "creates demands which take effect and the 
effect • • • extends to the cormnon life in communication. rr71 
72 Language really becomes an institution of life and is a key 
for the revelation of social experience. Through intelligible 
communication we become aware of the dialectic unity inherent 
in society. The social process is essentially a process of 
realizing the self and the other. For instance, to know one-
self as a neighbor, it is necessary to know the other as 
someone distinct, a knowledge which is gained through the 
interchange of ideas which reveal comparison and difference. 
Ames has brought this idea out clearly in the following quo-
tation, and shows the correlation of communication with the 
concrete universal. 
Thought is not a subjective process within the -head 
of an individual orgm ism. 'Ihought is bound up with · 
language, and language is a social fact ••• Minds .-•• 
are more fluid than human bodies. They interact and 
participate in ideas and emotions ••• Meanings are 
transmittable ••• It is of the very nature of ideas 
to be communicable and to be group possessions. They 
are events in time, but they are not isol~ted. Any 
idea is continuous with other ideas and is a partial 
definition of a continuum of experience. There are no 
individual histories. Each is an aspect of a flowing 
stream (73] and can be singled-·out, and des-cribed 
only within a social process. 74 
71. Dewey, EN, 167. 
72. Loc. cit. 
73. Cf. Whitehead, PR, 32, 65, 125, 228, 236; AI, 284, 251. 
74. Ames, REL, 135-139. 
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Because language shows the continuum of experience, and 
I because we know that experience assumes lower and hi gher 
forms, such as experiences of perception, experiences of 
,, 
I 
understanding, and experiences of r eason, there are correspond ! 
ing forms of communication. Urban gives t wo main classifica-
tions---the behavioral, the language of signs and ge.stures, 
and the linguistic, the language of intelligible communication 
through words.75 This is a l ead in the r i ght direction, but 
we feel ·that some distinction should be made between the low-
er and the higher forms of linguistic corarnunication. A vast jl 
group of people simply use language as a means of satisfying 
their wants and expressing their needs; while in contrast to 
this group, scientists, philosophers, religious l eaders, and 
artists make a more reflective use of language . To tbem 
languag e is a tool of understanding a larger universe than 
their immediate selves, and the narrow world which is en-
circled by their wants and needs. To the fir s t group, verifi-
cation of fact would be primarily one of confirmation through 
approval and disapproval of their fellow men; to the second, 
verification would be confirmation through coherence, the 
fitting of all facts and principles into one systematic 
whole through observation, analysis, and comparison. We feel 
therefore, in order to show a parallel of progr ess of 
communication with the three-fold classification of the 
I 
I 
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genetic progress, and in order to give a more precise treat-
ment, communication should be divided into three classes, 
(1) behavioral, (2} low~r intelligible, and (3} higher in-
telligible.76 
Let us illustrate each type of communication at this 
point by a concrete example. The language of a small child 
represents the first type. When a baby tugs at the skirts of 
his mother and cries urgently, pointing to the faucet, 
11Wa-a-ter! W-a-a-ter", he is using behavioral language and 
is trying to say that he is thirsty and would like a drink of 
water. The gestures in this instanc e are as important and 
necessary as the words he usesor the sounds he makes. For 
an illustration of the second type, let us take an incident of 
language transaction by the same child when he is a little 
older. He comes running into the house from play and ex-
claims, 11Mother, I'm dying from thirst. May I have a drink of 
lemonade"Z" 11 No, Son," replies the mother, "I am saving the 
lemonade for supper. Dad is bringing a guest · home. Go and 
drink a glass of nice, cold water." Here we have a type of 
communication which is most common, the lower intelligible, 
involving the interchange of meanings found in every day 
speech. Again the language of the same boy may be used for 
76. This classification is implied by Urban in his treatment 
of the naturalistic theory of language (572-578) and the 
transcendental (578-588). However, he is not explicit in the 
matter, and becomes too metaphysical in his criticism of the 
various fonns. 
the third type of communication. This time he is in the high 
school laboratory experimenting. He walks up to his instruc-
tor and says, "Sir, I have the formula for water. It is H20. 11 
This is an elementary example of the higher intelligible com-
munication, the language of scientific or reflective thought. 
The first type is merely a language of behavior and is 
carried on through gestures and simple sounds which have 
definite instinctive meanings. The language is based upon the 
emotional nature of man, and the referential element in it is 
simply the principle of similarity 77 which originates fr.om the 
physical inheritance of the race. 
The second fonn results from the social inheritance of 
a group, and corresponds to the plastic or spontaneous type 
of social cohesion. In this, we have a higher form of com-
munication. Gestures become fewer, and sounds increase.; 
understanding78 is obtained through words. In the exercise 
of .understanding, the relation of the like and unlike is 
considered. There is comparison with accepted universals 
through similarity of reference which is based upon the 
77• Urban, Art. 14, 569. 
78. There is a close correlation in our use of the word with 
that of Hegel, who calls it the function of the mind in the 
realm of essence, the realm where differentiation abounds, 
and comparison is necessary to get mea~ing or some d~gree of 
truth. 
43 
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objective elements of value, not merely physical inheritance. ,
1 
The relevant from the irrelevant is separated. Verbal lan-
guage transactions evolve which to Urban is the root of 
intelligible communication. 
All life -- including the life of art and science 
goes back to the question of speech, the medium 
through which we communicate, but intelligible 
communication, in its fullest m~aning and extent, is 
possible only through language.'79 
In Ogden and Richards we find an agreement to Urban's 
ideas. 
A communication or language transaction is a use of 
symbols in such a way that acts of reference occur 
in the bearer which are similar in all relevent 
respects to saose which are symbolized b.r them in 
the speaker. -
The presence of nniversals which help to bring about 
the understanding of meani ngs, produces in the language 
situation a "tacit recognitionn 81 of common elements, the 
public nature of which reveals the mutuality of mind, 82 the 
like-mindedness of creatures communicating. Note the statement 
79. Urban, Art. 14, 594. 
80. Ogden and Richards, MOM, 205. 
81. Urban, Art. 14, 57o. 
82. It is interesting to note that the publicity of experienc 
is based upon different grounds for different thinker~. Urban 
attributes -it to the transcendental elements of experience, 
most personalists to the objectivity of values, Heard to the 
subconscious, Perry to neutral entities, etc. / 
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by Urban: 
We may say then that the similarity of reference 
which makes the lower intelligible communication 
possible includes (a) similarity of referent, but 
also (b) similarity of context or of the universe 
of discourse. apeaker and hearer cannot understand 
each other unles.s they recognize the same universe 
of discourse and mutually acknowledge the presup-
positions which constitute or determine that uni-
verse.83 
A quotation from Spaulding, at this point, is also apropos: 
Bare similarity is not enough, and certain specific 
similarities do not explain. One might as well main-
tain, ~~ that the Earth and Mars are in communi-
cation because they are similar as planets, as main-
tain that I am in communication with you and you with 
me, because my ideas ••• are like yours;, as ideas; in 
respect to, ~~ their vividness, thei·r duration, 
etc. etc. There is only one S£ecific similarity that 
does explain, and that is the similarity which is · 
present when two mental processes, be these ideas, 
or judgments, or series of judgments, are each as 
awareness of exactly the same meaning (s) or proposi-
tion (s). But there are then, (a) the two or more · 
awareness, (b) the fact of the specific similarity, · 
and (c) that which this specific similarity involves, 
namely the oneness of the m~aning.84 
In these quotations is shown clearly the for.m the second 
type of communication takes, but in them we find also the 
ger.m of systematic connection of part to a whole, which is 
the core of the third, or higher intelligible type of com-
munication and corresponds to the reflective stage of genetic 
development of society. 
83. Urban, Art. 14, 569. 
84. Spaulding, woe, 13. 
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In the third type there is a combination of what we find 
in the other two forms with the addition of a purposive 
element. The purposive aspect is something more than a mere 
intentionality of meaning found in the use of words, but a 
coherent recognition of all the experiences of the individual 
and contains meaning "variable in the speaker and hearer."85 
The crux of this form of communication is the mutuality of 
mind. 86 
In the reflective growth ••••• we make ourselves in-
telligible to one another by speech so that external 
objects described by one part are brought before the 
mind of the other. Mutual understanding by speech 
in reference to objects common to us is the most 
pervasive experience of reciprocity; and to this is 
added the direct description of our own mind to 
another person. On the speculative side we have co-
operation of many minds in the pursuit of knowledge 
or science. On the practical side we have the combin-
ation of wills in conduct, with its judgments of the 
kinds of action which make common intercourse tol-
erable and good. Moral judgments and scientific 
agreement are the highest expression of the existence 
of other minds which8~e experience [8?] and on this level "acknowledge. Tt 
On this level of corrmunication, the tacit recognition89 
85. Urban, Art. 14, 569. 
86. Supra, p. 34-38 in this dissertation. 
8?. The word 'directly' is omitted. Alexander believes in 
the knowledge of other minds through direct experience which 
he terms enjoyment. We shall discuss that problem in the 
next chapter, and hence do not wish to bring it up at this 
point. 
88. Alexander, STD, 36-3?. 
89. Supra, p. 39ff. of this dissertation. 
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of the publicity of objects, is so strongly established, 
that symbols as mere pointers to meanings, grow less and less j 
important, and the meanings in symbols revealed through mind, I 
more and more impor tant. Language becomes elliptic; nmore is II' 
understood than expressed. 1190 The clich~s heard every day I 
are commonplace examples lounge-lizard, life-wire, cocky, 
softy, Red, Reactionary, etc. Consider the one word, Hello. 
In this single expression, we find many meanings, all based 
on common experiences. Bello may mean: "I see you; you are 
standing in space within sound of my voice; I am- glad to see 
you. How are you? You are an individual. It is a long time 
since I saw you last.n The meanings can be multiplied depend-
ing upon the tanal expressions. We might get evidence of 
s~prise, fright, expectancy, pleasure, displeasure, etc. In 
elliptical languag e we are aware of a mind at work , capable 
I 
., 
I 
I 
I 
of bridging gaps bet ·>'~een the symbols given and the meanings 
intended. Without the power of transcendency of t he self, vrhi '·h 
gives it unity, elliptical language would not be possible, 
for elliptical language shows gaps in the movement of 
j experience, and the mind br i dges gaps which may be either 
I of s pace or time. Each idea not expressed in time, but 
I 
90. Urban, Art. 14, 578. Cf. also Whit ehead, CN, 8-11. 
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implied shows the mind moving from the now, the expressed, to 
the then, the unexpressed. This movement also indicates a 
change of space, for the then must necessarily occupy a 
different position, as well as a different span of time from 
the now. An example might be given: When we say in surprise, 
"Oh, there you are," we are really saying, "Here we are at 
this particular moment and spot, and to our surprise, there 
you are at that spot at that particular rnoment.n Or t he 
exclamation may signify, "There we thought you were, and here 
you turn out to be•" In'either case, there is a change of 
position indicated. The meaning of such a statement depends 
upon the purpose of the statement. Only in the higher intel-
ligible communication are we able to find symbols freighted 
with meanings, for that is exactly what is meant by elliptical 
language. 
The discussion of the three types of communication has 
prepared the way for another answer to t he problem, How is 
social experience revealed to us? We find that in all t ypes 
of communication, there is an interaction of the subject with 
a subject, and the subject with an object •••• Communic~tion 
implies t wo or more awarenesses possessing a common meaning 
when understanding has taken place. The common meaning is 
possible because of universal elements in experience which are 
public and can become objects of experience. The publicity 
may be due to the world of nature and to the ground for sense 
I 
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j 
I 
I 
I 
lj 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
48 
--=- -==+!-----_-_-_-_-_--------------- -·-
data through its objects, which become a common environment 
for all selves, or to objective princ:j.ples and values which 
have like meanings for all minds. Let us fir s t look at the 
world of nature. 
The object aspect of communication as we have said is 
possible because of the world of nature which establishes 
the location of selves in a common environment, and thus 
becomes one of the avenues through which commnnication is 
revealed to us. Hence in ever~ experience, there is a personal ! 
a~d impersonal element, 91 the impersonal being objective and I 
public, and the personal, subjective and private. Leighton 
says that in order to have any communication there must be a 
minimum object, and space is the "minimum object any t wo 
minds have in common.n92 We are predisposed to broaden the 
minimum object to include the whole world of nature in order 
I 
., 
II II 
II to include time, which though not an ·object, is necessary for II 
the experience of objects; time represents the fluid process 
of' nature. The world of time and space becomes man's stage 
for acting. Whitehead says that "all thought has to be about 
things," and things can only be found in a world of nature. 93 
Price also insists on a common ground for communication: 
91. Alexander, STD, II, 226. 
92. Leighton, TOP, 290. 
93. Whitehead, CN, 5. 
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••••• Any mind whose existence is to be established 
by an argument must be aware of the same world as I 
am aware of. It must be such that the world which I 
am aware of is public to me and to it, common to both 
of us •••• Unless the symbols refer to objects which I 
too am aware of they will not be for me symbols at all.9 1 
Dewey empha-sizes the integrating aspect of experience and 
nature: 
Experience denotes what is experiences., the world 
of events and persons; and it denotes that world 
caught up into experiencing, the career and destiny 
of mankind. Nature's place in man is no less sig-
nificant than man's place in nature. Man in nature 
is man subjected, nature in r.uan, recognized and 
used, is intelligence and art. The value of exper-
ience ••• is t hat it serves as a constant reminder 
of something wh i ch is nether exclusive and isolated 
subject or objedt, matter or mind, nor yet one pl~~ 
the other •• . • Integration in life is a basic fact. 
I 
What more specifically is t his nature we have mentioned? , 
The word has both a broad and narrow meaning. In the broad 
meaning it stands for the universe as a whole including the 
and time subject to a single system of mechanistic laws.n96 
94. Price, Art. B, 448. 
95. Dewey, EN, 28. 
96. Hocking, TOP, 43. 
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Whitehead interprets nature as "that which we observe in per-
ception through the senses. In this sense - perception we are 
aware of something which is not thought and which is self-
cqntained for thought.n97 Later, he.'. makes the objective aspect 
of nature more explicit: 
I have said that nature is disclosed in sense-perception 
as a complex of entities. It is worth considering what 
we mean by an entity in this connection. t,Entity' ·is 
simply the Latin equivalent for thing.98 
For our purposes, these definit~~ns would be inadequate with-
out the addition of an idea found in Lotze. It says that the 
concept of nature implies three things: (1) a system of uni~ 
versal laws which determine sequence of cause and effect; 
(2) thE) concrete application of the laws; and (3) a purpose 
. 
to be realized. It is this third point w~ich is pertinent to 
us. Purpose implies value, the end purposed, so that value 
becomes a necessary factor of communication, and reveals the 
existence of social experience. 
Intelligible communication is ••• as much conditioned 
by the mutual acknowledgment of ' values upon which 
ultimately all meanings depend, as upon the mutual 
acknowledgment of things. 99 
We must now turn to the problem, What is the place of 
value in social activity? We have said that man is essentially 
97. Whitehead, CN 1 3. 
98. Ibid, 5. 
99. Urban, Art. 14, 590. 
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a social being, lives in connnunities, and "depends upon his 
coll'IIJ1Uilities for all that makes his civilization articulate.rrlOO 
Mere propinquity does not create a community of acti0n. The 
association which results from it is physical and organic; 
connnunal life on the other band is moral and maintained emo-
tionally, consciously, and intellectually, and requires ra tionall 
cooperation.lOl Dewey says: 
To learn to be ·human is to develop through the give-
and-take of communication and effective sense of 
being individually distinctive member of a community; 
one who. understands and appreciates its beliefs, 
desires, and methods, and who contributes to a fur-
ther conversion of the organic powers into human 
resources and values.l02 
Ames brings out the same ide~ when he says: 
Man achieves all his significant ends in association. 
His' language, moral ideas, science, and art are co-
operative enterprises. What belongs to his genuinely 
human nature is achieved in interdependence with his 
fellowmen.l03 
T. H. Green goes so far as to say that "No individual can make 
a conscience for himself. He always needs society to make it 
for him."104 Royce's thought is harmoni'ous with it: 
This self tmoral consciousnes~1 is known to eacp, one I · 
of us through its social contrasts without other 
100~ Royce, POC, I, 61. 
101. Dewey, PIP, 151. 
102. Ibid, 155. . I 
103. Ames, REL, 38. 
104. Green, PE, 226. 
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selves, and with the will of the community. If these · 
contrasts displease us, we try to relieve the tension. 
If they fascinate, we form our ideals accordingly. 
But in either case we become conscious of some plan or 
ideal of our own~ Our developed conscious, psycholo-
gically speaking, is the product of endless efforts to 
clear up, to simplify, to reduce to some sort of unity 
and harmony, the equally endless contrasts between the 
self, the fellow-men, and the social will in general, 
••• contrasts which our social experience constantly 
reveals and r .enders fascinating or agonizing, _accord-
ing to the state of our sensl tlveness or· of our for-
tunes.l05 
In criticism we must say that we cannot wholly accept the 
idea that conscience is molded by society; conscience is the 
divine spark of God in man. It is this which helps man to 
act, and activity is innate. Whether man lived alone or with 
others, he would form some plan of action. Society may modify 
a man's conscience, either by sensitizing or deadening it, 
but society cannot originate a conscience. A man, in order to 
be critical of his conscience, needs experiences to compare, 
analyze, and weigh judgments, but the tool for the process is 
given. Society furnishes the experience, and nature furnishes 
the reasoning ability of man. Conscience is reasoning. We 
agree with Royce, however, that all knowledge ultimately rests 
upon comparison,l06 and enlightened society may become the 
standard with which an individual may judge his acts. We 
105. Royce, POC, I, 134-135. 
106. Ibid, 130. 
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quote from Royce again: 
It is my knowledge of my fellows' doings, and or · 
their behavior toward me, -- it is this which gives 
me the basis for the sort of comparison that I use 
whenever I succeed in more thoughtfully observing 
myself or estimating myself.l07 
Alexander also thinks that comparison is necessary for value 
judgments. 
Many minds are needed then for truth, not because 
the many facets of reality are visible only to a 
multiplicity of minds, but because in the inter-
course of minds the truth is treated as truth, at 
the guidance of reality, by mutual confirmation 
or exclusion of beliefs.l08 
The individual mind is the mirror of social values: 
••• The mere individual is not, as such, the subject 
which judges truly or falsely; he is the subject of 
appreciations, of truth, and error, only so far as 
he represents the social mind; and here as in other 
cases value is something objective like language. 
Truth for the individual is a secondary conception. 
It is not curiosity alone which furnishes truth, but 
curiosity chastened by comparison with the curiosi~ 
of others.l09 
Again: 
(Appreciations] arise out of intercourse between 
minds. For without that intercourse the individual 
mind merely finds itself set over objects with which 
it is compresent, but does not recognize that in 
certain respects they owe their character to the 
107. Royce, POC, I, 131. 
108. Alexander, STD, II, 261. 
109. Loc. cit. 
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mind. We only become aware that a proposition is 
false when we find it entertained by another and 
our ovvn judgment disagrees with him •••• Thus we do 
not merely need other minds to supply us with facts 
which may ·have escaped our notice •••• We need them 
for t hinking tr1Ily in order that we may learn the 
very contrast of thinking truly and falsely.llO 
In giving these quotations we do not wish to i mply that 
values arise from sodial customs and conventions, although 
they appear in them. It is our firm belief tha t values are 
objective.111 We are overemphasizing the social aspect be-
cause we wish to show the place of values in social exper ience 
and to give a picture of the social man, the man nwho learns 
to judge by the judgments of the best society.nll2 Values 
may be objective, but the judgments of values arise through 
sodial intercourse. A judgment is possibl.e because of com-
munication, but a judgment is not always ~he result of a 
contingent fact; it may have as its source a necessary and 
objective truth. Otherwise we would not be able to speak in 
terms of universals, but only in particulars. And we ar e a pt j 
110. Alexander, STD, II, 239. 
111. In connection with this, it is interesting to note 
AYer's treatment of val~e in LTL (149-184). We do not agree 
with him "that ethics, as- a branch of knowledge is nothin~ 
more than a department of psychology and sociology." (169) 
He goes so far as to say that there is no validity in nor m-
ative judgments for they are expressing sentiments and can-
not be called genuine propositions. We think that t he uni-
formity of "moral sentimentsn as he says, through the a ges, 
and t he empirical evidence of mor al consciousness arising f r om 
the critical conscience, show some gromLd for belief in the 
objectivity of values. 
112. Baldwin, SEI, 163. 
-
-·----------
I 
55 
to make such statements as: Capitalists exp~oit the po?r; sel-
dom, Rocke£eller exploits the poor. All men are human; not, 
John Smith is human. We must realize that there is a differ-
ence between necessary truths and contingent facts. Plato, 
Aristotle and Kant led the way in showing the distinction with 
their theory of form and content. Leibniz followed with his 
verites de raison and verites de fait. In our own discussion, 
we do not wish to eliminate the distinction, but only to show 
that the two may be, and in fact are, dialectically related. 
Through social intercourse we become aware o£ a reality "com-
pounded of ourselves and the object",ll3 and the object may be 
eternally true for us and for others through time. If values 
were not objective, we should not £ind as much variation in in-
dividual thinkers as we do. Naturalists might say that the 
variations are due to environmental and hereditary factors, but 
to us this seems a weak argument. There is great variation in 
similar environments and same family trees. There is indivi-
dual contribution to value and to society. Society makes lead-
ers. Yes, but leaders also make society. 11 'I'he things which 
are taken up by society and incorporated in permanent for.m, as 
its acquisitions, are usually the outcome of the severest think 
ing of the ablest individuals. 11114 
II Society generalizes the values that the individual has 
1-----
1 113. Alexander, STD, II, 240. 
1
114. Baldwin, SEI, 476. 
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already p articular1zed. 115 Nevertheless, when an individual r--
acts "privately it is always with a bommerang in his hand; and II 
every use h e makes of his weapon leaves its indelible impression! 
both upon the other and upon him." 116 Real thinkers and leaders . 
will possess a sort of "social sanity" and vfill know how much 
variation from the accepted norm of society to show. Of course 
there may be instances where social approval may not be given 
to men of Vision 
scious of social 
and creative ability, but such men will be con- j 
needs and will forfeit life, liberty, and hap- I 
,, 
piness to inject ideas and values into society which will have 
I 
I social utility. Eventually such men will gain the approval of 
society. Individual evaluations may vary to some extent, but 
underneath each choice, there is a universal structure which 
I 
brings about a certain amount of constancy in acting. There is I 
a universal hierarchy of values, and within this hierarchy are 
found principles and maxims accepted by all men at all times.ll7 
In our analysis of social experience we found two forces 1 
always at work, mutually repelling and mutually attracting each ! 
I 
other- an individualizing force, and a universalizing force.ll8 J 
Genetically these two forces are evidenced by struggle, the 
struggle for self preservation - the struggle with nature, the 
struggle with enemies, and the struggle with members of one's 
115. Baldwin, SEI, 476. 
116. Ibid, 171. 
117. Ames, REL, 172. 
118. Baldwin, SEI, 476. 
own group who oppose or jeopardize the individual's life.l19 
Later, in the social development, the group, rather than the 
individual, assumes the responsibility of self preservation 
through cooperation. In the plastic period, the struggle be-
comes more mental, and the ends sought by the individual are 
ends tempered by the requirements of society.l20 In the re-
flective stage, the struggle becomes disciplined self control. 
The desires of the individual are submerged into the larger 
needs of the community. At this time the impulses of altruism -
generosity and sympathy - spring into being. 
From a metaphysical point of view, these two forces are 
known as the dialectic o~ society.l21 
Es ist dasselbe ub.erhaupt das Princip aller Bewegung, 
alles Lebens und aller Bethatigung in der Wirklichkeit.l22 
In the process of the dialectic, the subjective mind tries to 
become objective mind. 
Werden ist der wahre Ausdruck des Resultats von Sein 
und Nichts, als die Einheit,derselben; es 1st nicht 
nur die Einheit des Seins und Nichts, sendern ist die 
Unruhe in sich, - die Einheit, die nicht bloss als 
Beziehung-auf-sich bewegungslos, sondern durch die 
Verschiedenheit des Seins und Nichts, die in ibm ist, 
in sich gegen sich selbst ist.l23 
119. Supra, p. 34ff. of this dissertation. 
120. Baldwin, IS, 85. 
121. Supra, p. 35ff. of this dissertation. 
122. Hegel, ENC (Logic), 81. 
123. Ibid, 88. 
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In the realm of values, these two forces become a conflict 
between individual desires and group sanctions, between per-
sonal advancement and the greater welfare of the community, be-
tween egoism and altruism. In the course of the conflict, the 
idea emerges that the individual grows as society develops, 
and that each is necessary to the other. 
Society und the individual are not two entities, two 
forces acting separately, two enemies making forced 
and grudging concessions ... On the contrary, they are 
t.he two sides of a growing organic whole, in which 
the welfare and advance of one minister to the wel-
fare and progress of the other. There is but one 
hum~n interest 124 and this is both individual and soc1al at once.-
124. Baldwin, IS, 170. 
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CHAPTER III 
THE INDIVIDUAL I N SOCIETY 
In the previous chapter, we reached the conclusion that 
the individual grows as society progresses. On the other hand, 
it is an inescapable fact that social experience presupposes 
and rests upon individual experience. Hence, our present task 
will be a consideration of some of the fundamental problems 
dealing specifically with the individual as a self, and the in-
dividual as a p erson or social being. The question immediately 
arises: What is the self?l How is the self distinguished from 
a person? 
For a tentative definition we might say that the self is 
unified conscious process of experience, capable of thinking, 
willing, and feeling. In order to understand the meaning of 
self, we must also define the term experience, for the two are 
1. We are using the term self as synonymous with the term 
individual. Some authorities prefer to reserve the word in-
dividual to mean the person who has achieved a concrete unity 
with society. We feel that to be a real self is to have 
achieved this · unity. It is interesting to note that Barbara 
Morgan in ICW, 74, makes a similar distinction between indivi-
dual and self, though she uses the term personality in place 
of the term self. She says: 
"I would like to suggest that personality means the form 
attained by the mind-body complex and that individuality 
includes not only that complex, but its effect in the 
world, the constantly unfolding form of man himself and 
his works. 11 ICW 74. · 
, 
closely correlated and often used interchangeably. We agree II 
with Dr. Knudson that the word experience is not only ambigu-
ous, but "multiguous". 2 Nevertheless, we cannot discard it, 
for there is no other word which has the double-edged connota-
topm pf sub.'ject-object relationship. 3 We might use conscious-
I I, 
I 
I 
ness as a synonym since consciousness does imply "the conscious- !! 
ness of something by sameone", 4 but we wish to reserve the use I 
I 
5 I 
of the word for the "irreducible minimum" of experience, the 1 
so-called datum, or immediate experience, from which the whole 
mind develops. The datum is a cluster of experience, joined 
I. 
II 
I 
I 
I 
I 
with other clusters, and moving along as if in a stream. Each I 
I 
I 
I 
cluster is a unified whole with a vivid focus of consciousness 
as the present moment of experience, merging with a fringe 
which reveals a wider whole from which the present is chosen, 
i and which s~gnifies the existence of a past, and the possibili- 1 
I 
I ty of a future. The fringe acts as the indefinite possibility 
2. Knudson, VRE, 11. 
3. We are aware of the disagreement on this point. James Ward 
in PP, 47, says that instead of depending mainly on that "vague 
and treacherous word consciousness" let us use attention for the 
subjective element of experience and pl~esentations for the ob-
jective. Attention he thirurs implies all that consciousness is 
said to imply - preference, choice, selection - a~d yet is not 
ambiguous. We disagree with Ward; attention overemphasizes the 
active element and ignores the passive. 
Whitehead minimizes the element of subjectivity in the term! 
experience: "Consciousness presupposes experience, not exper- I 
ience consciousness." PR, 197. j1J 
John Dewey is in agreement with Whitehead: Experience can-
not be identified with experiencing. EN, 8-10. 
4. Knudson, VRE, 12. 
5. Ward PP, 29. 
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of experience, and together with the focus of consciousness, 
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combined with all the moments of actual experience, becomes the / 
whole mind or permanent I. The unity and the identity of the 
self rest upon the activity of the datum in transcending the 
present moment of experience in space and time. The permanence 
1 
I 
I 
II 
I 
and continuity of the self rest on the fringe as the indefinite 
extension of experience. In other words, the immediate self or 
datum is a moment of experiential whole, having a beginning, 
middle, and ending. Each cluster is joined with other clusters 
in the .stream of experience because of the unique power of the 
self to transcend its own immediacy, 6 and unite the particulars 
through memory linkages which connect the past with the present,! 
and to anticipate the future. Any given experience forms a / 
part of a distinctive and intangible unity, a type of unity 
found in no other substance or thing, a unity which supplies an 
ever expanding undercurrent of mental life. The whole mind is 
thus made up of present consciousness, and the fringe, which 
Leighton calls the subattentive7 part of the mind. Mind, thus, 
can be distinguished in an abstract sense, from the datum self. 
The immediate moments of a self are focal and transitory; mind 
is persistent and contextua1. 8 The mind as a whole is wider 
than the consciousness of the moment, and the greater part of 
6. Brightman, POI, 21 
7. Leighton, MC, 334. 
8 •. Dewey, EN, 303. 
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it is only implicit in any conscious act. 9 There is ne break, 
though, between the subaftentive and the conscious part of mind; 
the one merges into the other and forms a whole. 
the mind has a constant foreground and background 
In this way, I 
which is ever 1 
growing. 10 The mind is able to connect the subject with the ob 
ject because of both its psychical and physical qualities -
psychical in the sense that it originates from experience, and 
physical in the sense that it is manifested in a body. It must 
I 
I 
I' 
not be thought that the fringe or the subattenti ve part of mind j 
becomes the environment of consciousness. 'Ihe environment of a I 
self is distinguished from consciousness in that it is persist- 1 
ently and wholly unconscious. The subattentive is vaguely, 
dimly conscious at all times, even in deepest sleep. As the 
flux of experience moves from the focus to the fringe, there 
I 
I 
I 
I 
are degress of dimness of consciousness, but never total uncon- ! 
sciousness. The subattentive is not environment, but it is 
I 
I 
I 
I' directly related to environment by its resembla_nce to it, in 
that it is an experiential continuum while the environment is 
physical continuum, and it connects the environment with the 
immediately experfencing subject. 
ai 
,. 
I 
At this point, we may summarize the definition of the term 
9. Dewey, EN, 303. 
10. Loc. cit. Ward also intimates a similar theory, though he 
is not very explicit about what he means by the 11 presentational 
continuum." In PP, 31, he says: "But we too have to allow that 
besides the strictly limited 'field' within the bounds of 1 clea 
perception' there is an indefinite 'extension' of the presenta- 1 
t i onal continuum beyond it." 
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self by quoting Dr. Brightman, adding the subattentive to what 
he says. He allows for a subattentive aspect of self, but 
only as the fringe of the specious present. For him the unity 
and the identity of the self are found in its conscious exper-
ience or unity in memory and self-identification. The per-
manence of the self is based upon these aspects of the flow of 
experience in the continuous and connected moments of time. 
We feel that Dr. Brightman's theory accounts for the unity of 
the self, but not the persistence. In fact he denies any per-
sisting entity apart from experience. We wonder; does he go 
beyond Hume at all~ To us the whole self or the mind is some-
ness. What we call the subattentive preserves the reality of 
a continuing and enduring subject. In placing the existence 
of the self on experience, Dr. Brightman does not tell us 
specifically what becomes of the fleeting moments of the datum, 
in spite of the fact that apparently they are united by time 
in a moving stream. It may be that he intends to imply that 
the fringe is a process of indefinitely increasing experience. 
If so, then he is actually admitting the existence of the sub-
attentive. Yet Dr. Brightman's emphasis of consciousness and 
memory as constituting the continuity of the self would indi-
cate that, agreeing with William James, when the self is not 
conscious at all, as in deep sleep or in coma, the self is 
65 
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not. If such is the case, it would be difficult to account 
for dream experiences or thoughts arising from the subconscious 
which influence behavior. Although we ourselves do not make 
an ultimate distinction between the focus and the fringe, yet, 
by showing the permanence of the ever-expanding fringe, we are 
positing the existence of a substantive reality as the con-
stant background of consciousness from which memory chooses its 
data. In our theory, the self has being at every moment · 
whether asleep or awake. Dreams and thoughts that come from 
the subconsciousness arise from the storehouse of the mind 
which contains the every-growing subattentive. The whole self, 
then, 
••• includes my past, which means all of the exper-
ience which is connected by such a series of linkages 
of real or possible memory with the present datum. 
It also includes that future which purpose and desire 
in part anticipate and control and into which I am 
always growing through the connecting link of the 
subattentive. "11 
When the idea of control and purpose has emerged, the self has 
developed into a person capable of holding ideal values.l2 
11. Brightman, POI, 20. 
12. We are in general accepting the personalistic hypothesis 
of the self. Throughout the history of thought, the meaning 
of self has had a checkered career. Primi tive man . thought of J 
consciousness as refined matter, a tangible center of activi~r. ,. 
Plato made the soul immaterial and immortal. Aristotle said 
that the soul was the form or achievement of matter. Leibniz, I 
in keep ing with the trend of thought in his day, established I 
I 
I 
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And in Chapter I we found that a group of persons working to-
ward the attainment of an ideal: as a community of action forms 
a society. 
It is through an analysis of the meaning of self that we 
get an idea of the meaning of experience. Only in the concept 
of persons and finally of society, can we go beyond the limited 
definition, the immediate moment of consciousness, to the very 
broad or expanded meaning, life itself with all its changing 
vicissitudes. In a real sense we agree that "experience is a 
process of becoming expert by experiment."13 Martin Luther 
12. (cont 1 d) 
- the lex continui, and thought of the soul as a permanent 
substratum underlying consciousness. John Stuart Mill and 
David Hume, though they grappled to understand the unity of 
experience, ·yet said that the self was nothing but the stream 
of sensation and the relation of sensation. MacDougall 
thought of the self as the "sum of enduring capacity." The 
neo-realist _says that the self is a complex of interrelated 
neutral entitles. The behaviorists either consider the self 
as the function of the bodily organism, or the movement of 
motion in space. 
Our conclusion does not contradict these metaphysical 
theories, for all of them admit that experience in some form 
is vital for knowledge. 
T.he brief survey is based on Brightman's treatment in 
ITP, 166-189. 
13. Ward, PP, 29. 
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undoubtedly had this progressive development in mind when he 
said, "Life is no more essence, it is a growth.ul4 Dewey 
in our time has accepted the enlarged view of the term. 
says that: 
~xperience is primarily a process of undergoing: a 
process of standing something; of suffering and 
passion, of affection, in;- the literal sense of these 
words. The organism has to endure, to undergo, the 
consequences of its own action.l5 
He 
I 
i 
I 
A closer view of the word will show that between these two I! 
extremes, we find four distinct connotations. First, experienc J 
is the i~nediate datum of perception; second, experience is the 
object reached through meditation or cognition; third, experi-
ence is the concept of' the self as a unified whole, and fourth, 
experience is the total objective unity obtained through re-
flection, anticipation, and comparison of minds in a social 
group, forming a society. 16 All four have validity in usage; 
the different systems of thought emphasize one or the other 
I 
aspect of' the word. The associationalist s stress the first meal l 
ing of the word; the realists, the second; the personalists, th~ 
14. Cited by Brightman, In POI, 20. 
15. Dewey, Art. 21, 10. 
16. Baldwin has a similar division of experience in TT, I, 
143. Cf. Knudson, VRE, 112-23. 
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third, and the absolutists, the fourth. In all four there is 
the common acknowledgment, either implicitly or explicitly, of' 
the duality of the subject-object relationship, a necessary 
factor in every act of consciousness, though what the subject 
or what the object is, may differ in each view. Experience 
would be impossible without this duality. 
All mental action implies the relation of a subject to 
an object; and it makes no difference whether the object 
is a perceived one present to the senses; or an ideal one 
like a purpose consciously entertained such · as going to 
London as entertained in idea or in thought; or even an 
imaginary object ••• 17 
The subject-object relationship rises out of the fact that 
in every instance of experience, there is a personal element, 
an active subject and an impersonal el ement, an object that is 
given to consciousness and is public property to all experienc-
ing minds. Alexander has made this truth clear to us: 
In every experience we can distinguish a personal and 
an impersonal element in the situation. What is personal 
in the strictest sense is the act of enjoyment, which no 
other person but the experient can enjoy and which · 
neither the experient nor another person · can contem-
plate. [18] Enjoyments cannot be shared, and in general 
17. Alexander, STD, II, 15. 
18. Enjoyment for Alexander usually means direct, immediate 
awareness or perception, self-experience. Contemplated objects 
are objects reached through inferential thinking. The body of 
a self can be a contemplated object; the mind itself can only 
be enjoyed. Enjoyment gives knowledge by acquaintance, and 
contemplation gives knowledge by description or knowledge 
about. (Groos and William James.) 
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are public ••• The things we experience are impersonal 
from the beginning and hence public. · what makes them 
private is the individual bias "and perspective • .. If "" 
objects were not public from the beginning, no unity 
of experience either as an individual experience or as 
social experience would be possible.l9 
James Ward accepts the duality of subject-object in order 
to obtain knowledge through contrasts and comparisons. 
Subjective modifications no doubt are always one con~ 
stituent of individual experience, but always as cor-
relative - directly or remotely - to objective modifi-
cations or changes - present or prospective - in the 
objective continuum [20]. If experience were throughout 
subjective, : not merely would the conception of the 
objective never arise, but the entirely impersonal -and 
intransitive process that remained, though it might be 
described as absolute 'becoming' could not be called 
even solipsism, least of all real experience.21 
In order to understand the subject-object relation~hip, 
really, we must first show how the concept of the subject, as 
opposed to the object~ arises. To do this, we must consider 
the problem: How is the subject of experience known~ 
The natural approach to the solution of this problem is 
the historical one made famous by Descartes. We cannot deny 
the fact that we have a certain kind of direct intuition of the 
self for consciousness is inescapable fact.22 "Everyone", says 
Pratt, "has a natural impulsion to believe in it."23 Since 
19. Alexander, STD, II, 226-232. 
20. The continuum might be defined as the stream of conscious 
experience, the drops of experience which flow in time in a 
continuous process. Cf. Ward, PP, 31. 
21~ Ward, PP, _30. 
22. Brightman, POI, 11. 
23. Pratt 311. 
the self is "essentially unique and sui generis";4 he contin-
ues, "it is difficult to doubt the reality of a self which 
knows and feels and is capable of making decisions."25 
Descartes, of course, is the classic authority on this point. 
Through a mathematical process of analysis, he reaches the in-
dubitable truth of cogito ergo sum. 26 He gives his method in 
brief, but cogent manner. 
J'avais des longtemps remarque que pour les moeurs 
11 est besoin quelquefois de suivre des opinions 
qu'on sait etre fort incertaines, tout de meme que 
24. Pratt, PR, 302, 315, 301. 
25. Ibid, 274. In connection with this, it is interesting to 
note that Berkeley, who has a great deal to say about physical 
objects, says very little about the knowledge of selves. In 
speaking of God he writes, ''And though I perceive Him not by 
sense, yet I have a notion of Him or know Him by reflection 
and reasoning. My own mind and my own ideas I have an imme-
diate knowledge of ••• 11 Berlreley, Works, 236. Cf. Commonplace 
~, M568. Also Principles, Sec. 2:27, 135-142. 
26. Cogitare did not signify reflective thinking to Descartes, 
but rather consciousness; I am conscious, therefore I exist. 
Cf. Meditation Deuxieme, 92: 
"Mais qu'es-ce done que je suis'l Une chose qui pense. 
Qu'est-ce qu 1 une chose qui pense'l C'est une chose qui 
doute, qui entend, qui con9oit, qui affirme, qui nie, 
qui vent, qui ne veut pas, qui imagine aussi et qui 
sent." 
Ibid, 91. " ••• Je trouve ici qui la pensee est un 
attribut qui m'appartient, elle seule no peut etre 
detachee de moi. Je suis, j'existe, cela est certain." 
Cf. Principles, I, 9. "By the word thought I under-
stand all that of which we are conscious as operating 
in us." 
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si elles etaient indubitables, ainsi qu'il a ete dit 
ci-dessus. mais pource au'alors je desirais vaauer · 
, ' :L. I , :.a. 
seulement ala recherche de la verite, · je pensai qu'il 
fallai t que je fisse tout le contraire, et que je·· re- ·· 
jetasse cornme absolument faUJt; tout ce en quoi je ·pour-
rais imaginer le moindre doute, afin ·de voir 8 1 11 ne 
me res terai t point apres eels. quelque cho~1 en ma 
creance qui fnt entierement - ~ndubitable. 
Mais aussitot apres je pris garde que, pendant que je 
v~ulais ainsi penser que tout etait faux, 11 fallait 
necessairement que mol qui le pensai~ fusse guelque -
chose, et remarquant que cet.te verite: ·.1e pense, done 
Je suis, etait si ferme et si assuree que toutes les 
plus ·extravagantes suppositions des sceptiques n•e'taient 
pas capables .de l'ebranler, je jugeai que je pouvais le 
recevoir sans scrupule pour le premier principe de la 
philosophie que je cherchais.28 
It is true that the approach must be through intuition, but 
thought cannot rest upon intuition alone; mere feeling of cer-
tainty will not _give knowledge. We agree with Lewis that 
11 
••• Knowledge ••• rises through conceptual interpretation of 
the given ••• There is no knowledge merely by direct aware~ · 
ness."
29 Intuition, at best, can give us a sense of awareness, 
of enjoyment in Alexander's meaning of the word, but not 
knowledge. In order to gain knowledge, we must go beyond in-
tuition to the whole of experience and observe, compare, ana-
lyze, until we get a coherent picture of all the available 
27. Descartes, Oeuvres~ 28. (Discours de la MEfthode, 
Quatrieme Partie.) 
28. Ibid, 29. 
29. Lewis, ~NO, 27. 
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facts. We may feel that the self is, but in order to know what 
it is,30 we must employ inference to go beyond the genesis of 
~ belief to real knowledge~ 
Knowledge of self comes through reflective self conscious-
ness, the point where one is conscious that he is consc i ous. 
Experience, by its very nature of duality, forces the mind to 
go beyond the "glamour of' intuition"31 by presenting to it ob-
jects which are not self'-created. Without the unexpected con-
tact with these .objects, thought would never arise, and we 
would be whirling in a sea of subjectivity. Sa~tayana pai~t~ 
a vivid picture of the intrusion of' objects on consciousness: 
I think, prove, and enjoy without noticing that I do 
so. But when a clap of thunder deaf'ehs me or a f'lash 
of' lightning dazzles and blinds me, that fact that 
something has happened is f'ar more obvious to me than 
just what it is that has occurred.32 
Pratt is in agreement with Santayana when he say s that 
· "experiences pop into our mind and do so quite unexpectedly . 1133 
To r e-emphasize the world of objects independent of mind he 
30. This is a paraphrase of' Pratt's statement in · PR, 311. 
"We know that the self is, and we know what it is, by observ-
ing what it does." Pratt here is not quite consistent with 
his own thinking when ·he uses the term know with both the 
'that' and the ' what'. 
31. Santayana, SAF, 144. 
32. Ibid, 140. 
33. Pratt, PR, 142. 
================----------~--=··=--==-=-~=-====~ 
writes: 
According to Realism our present experiences point 
not only to something else besides themselves but to 
a whole nexus of temporal as well as spatial relations 
which need not be experienced by any mind.34 
Dewey reaffirms the point, perhaps over-stressing the ob-
jective nature of experience : 
••• Experience ••• asserts the finality and - comprehen-
siveness of the method of pointing, finding~ showing, 
and the necessity of seeing what is found ••• We need 
the notion of experience to remind us- that 1 reality' 
includes what is denotatively found.35 
In poetic language, Santayana speaks of the impact of the 
object on consciousness as a shock. Shocks posit the existence 
of the self as that which is shocked. 
In brute experience, or shock, I have only a clear 
indication, for my vlterior reflection, that I exist, 
but a most imperious summons at the very moment to 
believe in my existence.36 
A self, then, not a material world, is the first object 
which I should posit if I wish the experience of shock 
to enlarge my dogma in the strict order of evidence.37 
The self posited by a sense of shock is a living psyche.38 
Thus the objects which intrude upon consciousness furnish 
the data with which the whole self and the universe is built. 
34. Pratt, PR, 146. 
35. Dewey, EN, 11. 
36. Santayana, SAF, 141. 
37. Ibid, 146, and also Cf. Hegel, ENG, (liogic) , 91. 
38. Ibid, 147. 
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These objects are, in a sense, passive, in that they are given 
to consciousness and are not created by consciousness. Yet in 
another sense, they become objects, only as the mind thinks 
about them and makes them its datum. Passivity thus connotes 
the double-edged meaning of givenness - to be present as conten 
to consciousness, and "existent as experience."39 The passive 
object may have within itself the possibility of dynamicism and 
interaction with other objects. Both the dynamic and the pas-
sive elements are necessary for knowledge. Bowne and Dewey 
bring out this aspect of experience. Bowne has said in con-
nection with the presentation of objects: 
In some sense our objects are given; that is, we cannot 
have objects at will or vary their properties at our 
pleasure. In this sense we are passive in knowledge •• • 
but in a sense, also, our objects are our own products, 
for an existing object becomes an object for us only 
as we think it, and thus make it our object.40 
And Dewey: 
••• It is pertinent to note that the unification of 
the self throughout the ceaseless flu.x of what it does, 
suffers, a.nd achieves, cannot be attained in terms of 
itself [41J. The self is always directed toward some-
thing beyond itself and its own unification depends upon 
the ide a of integration of the shifting scenes of the 
world into that imaginative totality we call the uni-
verse.42 
Strong, Art. 25, 187. 
Bowne, TTK, 36. 
Here, to be more consistent with our original hypothesis, 
we prefer to say 11 in terms of its datum." 
Dewey, CF, 19. Here, again, we would change the phrase, ·· 
"imaginative totality, etc. 11 to "totality we call the whole 
sel.f." 
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Professor Bri ghtman also considers the consciousness of 
Dieses r e ine Sein ist nun die reine Abstraktion, damit 
das absolut Negative, welches, g leichfalls unmittelb ar 
genommen, das Nichts ist.44 
Das Nichts ist als dieses unmittelbare sich selbst-
gl e iche ebenso umg ek ehrt dasselbe, was das Sein ist. 
Die Wahrheit des Seins sowie des Nichts ist d~ger die 
Einheit beider; diese Einheit ist das Werden. 
Das Sein im Werden, als eins mit dem Nichts, so das 
Nichts eins mit dem Sein, sind nur verschwindende; das 
Werden fallt durch seinen Widerspruchin sich in die 
Einheit, in der be i de aufg ehoben sind, zusammen; sein 
Resu ltat ist somit das Dasein.46 
Das Dasein ist Sein mit einer Be stimmtheit, die als un~ 
mitt e lbare oder seiende Bestimmtheit ist, die Qualitat. 
Das Dasein als in d ieser seiner Be stimmtheit in sich 
reflektiert ist Daseiendes, Et was. --Die Kategorien, 
die sich an dem Dasein entwickeln, sind nur summarisch 
anzugeben.4'7 
Although inference, because of interaction of subject and 
object is necessarY for knowledg e, it must not be supposed that 
the . same sort of relationship exists between the self and 
43. Brightman, POI, 17. 
44. Hegel, ENC (Logic), 87. 
45. I?id, 88. Of. Hegel, ENC ( POM), 388. 
46. Ibid, 89. 
47. Ibid, 90. 
objects of sense perception, and the self as an object to it-
self or to other selves. The contact between minds is unique 
and unlike any other relationships except for the factor of ob-
jective reference. It is this unique relationship which makes 
Burns say that "other minds are enjoyed in the same sense as 
my own mind is enjoyed."48 Enjoyment is defined as "that ex-
perience which distinguishes awareness of mental process .from 
the awareness of an object in or through that process. 1149 In 
the contact between a mind and a sense-object, the primary ac-
tivity is one of selection through appropriation or rejection. 
In the contact between a mind and another mind, there is an 
added element of stimulated interaction. The result of the 
interaction is change, in the object, and growth or progress. 
From the point of view of physical science it may be said 
that matter underlying the sense objects also reacts to stimu-
lus, and that there is change when t wo elements are added to-
g ether to make a compound. Or that when a stone is pressed upo 
another stone, we have a form of action and interaction. These 
changes, however, are external and do not affect the inner 
nature of the objects. For instance, the elements of a com-
pound can be separated into their original forms without loss 
of energy or force. The pressure on the stones can be 'removed 
48. Burns, CM, 43. 
49. Loc. cit. Cf. Ibid, 38, 44-45, 40, 47. Note that enjoy-
ment is defined with a little different sense from Alexander's 
definition. Infra, 
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and the previous equilibrium restored. In the interaction be-
tween mind and mind, changes occur which are irrevocable. In 
every instance of social experi ence, where there is contact of 
mind and mind, some changes occur which give added negative or 
positive qualiti.es to the persons involved, and wh en the inter-
action is removed, the changes remain. Personal growth and 
creative activity are the direct results of the contact. Burns 
has given us a real insight in explaining the difference between 
the two types of relations. 50 He says that the 'other' in the 
. . 
case of a phy sical object is exclusive; i.e., the contact is 
discovered through introspection. The person experiencing the 
object is aware of the complex of non-mental elements. The men 
tal p rocesses are known to be distinctly personal and can be 
called "my" experiences. In other words, the experience of a 
physical object might be said to be definitive, and as Perry 
states, unless the experience is wholly new and unique, the 
definition might be based upon past experiences and be said to 
be by 11 initial predication. 11 51 The experience possesses ex-
clusive particularity. 52 
On the other hand, the 'other' in the case of the inter-
action between mind and mind is contributory. There is a give 
50. Burns, CM, 57. 
51. Perry, PPT, 128. Cf. 133, 158-162. 
I 52. Loc. cit. 
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and take in living relationship which is not found in other con-
tacts. The experience is a joint process where an aim or goal 
is in View as the end-result of the activity. The difference 
might be crudely illustrated by the rope game called 11 the tug-
of-war". Here the pulling of rop e is a social act, the purpose 
being to try to pull tne rope from the opponents 1 hands across. a 
set boundary. The pull of the group is very different from the 
individual pull. In the pull together, there is no distinguish-
able pull as "mine" or "yours". If there is victory, the vic-
tory becomes "ours". To take a better example: In a group dis-
cussion when the ideas at the end of the period are "pooled" to-
gether to form a common conclusion, there is no way of telling 
where the particular idea of a particular individual began, and 
another ended. The conclusion, as the meaning in a communica-
tion situation, becomes the property and meaning of the group. 
In the words of Perry, it might be said to possess "multiplicity 
rather than 11 exclusive particularity. 1153 
The difference between the "exclusive" and "contributory" 
type of experience might be explained again through an analogy 
. 54 
borrowed from Bu1•ns, though somewhat modified. The contact 
between a mind and a sense object might be likened to an af-
firmative proposition. In this proposition the predicate is 
53. Perry, PPT, 127. 
54. See chart on p~ 80. 
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included in the subject, and the object subordinated to the sub-
ject.55 The contact between minds might be likened to a nega-
tive proposition. In this, the predicate is excluded from the 
subject; yet both terms are included in the same universe of 
discourse. In the negative proposition, we have an exclusion 
and an inclusion combined. 56 Minds can be distinguished be-
tween a ~this 1 and a 'that' without each being 1 in 1 the other, 
yet they are not as 'external' in their contacts as objects of 
nature. 57 
It is because of this mutual interaction of mind with mind 
that the idea of the self grows with the idea of the other. 
Price says that the " ••• consciousness of the self and the con-
58 
sciousness of others come into being simultaneously." Bald-
win thinks that "the sense of self is not a ready-made and 
perfect gift; it is a slow growth ••• which shows ••• the in-
teraction of the individualistic and social factors.n59 
Alexander says: 
55. 
56. 
57. 
58 • . 
59. 
Our reflective consciousness arises in and through 
our consciousness of others. We are led, not of 
course to the enjoyment of ourselves but to noticing 
": 
Burns, CM, 71. 
Ibid, 72. 
Loc. cit. 
Price, Art. 8, 439. 
Baldwin, IS, 23. 
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ourselves [ 601 through intercourse with others: the 
knowledge of ourselves and that of others grow up . to-
gether ••• Were we alone in a non-conscious world ••• 
We should hardly experience ourselves as individual 
persons.61 
Baldwin shows, through a dialectic of personal growth~ 
that the idea of the 1 other 1 comes before the idea of 'me'. 
A child feels his social unity with others long before he de-
ve l ops a concept of his own personality. The first experiences 
of a mind are projective; there is constant feeling for other 
through comparison. The projective experiences are followed 
by subjective ones; there is recognition of similarity through 
which the 1 me 1 emerges. Ejective experiences supplant subjec-
tive experiences; other persons are posited, and there is con-
stant interaction between difference and similarity • 
••• My thought of self is in · the main, as to its 
character as a personal self, filled up with my 
thought of others, distributed variously as indi-
viduals; and my thought of others, as persons; is 
mainly filled up with myself. In other words' but 
for certain minor distinctions in the filling, and 
for certain compelling distinctions between that 
which is immediate and that which is objective, the 
ego and the . alter are to our thought one and the---
same thing.62 
Hegel gives a logical description of the same dialectic: 
60. This intimates the need for inference in order to go 
beyond the mere feeling of awareness to reflective self-
consciousness. Supra, 
61. Alexander, STD, II, 31.;,32. 
62. Burns, SEI, 18. 
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Das allgemeine Selbstbewusstsein 1st das affirmative 
Wissen seiner selbst im anderen Selbst, deren jedes 
als freie Einzelheit absolute Selbsts.ndigkeit hat, 
aber vermoge der Negation seiner Unmittelbarkeit oder 
Begierde sich nicht vom anderen unterscheidet, all-
gemeines und objektiv 1st und die reelle Allgemeinheit 
als Gegenseitigkeit so hat, als es 1m freien anderen 
sich anerkannt Vleiss und dies weiss~ insofern es das 
andere anerkennt und es frei weiss. 3 
The dialectic is saying that we are by nature social be-
ings.64 Alexander thinks that the instinct of sociality is so 
deep-rooted in us that the response of one mind to another 
reaches emotional heights. "The emotion of sociality is a 
double-sided one; it is a response on our part to the other be-
nf d b hi 1165 ing, co irme y a response on s part to us. 
The same sort of faith that originally posited the indivi-
dual self, posits the other mind. As Alexander says, "That a 
mind is there, is assurance. It is not invented by inference 
or analogy but is an act of faith forced on us by a peculiar 
sort of experience. 1166 
63. Hegel, ENG (POM), 436. In simpler language the dialectic 
might be written thus: 
I desii•e - consciousness. Thesis. 
I recognize - self consciousness. Antithesis. 
I universalize - the unity of consciousness and self con-
sciousness. Emergence of other persons. Synthesis. 
(Taken from notes of a lecture given by Dr. Brightman at 
one of the sessions in the Nineteenth Annual Seminar in Philo-
sophy (1937-38) on Hegel's Ph~nomenologie des Geistes.) 
64. Supra, Chapter I of this dissertation. Cf. Alexander, ST.D, 
II, 35. 
65. STD, 33. 
66. Ibid, 3.7. 
-~---
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Just as in the discussion of the knowledge of the self we 
found that we had to go beyond intuition, so in knowledge of 
other minds we must go beyond the enjoyment of another mind to 
more conclusive evidence. Alexander himself goes beyond the 
feeling state to an inferential situation. Since he makes the 
social instinct a sort of emotion, he gives an emotional groun 
for inferential thinking: 
••• Although we thus have direct experience of the 
existence of minds in others, such experience is not 
knowledge derived either from contemplation of the 
external or enjoyment of ourselves. We can enjoy only 
our own mind and not the mind of another. On the other 
hand we do not contemplate our own mind as if it were 
an external object, much less the mind of another. Thus 
I am not aware of B's mind as I am aware of his body, 
so that I should be able to inspect it and say what it 
is. Yet experience assures me that he has a mind , What 
sort of a mind it is, how the other mind feels in a 
given situation, I am left to divine sympath5~ically 
on the basis largely of analogy with my own. 
It seems to us that since there is privacy in experience, 
and since minds are not given as sense-objects, we cannot say 
that sympathy, a feeling for others, can be a legitimate ground 
for analogy. Analogy implies a comparison of observable data. 
Can we really observe another mind through a feeling of under·-
standing? If analogy is possible at all, must it not be in the 
realm of physical behavior? There must be some observable 
facts before real understanding can take place • 
••• The individual human selves are sundered from one 
another by gaps which, as it would seem, are in some 
sense impassable ••• Sympathy may try its best to 
6?. Alexander, STD, II, 3?. 
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bridge the gulf thus established by nature. Love may 
counsel me to view the pangs of m.y fellow as ' if thev 
were my own. But, as a · fact, rny sensory nerves do not 
end in my fellow's skin, but in mine. And the physical 
sundering of the organism corresponds to a persistent 
sundering of our streams of ilmaediate feeling. Even 
the most immediate and imp ressive forms of sympathy 
with the physical pangs of another human being only 
serve the more to illustrate how our various conscious 
lives are thus kept apart by gulfs we cannot cross ••• 
The sympathizer does not feel the sufferer's pain. What 
he feels is his own emotional reverberation at the 
sight of its symptoms. That is, in general, something 
very different, both in quality and in intensity, from 
what the injured man feels.68 
' ! 
Burns puts a little more emphasis on the observable aspect 1 
I 
I 
I 
I 
'I 
of experience by saying that the inferential process is a mutua~ 1 
activity of "sympathy and love", and "cooperation in action"; 
communication is the evidence . of such activity. 69 
Lewis, though admitting the impossibility of getting into 
another mind, is empirical in his approach. He intimates that 
we must, because of need for efficiency in practical action~70 
go beyond the feeling that other beings exist and put some 
faith in inference from behavior • 
• • • It is a native longing of hurnan·ity to transcend 
the bounds of subjectivity; to know our object not 
68. Royce, POC, II. 19-21. Alexander would say that he - does 
not think that one mind can reall¥r get into another mind, but 
that the "emotional reverberation' is what gives a clue to 
what the other mind is feeling. 
69. Burns, CM, 57. 
70. Ayer, in LTL, holds the same position. Note: " ••• We 
define the qualitative identity and difference of two people's 
sense-experience in terms of the similarity and dissimilarity 
of their reactions to empirica l tests." 206. 
I 
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• 
only in the pragmatic sense of successful predication 
and control but in a deeper sense of somehow coinciding 
with its nature ••• 71 
The directly given quality of experience, however, can 
never be conveyed or expressed; it is ineffable and in-
communicable. I seek to interpret other minds by em-
pathy or einfUhling, and inference from behavior. That 
such sympathetic comprehension is not pathetic fallacy, 
there is - so far as I can see - no theoretical assur-
ance. It - transcends the possibility of verifi~~le 
knowledge, and be founded only on a postulate. 
If a taxi-man has a proper concept of an hour and meets 
1
1 
me at the end of that time, he achieves a perfect prac-
tical understanding regardless of the tedium or vivacity 
with which the passing time may · differently affect us. _ I 
The hour we are concerned about, in our interests of 
cooperative behavior, is a purely rational thing, which 
may be the same for both of us regardless of the fact 
that, if I could put myself inside his experience, 
this hour might feel twice as long as to me now. For 
me to disregard this immediate quale which the time has 
for the taxi-man, · is to treat him as a thing and not as 
a fellow creature ••• I cannot literally know his exper-
ience: I can only postulate that his behavior is a clue 
to it ••• 
In the case of other conscious be.ings empathy has a 
meaning ••• Knowledge is independent of any supposed 
identity of quality between subjective knowing state 
and objective thing ••• Genuine verifiable knowledge 
cannot, thus, interpret things on any analogy to spirits• 
On the contrary, it can grasp other minds only as things, 
revealed i~ the patterns of behavior ••• The rest is 
postulate. 3 . 
Berkeley gives some indications of being aware of the prob-
lem of knowledge about other minds. In the Commonplace Book 
he says, "··· I know with an intuitive knowledge of the 
71. Lewis, ~MO, 410. 
72. _Ibid, 409. 
73. Ibid, 409-411. Note, Ayer, LTL, 208. 
"··· Mutual understanding is defined in terms of 
harmony of behavior." 
... 
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existence of other things as well as my own soul. 1174 By "other 
things", he meant the existence of selves as well as physical 
objects. In the Third Dialogue Between Hylas and Philonous, he 
shows the need for inference: "My own mind and my own ideas I 
have an immediate knowledge of; and, with the help of these, do 
mediately apprehend the possibility of the e.xis tence of other I! 
s pirits and ideas. "76 He omi.ts telling us just what the process ll 
of mediation is, but he does s peak of nature as being the l an- ~~ 
guage of God, and we judge from this that mediation is possible I 
I 
·because of language which acts as the tool for the expression of 
meaning , an idea fou~d in both Burns and Price. 
Gregory accepts both the fact that all knowledge comes 
through inference, and the fact that all indiVidual experience 1 
is private, and concludes that analogy is the ?nly possible way lj 
of knowing whether anoth er mind existed or not. 76 Mind can 
know mind, h e says , only through the observation of bodies which 
resemble each other in size, shape, and manner of movement.77 
1 T.he material world is the tie that holds the various separate 
centers of activity in one continuous whole. 78 Communication is 
carried on by way of bodily actions79 because our knowledge 
74. Berkeley, Commonplace Book, M568. 
75. Berkeley, Works, 326. 
76. Gregory, Art. 19, 468-473. 
77. Price, Art. 8, 425. 
78. Gregory, Art. 19, 446. 
79. Ibid, 448. 
II 
depends on our p revious experiences and resemblances of these 
experiences in the behavior of another. Thoughts, r,eelings, de-
sires are inner experiences and closed to inspection; minds are 
private; only bodies can be inspected. Absence of bodil¥ signs 
would make it impossible for us to receive mental states • 
••• Ultimately every intimation received by one mind 
from another appears to be open to inspection only up 
to some movement in the body of the latter. Behind 
these movements, open to inspection in principle if 
not always in fact, lie the inferred thoughts and 
mental states and processes in all their infi nite 
variety which are intimated by these movements.80 
He continues: 
Our knowledge of other minds seems to be the inverse 
of our knowledge of physical objects. To know that 
other minds are angry or can be angry we must have 
been angry ourselves. We can apprehend the hardness 
of objects without being hard ourselves or perceive 
colours without being similarly coloured.Sl 
In mature minds the recognition of other minds appears to 
be immediate because inference in infancy is implicit and spon-
taneous. His chief reason for rejecting the immediacy of 
knowledge is sound. If knowledge is immediate, he says, then we 
should be able to disregard any unlikeness of an object in 
structure and habit and know immediately that it is a man. 82 
In our every day experiences, we naturally tend to limit the 
possibility of an object having a mind to an object that seems 
to have a similar body and actions. 
80. Gregory, Art. 19, 448. 
81. Ibid, 450. 
82. Ibid, 449. 
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Alexander and Burns reach their conclusions of knowing Ill 
another mind through enjoyment because of the social aspect of J 
experience and the publicity of given objects; Gregory, on the 
other hand, reaches his point of view from the privacy of expe-
rience, or the idea of the individual as a closed monad. Yet 
it is interesting to note that each accepts the end-results of 
the other .as a postulation with which to begin. Alexander and 
Burns start with the individual as given, and upon that, build 
I 
a social world; Gregory recognizes the world as given, and upon f 
r 
it, creates the individual with his world of private experiences l 
Vfhen Gregory talks about the inference in infancy as being 
implicit and spontaneous, we wonder if he is not contradicting 
his own hypothesis, and really agreeing with Alexander, admit- I 
ting that ultimate knowledge of other minds rests upon instincu
1
1 
If so, he has a truth here. We cannot escape the deep-rooted 
social instinct implanted in all men. Are not the actions of 
babies an evidence of this~ Do not tiny infants know their 
II 
II 
II mothers long before they are able to observe the behavior of 
1 their own bodies~83 The argument from analogy alone is not con 
elusive. Analogy puts the whole weight of evidence upon simi- IJ 
larity and resemblance. In the process of knowing, difference 
is e.s necessary a factor as similarity. Similarity limits 
knowledge to that of sameness of classes and types. It may be 
possible, and experiences of some of the mystics seem to prove 
83. Burns, CM, 48. 
II 
I 
il 
I 
I 
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the probability, that objects which do not resemble the human 
body may show evidence of mind-activity. William Blake and St. 
Joan saw spirits in trees, and St. Francis of Assisi talked 
James Ward accepts the theory of analogy for knowledge or 
other selves only after the knowing self has been posited. His 
position is similar to that of Descartes in this respect. He 
says, 11When the [individual's bodily} self has become an obJect, 
the objects that resemble it become other selves or e.jects.n85 
Royce wavers between the ultimately individual aspect ?f 
1 experience, which necessitates the analogical point of view, and 
the fundamentally social explanation. Finally the social point 
of view - predominates. In the earlier pages of The Problem of 
Christiani~, Vol. II, he says: 
84. vVheelwright, Art. 16, 122. 
85. Ward, PP, 33. 
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One man ••• can only indirectly discover the intentions, 
the thoughts, the · ideas, of another man ••• By nature, 
every man's plans, intents, opinions, and the range of 
personal experience are secrets, except in so far as his 
physical organism indirectly reveals them. His fellows 
can learn these secrets only through his expressive move-
ments. Control your expression, keep silence, avoid the 
unguarded loo~ and telltale gesture; and then nobody can 
discover what is in your mind. No man can directly read 
the hearts of his fellows. This seems, for our common 
sense, to be one of the deepest-seated laws of our 
I 
., 
social experience ••• We are individuated by the law that 
our train of conscious thought and purpose are mutually 
inaccessible through any mode of direct intuition. Each 
of us lives within the charmed circle of his own con-
scious will and meaning, - each of us is more or less 
clearly the object ~f his own inspection, but is hope-
lessly beyond direct observation of his fellows.86 
Yet in the latter part of the book87 he definitely comes to 1 
I 
the conclusion that analogy is not a conclusive proof of the I 
I 
II 
I and the general workings of its ideas into the perceived mind, 
through the perception of my body, to that of my neighbor's, and / 
thus find that his movements and expressions resemble mine or my 
1 
known self. This analogy is false, for most of my ideas and 
knwwledge of myself, I learn through my own community, through 
the testimony of my fellow men. 
IJ 
I cannot perceive as directly 
my inner expressive movements, in as direct a manner, as I can I 
Analogy tends to I the movements of the members of my community. 
I 
say that when I look thus and thus, I feel so and so. This is 
false in the light of social common sense. I know that often 
I 
86. Royce, POC, II, 31-33. 
87. Ibid, 319-324. 
I 
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I pretend to look a certain way in order to hide from my fellows 
my true feelings. And the correlation of feelings and facial 
expressions I learn through my neighbor's reports regarding 
them. In a true sense, social experience is prior to individual 
experience, and knowledge of others is prior to knowledge of my-
self. 
Price rejects both the analogical and intuitive theories of 
knowing other minds as being inadequate, and advances one which 
is implicit in the thoughts of many modern philosophers. 88 He 
thinks that "one's evidence for the existence of other minds is 
derived primarily from the understanding of language. 1189 By 
! language he means not only writing and speech, but all signs 
which can be intelligibly interpreted, such as, signals with 
flags and lights, and gestures of pointing and beckoning. How-
ever, he is firm in saying from the start that at best, language 
can only be an evidence of the existence of minds, and not 
proof • . It would be impossible to give proof in a mathematical 
sense. 90 The evidence in the case of language will be strongest 
when new information is given, information which can be subse-
quently verified. 91 With information given which was not known 
before, and therefore not believed in, all possibility that the 
88. Supra, Preface of this dissertation. 
89. Price, Art. 8, 429. 
90. Ibi9., 431. 
91. Lo c • c i t • 
92 
subconscious of the individual is at work, communicating with 
the conscious mind, is removed. Price reiterates the need for 
the new information over and over a g ain • 
••• If the noises uttered by a fo r eign body (or its 
visible gesticulations) are to p rovide adequate strong 
evidence for the existence of another mind, they must 
g ive me info~tation. They must symbolize something 
which I did not know or believe beforehand, and which 
I then p roceed to verify for mys elf. If these condi-
tions are fulfilled, I have evidence of the occurrence 
of a foreign act of perceiving - an act of perceiving 
which did not form a p art of my own mental history.92 
The information given may be particular, such as: The bus 
is c oming; or g eneral: Salt dissolves in water; or any universal 
p rinciple which c an be proved to be true through empirical ex-
perimentation, such as: Bodi e s fall. The basic qualification of 
the theory is that the information must be verifiable. 
There are several advantages in this t h eory over the in-
tuitive or analogical ones. In the first place, it will not be 
essential to posit a body. Intelli gible and informative 
ances will suffice to postulate the existence of another 
I 
utter- I 
mind. 93 1 
It appe ars that I could conceivably g et strong evidence 
of the existence of another mind even if there was no 
observable organism with which such a mind could be 
connected ••• There is no log ical absurdity in the hypo~ 
thesis of a rational parrot or a rational caterpillar ••• 
I could have ••• better evidence ••• than I can have 
in the case of a human idiot.94 
-----------------------
9 2 . Price, Art. 6, 432. 
93. Ibid, 434. 
94. Ibid, 436. cr. 434, 435. 
93 
In the second place, the theory allows .for the idea or the lj 
!'all in~ impact o.f objects on consciousness. The new in.formation, 
on the ears, acts like the shock o.f Santayana. 95 Also, in the 
communication situation there is the intrusive sort o.f communi-
cation where ideas, though not new in.formation, break upon one's I 
consciousness and .force attention. Price accepts the intrusive 
nature o.f communication as a weak evidence, though, .for he says 
that it would be di.f.ficult to prove the .fact that ideas were 
coming from a .foreign body and not .fron1 the subconsciousness o.f 
the hearer. 96 
The greatest value o.f this second advantage is that it 
gives evidence o.f a common world. The in.for.mation comes 
symbols which are understandable. The objects which s~nbols 
represent are presented and are not the creation o.f an indivi-
dual. There.f ore, the ·world that the individual is aware o.f is 
public to him and conunon to another mind. 97 P.r-ic:e ~ wri tes: 
••• If I am to have evidence of your existence, there 
must be .publicity somewhere. Somehow or other we must 
both have access to one and the same world; if not by 
sensing, then by some other fssm of consciousness 
which sensing makes possible. 
95. Price makes a distinction between s pontaneous thinking, 
the train o.f coherence within consciousness, and imposed think-
ing , thinking which starts from an outside stimulus. This dis-
tinction is also an example of the intrusion of an object on 
consciousness. 
96. Price, Art. 8, 341. 
97. Ibid, 448. 
98. Loc. cit. 
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Again: 
Any evidence that I can get of your existence is bound 
also to be evidence that you do not live in a private ! 
world, but in the public world which is common to all 
intelligence, or at least to all those which can have · 99 any good reason to believe in one another's existence. 
The third, and perhaps the most important value in the 
theory is that it accounts for particularity of experience. In 
any communication situation, there is a relationship of three 
terms- Symbol, Object, and Mind. The . symbol must be an object 
and have meaning for a particular mind • 
••• It is not sufficient that S should symbolize some 
object to someone. It must symbolize some object to 
me. I must understand it. Otherwise all I know about 
rr-is a noise or black mark having such-and-such sen-
sible qualities. It is true that if I heard sounds 
uttered in the Arabic language, which I do not under-
stand, I could reasonably conclude to the existence 
of another mind. But only by analogy. The sounds 
have some similarity to others which are symbols to 
me; I therefore assume that they, too, ·mi§ht come to 
be symbols to me if I took the trouble.lO 
In order to be evidence, the symbols must propound proposi-
tions which can be tested to be true or false by a particular 
mind. The propositions need not be in grammatical for.m; lan-
guage can be elliptic and yet signify a proposition. The basic 
requirement is that the symbols of language, words or signs, 
must be understandable. The only way to test meanings is to 
observe the reactions of people and see if their actions are 
99. Price, Art. 8, 449. · 
100. Ibid, 441-442. 
95 
appropriate to the intended meanings. As Ayer says, "mutual 
understanding is defined in terms of ••• harmony of behavior.rrlO 
Price, in his anxiety to emphasize the particular mind at I 
work, fails to tell us how symbols get their meanings, or how 
they originate. Royce supplies the link by suggesting that so-
cial relationships in a comraunity give rise to meanings.102 
How do I postulate another mind1 he says. First, through the 
fact that when another addresses me by word or gesture, certain 
ideas are aroused in my mind which by contrast to my own, and b 
t heir unexpectedness and novelty, 103 I know they are not the 
ideas of my own creation, and h ence the ideas of another. 104 
These new ideas which your words and deeds have -sug-
gested to me actually possess an interpretation. They 
have an interpreter. They are interpreted ••• This in-
terpreter would mediate between the new ideas which 
your deed have suggested to me, and the train of ideas · 
which I already call my own ••• Now such an interpreter, 
mediating between two contrasting ideas or sets · of ideas, 
and making clear their contrasts; their meaning ; and · 
their mutual relations, would be, by hypothesis, a mind. 
It would not be my own present mind; for by myself 
alone I actually fail to interpret the ideas which your 
deeds have aroused in me.l05 
Though the language theory is perhap s the most comprehen-
sive in giving evidence of the ex istence of other minds, yet it, 
too, in itself is not ade quate. All three t h eories, the lan-
guage, the analogical, and the intuitive, have valuable 
101. Ayer, LT.L, 208. 
102. Supra, Chapter II of this dissertation. 
103. This is - analogous to the n ew information concep t of 
Price. Supra, Chapter Il -of this dissertation. 
104. Royce, poe, II, 320. 
====1~105 Ibid 322. 
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contributions to offer for an empirical and coherent theory of 
knowledge. We do not deny our earlier postulation that belief 
in a self or selves is based upon faith rising from a feeling of 
certainty supp lied by intuition. But in order to go beyond the 
believing state to a knowing state, we must verify our beliefs 
by a consistent view of all the facts of experience. Even Des-
cartes had to have objects of doubt, to know that he was doubt-
ing. The truly empirical account of knowledge must take the va-
luable aspects of the known theories into one comprehensive 
whole. If intuitions were valid in themselves, we should have 
no ground for error, and would know unfailingly whether an ob-
ject before consciousness was another self or a physical object. 
V'ie do have error. We see men as trees walking, or trees as men. 
It may be said, in reply that error in knowledge rises because 
intuition is not at work at all times, though when at 'Nork, it 
is unfailing in its function. Again, we ask, if intuition is 
not at work at all times, how are we to distin~1 ish the times it 
is at work from the times when it is not~ At what special time 
can we say that we have extrospective experience~ There is no 
criterion which would enable us to judge when one kind of ex-
perience begins and another ends. Hence, intuition is valuable 
only in giving us a basis for postulation. Beyond that, we must 
discard it for more relational evidence. 
On the other hand, the analogical theory, which is empiri-
cal to the core, can point only to a 'that' without telling 
whether the 'that' is a machine or a purposive agent. It ·can 
97 
point to outward behavior, but cannot tell or describe the in-
ner states of a mind. We may be able to draw some inferences 
from outward action, but we have no guarantee that the infer-
ence is true or false. A person may deliberately act one ·way, 
and mean another. 'Ihen, again, as we have said before, analogy 
places too much emphasis on similarity, and not enough on dif-
ferentiation. Through analogy we can know only like minds. 
On the other hand, analogy has three important contribu-
tions to make to knowledge which cannot be ignored. First, 
analo gy helps to reaffirm the transcendental power of the self. 
By its method of comparison, the individuality of objects is 
recognized. Also, in the very fact that one self can interact 
with, and understand another, even if the understanding is 
reached through bodily behavior, it is shown that the self some- I 
how has bridged the gap between subject and subject, and in so 1 
I 
I 
doing, has transcended space and its own immediate experiences. 
Second, the search for the like, constantly going on in I 
analogy, intimates an underlying unity. This is valuable, for :I 
unity is the "necessary condition of that universality, that 
mutuality of mind without which knowledge and its communication 
are impossible."106 
Third, through analogy, we get a key to the deduction of 
formal, universal concepts which are essential to the signifi-
cant existence of any se1f.107 
106. Urban, Art. 14, 582. 
107. Wnee1wri ght, Art. 16, 122. Infra, p. l40ff. 
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Of the three theories discussed, the analogical, the intui- /i 
An echo coming from a wall might consist of intelli-
gible noises, but they may give me new information. 
But I should not conclude that the wall was animated 
by an intelligent mind, . because I know that walls do 
not s pontaneously p roduce noises of that sort ••• 108 
Then again, there is as much opportunity for error in this 
theory in mistaking inanimate ob jects for animate ones as in the 1 
intuitive theory. Unless a person has had past experiences, he 
could in no way know that telephones and radios were not human 
being s or spirits. Error, in this theory, also may be found in 
the interpretation of meanings. Just as behavior may be con-
sciously falsified to mislead, so meanings may be consciously 
f alsified to mislead, or the real meanings intended by symbols 
108. Price, Art. 8 , 430. 
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employed may be misconstrued. Nevertheless, since persons are 
purposive agents, the meanings they express through language 
will give a better clue to their inner states than the bodily 
behavior they show. In order to get truth, however, meanings 
II 
I 
i 
I 
I 
II 
must be check ed with bodily behavior, and with social activity. I 
~~yway, as men develop socially, they show greater desire to 
think reasonably and less desire to deceive. Reflective social 
consciousness produces cooperative action for significant ends, 
and the aspiration to infuse worthy moral ' judgments throughout 
society by higher intelligible communication. 109 
109. Supra, p. 43ff. of this dissertation. 
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CHAPTER IV 
'l'HE PRESUPPOSITIONS OF COMMUNICATION 
In Chapters I and II, we say that communication is the 
conscious recognition of the unity underlying social activity.l 
T.hrough communication the raw events of experience turn into 
objects or things with meaninga, 2 and meanings not only give 
signifi.ca:mee to co8perative activity, but also become the means 
of perpetuating and transmitting culture through language.3 
The etymology of the word brings out the social aspect. 
The English word communication is derived from the Latin £Qm-
municatio, which in turn is derived from the verb communicare. 
T.he word communicare comes from communis which is the root of 
our English word common, meaning public. Communis is a combina-
tion of com (cum), meaning with, and the root~ (old Latin) 
or~ (new form) meaning shut or fasten. Thus ·£Qm +munis con-
notes the idea of sharing in common or even being bound to-
gether. The Latin dictionary edited by Andrews, and revised 
and enlarged by Lewis and Short; and both the la.rge and small 
1. Supra, p. 39ff. of this dissertation. 
2. Dewey, EN, 166. 
3. Dewey, LOG, 19, 20. 
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II 
dictionary by Skeat; and the dictionaries by Webster, Funk and I ~ 
.I 
Wagnall, Winston, agree in general with t he derivation as given.j
1 
The new Oxford dictionary, however, opens a new problem. In I 
the discussion of the word there, we find a question raised as 
I 
!I 
I 
whether communis is a combination of ~ ~ ~~ meaning fastened I 
together, or com~ oinos (old Latin) or~ (new form), mean- 1 
to the root meaning of communis. It is not definitely known 
ing one. 4 
Interestingly enough we shall find that this very uncer-
' 
tainty in the final root derivation of the word is the same sort / 
of difference we notice among philosophers who have written on 
connnunication. The realists tend to stress the oneness, the 
common elements, in the process of communication, and the 
I 
'I 
i 
idealists, on the other hand, the harmony and the purposive as- j 
pect of communication. The latter claim that through communica- i 
tion person is united with person in a common end, but is not 
unified into an undifferentiated whole. 5 This outstanding con-
I 
I 
troversial difference will be discussed more fully in the course ! 
of the chapter in treating the problems: What makes communica-
1 
tion possible'i What are the presuppositions of communication'C 1! 
'I 
In order to begin the discussion, let us take a single in-
stance of communication, and see what is involved in the pro-
cess. When a speaker say s to a hearer, The Mongolians belong 
4. Murray, NEF, Vol. II, Part II, 699. 
5. Burns, CM, 65. 
to /! 
I 
I 
I 
I 
the yellow race, or makes any other statement of fact, or fic-
tion, for that matter, the words as mere sounds mean nothing. 
They are the result of specific motor actions such as the intak 
ing of breath, the movement of larynx, the palate, the tongue, 
the lip s, and the exhaling of the air taken in. The significant 
fact, in any such instance, is not the physical event, but the 
f act that a mind, in the utterance of a statement, has made an 
inference or judgment through the use of words which have a 
6 
common meaning to both the he a rer and the speaker. What is an I 
Inference is nothing but the "operational p rocess of l inference? 
readi n g meaning s in the marks and signs of language. 117 Words, 
in any judgment or inference, act as the tools of meanings; 8 
and language, thus, becomes the instrument that "perp etuates oc-
currences and renders them amenable to public consideration." 9 
In the statement made, the public consideration is either the 
accep tance or rejection of whether the Mongolians do, or do 
not, belong to the yellow race. 
Philosophers as a group agree that signs and symbols are 
6. Ogden and Richards, MOM, 90. 
7. Dewey, EN, 174. 
8. Dewey, LOG, 46. 
9. Ibid, 19. 
103 
I 
necessary for communication, 10 but they disagree as to whether 
signs and symbols have meanings inherent in them through rela-
tions, such as the complexes of neutral entities, or whether 
meanings are g iven to signs and symbols by mind either as a re-
sult of the interaction of mind with mind in social intercourse, 1 
or as a result of the interaction of mind with an object in 
!sense experience. The problem is sometimes stated thus: Do 
symbols denote or connote meanings~ 
The distinction between denotation and connotation is super , 
ficial,for the terms may be used interchangeably without losing I 
very much, but the nee-realists make this a major issue. 
Spaulding gives a p eculiar sort of objectivity to meanings. He 
says that meanings are subsist ent reals and are therefore 
neither mind nor matter. Symbols denote meanings because the 
human mind does not produce them; meaning s are disclosed to mind 
as propositions. 11 Thus the mind mi ght be said to be passively-
active; and to become a sort of effect, what Spaulding calls 
the "end term of the communication relation. 1112 He defines 
10. At this point, we must not overlook the growing tendency 
among some thinkers to believe that telepathy may be a means of 
getting meanings directly without the media of symbols. How-
ever, to us, it is a problem whether the impact of telepathic 
messages is the transference of symbols or the stimulation of 
symbols in the mind of the receivers. In either case, we are 
convinced that some symbolic reference is necessary for even 
telepathic communication. 
11. Spaulding , WOC, 10. 
12. Ibid, 18·. 
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mind as 11 (1) that which is rational inquiry (by means of propo- II 
sitions), (2) that to which 'something' is disclosed, and ' 
(3) that which communicates and is communicated to - again by 
means of propositions.rrl3 
From his definition it is difficult to know just what the 
function of mi nd really is. It seems to us that there is a 
contradiction between mind as "rational inquiry" and mind as 
that "to which something is disclosed. 11 The first is voluntari-
ly active, and the second, wholly passive, though it might be 
said that it is voluntarily passive in the sense that it chooses 
to be disclosed to; but to us, the very term 'disclosure' sug-
gests inactivity, and hence a lack of volition. We think that 
the inadequacy in his theory troubles even Spaulding, for he 
questions the possibility of "real communication" when he tries 
to define the relationship of symbols and meanings • 
••• What I have called the meaning cannot, if there is 
genuine communication of one mind with another, be iden-
tical with, [a)l the words, for these are purely physi-
cal events; (b), the consciousness of the words, for 
this is two-fold ••• the meaning is~; (c), the con-
sciousness of the meaning, for these are also n-fold; 
(d), facts, for these are ••• independent of being 
communicated ••• Facts simply are: they are neither true 
nor false. The meaning is, then, not a mental or · a · 
conscious entity; it is also not a physical one; ••• 
Still, it is either something, and one single something 
in the case of genuine ·, communication ••• I am not saying 
that there is ever such communication ••• If there is, 
then this is possible on one and· only one condition, and 
that is that there is one and only one me~ning of which 
13. Spaulding, WOC, 275. 
I 
I 
I 
two or more minds are aware ••• The meaning is, in any 
particular instance, · identical with what is usually 
called a proposition.l4 
For Spaulding, consciousness is not really necessary to 
systematize experience and to help create meanings through judg-
ments. Consciousness becomes to him only a tool for the dis-
closure of meanings. In his theory we find three irreducible 
gaps 1 a gap between mind and meaning; a gap between meaning and 
symbol; and a gap between symbol and mind. We are not told how 
meanings are united to symbols or how any of the gaps are 
bridged. We wonder: is the process of disclosure a sort of in-
tuition which in its very function produces certainty~ How is 
the disclosure of symbols and the disclosure of meanings differ-
entiated~ Is it habit and constant repetition that make the 
connection, and force the mind to say: When this, a symbol, is 
followed by that, a meaning, this is a representation of that~ 
We think it possible to remove one of the gaps by making the 
ml nd an active agent, which in the interaction with an object 
(in a communication situation, the object might be a meaning), 
produces a symbol to represent the object. It seems to us that 
without the activity of mind, it would be impossible for symbols 
to spring into existence. 
To us it is not surprising that Spaulding wonders about the 
possibility of communication. His theory would make it impos-
sible for one mind to act upon another, especially in view of 
14. Spaulding , WOO, 5-6. 
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the fact that for him mind is an "end product" in connnunication 
and not a causal agent. The only possible way for his theory to 
be logical and retain all the terms in the communication of mean 
to maintain a direct relationship between meanings and symbols, 
1and an indirect one between symbols and mind. In this way, the 
symbols, already full of meanings, can be disclosed to mind, and 
the gap between symbols and meanings be eradicated. But even I 
this would raise serious problems. How can passive objects~ suc l 
as symbols and meanings, both of which are other than mind in 
Spaulding's theory, unite directly~ Of course, it is conceiv-
able that a natural force of attraction and repulsion could make 
it possible for some meanings as subsistent entities to be at-
trac.ted or repulsed to certain symbols, other subsistent enti-
ties. If such were the case, it still would not explain the 
possibility of error in knowing. If meanings are inherent in 
symbols, how can misunderstandings arise~ There are cases of 
misinterpretation of meanings of some symbols, such as mistaking 
artificial fruit in a bowl for real; speaking to a stranger, 
thinking that he was someone known; hallucinations, etc. Then 
again, so~e symbols are ambiguous - even in the writings of 
philosophers, it is difficult at times to know what is meant. 
If minds were merely passive ln knowing, there would be no room 
for ambiguity. Then again, we find cases of deliberate misuse 
of symbols to deceive through such means as sophistry and play 
on words. Some propagandists, in order to gain their ends, 
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consciously g ive misleading information. These instances show 
that the mind is not wholly p assive. The activity of the mind 
is revealed by the fact that in thinking and communicating, the 
mind is constantly selecting some meanings and discarding others 
At times new meanings are created, and old ones chang ed greatly. 
No theory of knowledge or communication would be satisfactory 
and true to all the facts of experience, if it did not acknow-
ledge the creative aspect of mind. 
Ogden and Richards, whose theory is very similar to Sp auld-
ing 's, show a deeper insight into the understanding of the mean- ~ 
ing of communication because they allow for some activity on the l 
p art of mind. 'Ihey claim a causal interaction of mind with sym-
bols which helps to eliminate one of the irreducible g aps found 
in Spaulding 's theory. They say that the mind not only finds, ,, 
but creates symbols which point to meanings discovered in social 1 
relationship. Symbols thus become indicable and descriptive of 
meanings having objective status. Others understand the sym-
bols used not only because meanings are common or public prop-
erty, but because minds function alike in perceiving meanings. 
They believe that 
between a thought and a symbol causal relations hold. 
When we speak~ the symbolism we employ is caused partly 
by social and psychological factors - the purpose for 
which we are making the reference, the p roposed effect 
of our symbols on other persons, and our own attitude. 
~Yhen we hear what is said, the symbols cause us to 
perform an act of reference and to assume an attitude 
which will, according to circumstances, be more or less 
similar to the act and the attitude of the speaker.l5 
15. 0 den and Richards MOM 10-11. -==~~==~==========~==============================#====== 
We can see rrom this that the symbols rather than meanings 1 
are the product of mind. The meaning s seem to be independent I 
objects ·to which symbols refer. "Symbols record events and com- 1 
municate facts. "16 There seems to b e a sort or direct relation- ~~ 
ship between mind and symbols, and between mind and meaning s, 
and an indirect one between meanings and symbols. This very 
thing is a weakness in the theory. It seems strange that mean-
ings, which indicate by their very terms an activity of mind, 
should be a referent, a physical indicable17 independent of mind 
for their origina tion and existence. It seems to us that it I 
would be more logical to have meanings, rather than symbols, H II 
a choice has to be made between them, the end-terms or product 
of communication. Since symbols indicate or represent meanings, 
why not have a direct relationship between symbols and meanings? 
Burns attempts to eliminate the defect by stating that 
meanings are a peculiar relationship of minds to minds. They 
are not entirely objective like sense objects, as acceptanced 
by Ogden and Richards, nor are they entirely subjective like 1 
consciousness, but are at once the process and the result of thel 
interaction of minds in social experience, the subject-object 
determinations which as p rocess are relations, and as determina-
tions, are what might be called tertiary qualities or ideal 
16. Ogden and Richards, MOM, 9. 
17. Ducasse, Art. 23, 46. 
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values. In other words, the terms are simultaneous with the re-
18 lations. At the same time, as meaning s are discovered, or ap-
propriated, or expressed, symbols are created by mind which 
become the common tools for cooperative action and indicate or 
describe the relationship between minds. Through symbols, the 
meaning s which are originally the individual's become society's. 
Communication is the tang ible sign of the change from individual 
experience to social experience. "In communication your enjoy-
ment is p resent, as mind is, within what is fundamentally 
'ours' ."
19 Communication, thus, rests upon meanings, and become. 
an ultimate reality. Meanings as a relation between minds canno 
be explained entirely"by the terms of that relation, for the 
terms are not the relation, and the relation is not the terms.20 
In the theory of Burns we find the mind actively employed 
in filling the three g aps left by Spaulding. In his theory 
there is a direct relationship between the mind and symbols, be-
tween the symbols and meanings, and between meanings and mind. 
All three terms are tl1e result of the activity of a mind in 
constant inter-relationship with society. However, there is one 
noticeable defect. Burns fails to tell us explicitly how the 
dialectic process in society produces new meanings. In order to 
explain this, he must in reality show a tetradic rather than a 
18. 
19. 
120. 
Burns, CM, 44. 
Ibid, 66. 
Ibid, 44. 
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triadi~ relationship in communication, for the meaning turned 
I into an effect is a different relationship from the meaning used I 
as a cause in producing the symbol; the effect in turn becomes 
the context for further interaction, and so on ad infinitum.21 
Ducasse makes explicit this four-term relationship. Like 
Burns and Ogden and Richards, he thinks that the mind is a 
causal agent. The relationship of symbolizing is a psychologi-
cal, and at times a logical one. 22 Through the activity of 
mind, the symbols "can acquire or relinquish" a relatiohal 
23 
status. Note his statement: 
••• Nothing is intrinsically a symbol, but that 
anything · is a symbol if and only if it symbolizes. 
MoreoVer, the relation called syrabolizing is not a 
dyadic but rather a tetradic relation. That is, in · 
order for something A to be a symbol of something B, 
there must be in addition C, a mind trained in a 
special way, and D, a certain manner in which that 
mind is occupied at the time. For although we do say, 
for instance, that a mark consisting of a little 
cross is the symbol of addition, the fact is of course 
at times when that mark is not present to a mind, it 
does not symbolize addition or ,anything else. More-
over, even when it is present to a mind, it does not 
symbolize addition unless that mind has been trained 
in a certain manner.24 
Wnen this causal activity of mind acts in a uniform and 
regular manner, i.e., if "a change of a kind C occurring in a 
state of kind S of something of kind T, causes regularly in it 
21. Infra, p. l8?ff. of this dissertation. 
22. Ducasse, Art. 23, 41-42. 
23. Ibid, 45. 
24. Ibid, 41. 
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a change of kind E", 25 th h think h en, e . s, we ave a causal law 
!called semeiotic interpretation. The four terms involved in 
this interpretation are as follows: 
(a) The interpreter, namely, the set of mental habits 
possessed by the person concerned. These constitute 
the kind of mind he has. 
(b) The context of inter2retation, namely, the kinds 
of things of which at a given time he is conscious, 
whether clearly or unclearly. 
(c) The interpretandum, namely, a kind of change super-
vening in the context of interpretation and thus func-
tioning as cause. 
(d) The interpretans, namely, another kind of change 
immediately following it and thus functioning as an 
effect.26 
For any theory of communication, the explication of this 
four-term relationship is valuable. Ducasse, here, is acknow-
ledg ing an important contribution made by the logical positi-
vists, namely, the shift of emphasis from verification to con-
firmation. This is the real ground for the recent trend to re-
evaluate individual activity in the light of social activity. 
In Dewey we find the social emphasized over and over again. 
He says: 
25. 
26.' .. 
27. 
••• Meaning which a conventional symbol has is not 
itself conventional. For its meaning is established 
by agreements of different persons in existential 
activities having reference to existential conse-
cuences. This g ives its commonality.G7 
Ducasse, Art. 23, 42. 
Ibid, 42-43. 
Dewey, LOG, 47. 
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Thus, we are told that a meaning is given to a word when the 
use of the word establishes a community of action. 28 He says: 
A sound or mark of any physical existence is a part · · 
of language only in virtue of its operational force ••• 
Words or symbols provide no evidence of any existence • 
••• They make possible ordered discourse or reasoning ••• 
Words mean what they mean in connection wi~h conjoint 
activities and effect a common, or mutually participated 
in, consequence.29 
We can see that for Dewey, meanings spring from social inter-
action,30 and symbols become the instruments for concerted 
'I 
I 
I 
I 
·I 
action for a definite end or purpose. 31 I Words, therefore, not J 
only are denotative, but also connotative. They may be used in I 
Language, as a set of sys tema-j an intensive or extensive way.32 
tized symbols, is the relating tie of an organized group, and 
presupposes the group.33 
Dewey's stress of the social aspect of communication is 
commendable, but we wish that he had been more specific on the 
origination of symbols. At times he seems to be saying that 
· some symbols with inherent meanings exist per ~~ s.nd at other 
times that meanings are attached to symbols through usage. We 
wonder if we have here the ghost of the Scholastic distinction 
28. Dewey, EN, 185. 
29. Dewey, LOG, 48-53. 
30. Ibid, 50, 53. 
31. Dewey, EN, 185. 
32. Alexander, STD, II, 15. 
33. Dewey, EN, 185. 
II 
,, 
I 
113 
114 
___ l ____ · ----
----~- ------- ----·--=--=-~--=--=-~=--=-=-:1:1===== 
1: between primary and secondary qualities? Or perhaps, he is, II . 
l like Ducasse, attempting to show a tetradic r elationship between 
Jmind and meanings and symbols, and is really trying to say that 
I 
Jdenotative me anings are changed to connotative terms in the 
I 
I 
!process of experience. This latter interpretation is perhaps 
closer to Dewey's idea, for in g eneral he rejects the possibili-
l
ty of subsistent meanings or symbols, for he says that 11words or 
!symbols p rovide no evidence of any existence." 34 Subsistent j 
jreality can be known only through its manifestation in existence 
I jand subsistence is a f orm of existence in one sense of the word, 
lfor subsistents are, or have being,though not in a sp ace-time 
1realm. 
I The ambiguity at this point rests upon Dewey's peculiar use 
lor consciousness. He makes a distinction betwe en mind and con-
!sciousness and says that consciousness is the raw, brute fact 
I . 
jof 1 isness' , 35 and yet, this 1 isness 1 is awareness of meanings 
\and the having of ~ctual ideas. 36 There seems to be a contra-
/diction of terms here. We have a mere flux, and somehow that 
!mere flux becomes full of meanings and functions more like a I 
·whole mind. In our treatment of the self in Cha·pter II, we make j 
! a distinction between consciousness and the whole mind, but we I 
iallow for the possibility of transcending the 1 isness 1 or datum 
by the mediating power of the self. Dewey gives no such ex-
134. Dewey, LOG, 52. 
I !35. Dewey, EN, 86. 
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planation, though he means to imply mediation through the acti-
vity of the mind. Let us return to our discussion of signs and 
symbols. 1· 
I 
Whatever the interpretation of signs or symbols may be I 
among philosophers, all of them agree that they are necessary 
either as indicators or carriers of meanings. Without symbols, 
communication would be impossible. Therefore, we may establish 
as our first principle or pre~upposition of communication the 
statement: Signs and symbols are the tools of communication. 
In the course of this discussion, we have consciously 
avoided the use of the term 'words' and constantly referred to 
signs and symbols, as the broader term. What we have said 
about symbols holds true of words, and we have tried not to use 
the term words or language for two reasons: First, there are 
symbols which convey meaning which cannot accurately be called 
words, though they may have verbal equivalents as sounds. Under 
these might be mentioned the signs of the special sciences. 
Then again, it is questioned whether every process of thinking 
needs language, though we maintain that some sort of symbolism 
is necessary. Reichenbach has said: 
It is true that most conscious thinking is bound to 
the language form, al 'though perhaps in a more or less 
loose way: the laws of style are suspended, and in-
complete groups of words are frequently used instead 
of whole propositions. But there are other types of 
thought of a more intuitive character which possibly 
do not ., contain psychological elements which can be re-
garded as constituting a language.37 
37. Reichenbach, EP, 16. 
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It is true, as Reichenbach has said, that words usu~lly 
limit their r eference to verbal or written communication. And 
we know that there are instances of transmitted or received 
meaning s which are not given or received through words. Tele-
pathy and mysticism may be given as examples. Some who believe 
in mysticism say that meanings are transmitted intuitively with-
I 
out the media of symbols because the minds communicating become I 
one undifferentiated whole. Judging from the necessity of acti- 1\ 
vity to produce thought at all, it seems difficult for us to I 
believe in complete absorption of one mind into another. To us 
direct intuition produces more problems than solutions. People 
who accept such a theory of intuition, lose sight of the fact 
that the process of knowledge or co~nunication is a two-way 
process; meanings are sent as well as received. Interaction of 
some sort is necessary for communication, even if the interac-
tion consists of the activity of sending meanings, and the acti-
1 
vity of attending to the impact of meanings, followed by selec-
tion of some meanings and r e jection of others. 
The double aspect of communication is perhaps .more evident ·j 
in telepathy than in mysticism, for in the former, there is al-
ways both the projection and reception of meanings ·, while in the 
latter, there may not be any consciousness of' meanings as ideas, 
but rather one expansive feeling of ecstasy. As we have said 
previously38 the impact of meanings in telepathy must be either 
38. Supra, Chapter I of this dissertation. 
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II the stimulation of symbols, or the transference of symbols. I 
Without some media of exchange as the common ground where minds J 
may meet, interaction would be impossible and meanings cannot 
be sent or received. 
The symbols · as the media of communication become the com-
mon ground of experience. These symbols need not be words but 
telepathy, these concepts become the symbols employed to trans-
mit meanings. The concepts are understood by the minds com-
municating because these concepts are inherent in the structure 
of experience itself. We shall find later thatmeanings, in 
reality, are objective values independent of particular indivi-
duals,40 and that some sort of symbolism is needed for a point-
ing tool. The impact of symbols follows certain logical laws 
II 
I 
We shall discuss I which make the flux of experience meaningful. 
these laws briefly.41 I 
I 
The first principle is one which all thought must follow if I 
coherence and rationality is to be obtained. It mi ght be called lj 
the principle of Logical Singularity: No symbol can mean and I 
39. Infra, p. 146ff. of this dissertation. 
40. Supra, Chapter II Cf. Infra, p. l35ff. 
41. Cf. Ogden and Richards, MOM, 88-108. The laws discussed 
here are somewhat similar to the "Canons of Symbolism" found 
in these · pages. We have attempted to simplify them as much as 
possible. 
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lj not mean an object at the same time; i.e., a symbol must stand 
for one object, and one only at a given time. This is in j, reali-; 
ty the logical law of contradiction applied to. symbolism: A is 
not non-A. The principle guards thinking against misunderstand- ! 
. I 
ing ambiguity. Without this principle, for instance, it would 1! 
be difficult to know the exact meaning intended by symbols 
which might have several connotations such as jam, a preserve, i I 
I! 
or jam, being in a crowd; staff, a walking stick, or staff, a II 
musical score, or staff, the officials of an organization; head,' 
the upper part of the body, or head, a crisis, or head, the top-' 
I 
ranking individual in a group, etc. I In order to make symbols 
I 
understandable, one and only one meaning must be intended at a 
particular moment. 
There are times, however, when, even if the symbol is used 
in only one sense, there is obscurity in the thought unless ad-
ditional explanation is given. For example, in the statement: 
I 
Mary finds it difficult to manage the staff, the two symbols 
used, staff and manage, are ambiguous. Wbat is meant by staff~ 
A walking stick? Musical score? A group of workers? What doesJ 
manage mean'i Control'i Use't In order to clarify the idea, 
another principle is set to work: This might be called the Law 
of Substitution: Symbols may be substituted one for the other 
if they mean the same thing or refer to the same object. This 
law is better known as the law of identity: A is A. The 
I 
thought in the above statement is clarified when we substitute 
'use' for manage, and 'walking stick' for staff: Mary finds it I 
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difficult to use the walking stick. The idea has not been 
changed; the first principle has been followed, the second in-
corporated, and the ambiguity removed. 
Although the uncertainty of the meaning has been eliminated 
the meaning still needs further elucidation. Why does Mary find 
it difficult to manage the stafft 
ing sticks. 
Most people can handle walk- Jl 
In order to remove the question, a third principle / 
is employed: the Law of Expansion: Symbols may be expanded in a 
particular universe of discourse to indicate an order of time, 
place and quality. With the symbols expanded in the above 
statement, we might get some such result: Mary Jones, who is 
paralyzed in the. arm, and who is lame as well, finds it diffi-
cult to use the staff. 
We do not question the truth or falsehood of the statement 
about Mary Jones. - We can observe her actions and verify the 
statement. But suppose we are told that she is sick, and 
through observation we discover that she is not sick. Are the 
principles mentioned thus far violated? Are the symbols sick 
and not-sick used to contradict each other and hence become 
meaningless~ Is not the Law of Singularity functioning~ In 
order to reach a conclusion in the dilemma presented, we become 
aware of a fourth principle, the Law of Impartiality, which 
states that the possibility of truth or falsehood does not 
change the reference of symbols. The statement: She is sick, 
is valid, until the idea is aoplified through expansion to: She 
acts as if she were sick, but all signs show that she is well. 
I 
I 
I 
II 
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Thus we get the truth of the statement: She is well. 
All these principles are substuned and implied by the fifth I 
and most important law, the Law of Coherence which states that II 
the symbols used in any given universe of discourse must not I 
violate the consistency implied in the logical laws of Identity, 
Contradiction, and Excluded Middle. The Law of Coherence has I 
two aspects, negative and positive. Negatively it means the 
absence of contradiction,42 and positively, the inter-relation-
ship of the parts to the whole. In the process of knowledge, 
I 
I 
I! 
the negative aspect of the Law is emphasized because if there i~ 
an absence of irrevocable contradiction, then the positive ele-
ment is revealed, the parts are shown to be correlated into a 
systematic whole. 
The Law of Coherence is the criterion of judgment and helps! I 
to test the truth oi' validity of any statement or proposition. 11 
I 
In the testing of the statement given: Mary Jones is sick, the 
process is simple. The Law of Identity says: She is sick; 
I 
I Contradiction, She is not sick; Excluded Middle~ She is either 
I 
sick or not sick. Then, when absence of contradiction is ob-
tained through Expansion: She acts as if she were sick, but 
other signs seem to indicate that she is not sick, the positive / 
aspect of the Law of Coherence sets to work and points to the 
signs which indicate that she is not sick. When the parts 
,, 
I 
I 121 
the test of Coherence may be discarded as meaning less. 
The Law of Coherence with the other laws of symbolism are 
operative in the field of meaning s and are employ ed primarily to 
remove contradictions in p articular universes of meanings and to 
clarify vagueness of expressions. Meaning s and symbols are thus 
interdependent and cannot be separated. The problems arising 
from symbolism are due p artly to the ambiguity and inexactness 
with which the word 'meaning' has been employed by the philoso-
1 phers ! Ogden and Richards list at least sixteen different ways 
in which reputable, contemporary philosophers have used the 
term.43 
T.he meaning of meaning is significant, for on its defini- I 
To us it is particu- II tions hang the various systems of thought. 
larly important, for we find that me anings are the end terms of 
the communication process. It is obvious that we cannot ana-
lyze the meaning of communication, without paying special atten-
tion to the aim of communication. It is interesting to note tha · 
desp ite the value of precise definitions · in understanding the 
meaning of meaning, very little systematic work has been done 
by philosophers on the subject. The En glish language leads in 
what little has been done, and English is the only language 
which employs the term. 
The Greek language does not have an equivalent of the word 
43. Ogden and Richards, MOM, 186-187. Cf. 160-184. 
I 
'meaning' in its vocabulary. It does hav e a word for defini-
.1_1 
tion,O<(D5, but in this word we do not have the exact connota-
1 
tions implied in the term meaning . Meaning includes 'definition' 
with the additional idea of purpose, volition and significance, 
suggested by implication. Meaning is a much broader term than 
definition. 
There is no such word in the Latin language. In peri-
phrases, significatio or sensus are used. But significatio 
is too intellectual a word, while s ensus is a misnomer. 44 The 
inten tional aspect of the word, indicating an activity of the 
will, is recognized in the Latin by the occasional use of volo 
and yaleo. 45 This approaches the English usage, but is not very 
satisfactory, for only one particular aspect of the word is em-
phasized. 
Originally, the Teutonic lmguage had a term Meinung , for 
meaning , but in the change and growth of the language, the word 
has "suffered serious degeneration."46 Meinung has become to 
mean opinion, though the verb meinen is still translated as 'to 
mean' in such sentences as 11Was meint er dami t'i 11 Sometimes the 
term Bedeutung is used for meaning , but this really means inter-
pretation or po ssibly significance. Sinnlos is often translated 
44. Schiller, Art. 10, 385. 
45. Loc. cit. 
46. Ibid, 386. 
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as meaningless, but literally the word means senseless.4~ Per-
haps as interest in the concept develops, new words will be 
coined which will allow for more precise definition. 
The problems underlying the concept of meaning are closely 
connected, if not the same, as the problems underlying symbo-
lism: Are meanings inherent properties or qualities in objects? I 
Are meanings purely relational? Are me aning s subsistent reals, 
or are meanings the result of the interaction of minds with 
minds? 
T.he answers to the problems depend upon the system of 
thought accep ted. None of the hypotheses suggested by the ques-
tions are clear-cut issue s with the various thinkers. Perhaps 
the neo-realists and nominalists come nearest to being the most 
consistent in saying that meanings are properties inherent in 
objects. For them obj ects are complexes of neutral entities, 
and h ence when a complex of a kind is formed, the meaning is al-
so formed. Yet there are differences even among the neo-
realists. For instance, Spaulding thinks of meanings as them-
selves being neutral entities, as subsisting even prior to the 
complex structures found in experience. Bertrand Russell and 
G. E. Moore would undoubtedly agree with him. Yet Ralph Barton 
Perry, an ardent realist, allows consciousness a part in produc-
ing meanings. We get a clue to the role of consciousness 
47. It is interesting to note that the German language follows 
the Latin in the interpretation of t h e term. Cf . Significatio 
and se~ with Bedeutung and Sinn. ·· . 
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especially in his treatment of truth and error • 
• • • 'Ihere is no error until fiction is mistaken for · · 
fact; and there is no truth in the correlative sense, 
until a content of mind is rightly taken to be fact. 
Error and truth arise from the practical discrepancy 
or harmony between subjective manifolds and the mani-
folds of some independent order.48 
The term truth in the quotation can be correlated with 
meaning. The relation of mind with object in getting truth or 
meaning is further brought out by the statement that 11 Truth is 
nei~her coherence among, things merely, nor the complete internal 
coherence of thought; but a harmony between thought and 
things.n49 He continues: "There seems to remain only the al-
ternative of regarding truth as a kind of right action on a 
thing, and error as a kind of mistake. 1150 In attempting to 
clarify his disagreement with those who say that meaning and 
value is found entirely in the object, he says: 
To be conscious of a means that it is acted on in a 
peculiar manner; and while this action gives ~ a new 
status and new connections, it does not condition the 
being of ~ or give it its character as ~.51 
There is the suggestion in the above quotation that meaning 
can be obtained only through the activity of mind, and through 
this actiVity, new relations and therefore new meanings are 
found. It is not clear, however, whether the phrase "gives ~ a 
48. Perry, PPT, 325. 
49. Loc. cit. 
50. Ibid, 326. 
51. Ibid, 332. 
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new status 11 means a new meaning or only the relation of meaning 
to consciousness; the meaning being already inherent in the 
character of .!!.• Whether it means one thing or the other does 
not matter here. In either case, consciousness, is important 
and has a part to play. Perry's view is in harmony with the de-
finition of meaning given by Reichenbach: "Meaning is a func-
tion which symbols acquire by being put into certain corres-
pondence with facts."52 
Dr. Schiller shows a similar ambiguity in his definition. 
We cannot be certain whether meanings are objects of thought or 
a kind of relation in the activity of mind. "Meaning [is] acti- J 
vity or attitude talcen up towards objects by a subject and ener-
getically projected into them like an ~ particle; until they, 
too, grow active and begin to radiate meaning. 1153 
Is meaning here the activity or the result of the activity, 
the 11 a particle"? Dr. Schiller undoubtedly intended that both 
should be meaning. If so, should we not really separate the 
process from the end-result~ Is not Ducasse more consistent 
when he says that the change supervening in a context first acts J 
as cause, and then effect, and meaning is the effect at the end 
of the. process~54 Schiller, we think, is attempting to say the 
same thing, but he is not as clear on the matter as Ducasse. 
52. · Reichenbach, EP, 17. 
53. Schiller, Art. 10, 389. 
54. Supra·, p .135ff. of this dissertation. 
I 
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Some philosophers, e.g., Baldwin leading one group, and II 
Royce another, have attempted to combine the two aspects of mean~ 
I 
ing, meaning as object, and meaning as activity, in a slightly 
different way. They claim that meaning is essentially interpre-
tation. Interpretation to them implies both an object pointed 
at, and the process of pointing . To Baldwin, because he makes 
meaning s physical indicables,55 pointing is a psycho-physical 
activ i ty, and to Royce, who thinks of reality as fundamentally 
purposive activity, pointing is purely mental, a conscious 
process of comp aring and discriminating. To the pragmatists 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
,I 
pointing refers to the idea of designating a useful object which 1 
fits the pattern of social activity. James as a pragmatist . I 
says that an idea is whatever functions as meaning ; there are no 
qualities attached to ideas, but only offices. 56 Meaning be-
comes a prospective, a plan of action terminating in the object 
meant. 57 The criticisms of pragmatism are well known. We shall 
not discuss them, except to ask: How is the value of meaning as 
55. Supra, Chapter II of this dissertation. 
56. James, MOT, 30-31. 
57. Perry, PPT, 201. I 
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our social and spiritual relations; and without some process or lj 
I 
interpretation, we obtain no fullness of lire. n 58 Interpreta- I 
tion is the essence of communication and is essentially per-
sonal, involving a triadic relationship of minds, objects, and 
other minds. 59 When interpretation is carried to the realm or 
social intercourse, it might be said to constitute the real 
community, 60 and exemplify both the internal meaning, the idea 
of unity and oneness, of interpretation, and the external mean-
ing , the individual reference to an object. I 
The melody, the sun, the artist's idea, the thought or your l 
absent rriend: all these not merely have their obvious 
internal meaning as meeting a conscious purpose by their ! 
very presence, but also they at least appear to have I 
that other sort of meaning , that rererence · beyond them-
selves to objects ••• This external meaning, I say, ap- I 
pears to be very different from the internal meaning 
and wholly to transcend the latter.61 I 
Another group of thinkers, such as Urban and Dewey, combine 
the function of knowing with the object or knowing, by defining 
meaning a s intent. Thus, like Royce, they emphasize the voli-
tional aspect or interpretation. Dewey claims that intent makes 
58. Royce, POC, II, 136. 
59. In communication the triadic relationship really becomes 
tetradic. The element of cause and effect which enters into 
the interpretation of meaning, becomes the fourth aspect of the 
relationship. 
60. Royce, POC, II, 211. 
61. Royce, WI, 36, 176 . It is a pr oblem whether there really 
are t wo t ypes of relationship, and whether the two cannot be re-
duced to the one, internal. We are leaving the issue open. In 
the finite world where knowledge is gained, there seems to be a 
certain distinction between internal and external relations. 
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'I 
for publicity of knowledge, - two or more "centers of beha-
vior" 62 have the same intent when connnunicating . 
tent, and intent is not private to the individual 
Meaning is in- , 
in an exclu- I 
sive sense, 63 especially when "meanings are generated and in 
some degree sustained by existence." 64 Meanings have some rele-
vatory office, apprehended by minds in social contact. 65 
Urban e bases not only his theory of the publicity of expe-
rience, but also the possibility of intelligible communication, 
on the similarity evidenced in intentions. He says: 
••• In addition to the primary reference or intention I 
of any word, there are secondary indirect references, ., 
variable to speaker and hearer ••• For a genuine speech 
transaction to take place, the indirect references, or6 
secondary intentions, must be similar to some degree. 0 
Ogden and Richards, on the other hand, as well as Burns, 
emphasize the relational aspect of meaning . · The first two 
claim that meaning is the relation between and object; while 
Burns maintains that meaning is the relation of mind to mind. 
The theories of all three are rather obscure. Very little is 
said about the activity of mind in interpretation. Relation 
as mere relatedness, without the function of mind in pointing, 
62. Dewey, EN, 178. 
63. Ibid , 180. 
64. Dewey, PC, 10. 
65. Loc. cit. 
166. Urban, Art. 14, 568-569. 
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is meaningless. Pratt brings out the value of the specific 
nature of the relation of meaning. 
Doubtless. every case of meaning involves relation, but 
while every meaning is a relation, or better, a rela-
tional quality, it is not true that every relation is 
a meaning. There is nothing that is unrelated to an 
infinity of other things; but if it means all these 
things, it ceases to mean anything in particular ••• 
Meaning is a relation, but it is a V,ery specific re-
lation and must n o t be made into a synonym for rela-
tion in general.67 
Then Pratt continues to show that meaning necessarily in-
volves a three-term relationship: 1. The sign or symbol repre-
senting an object; 2. The referend .. or the object meant; 3. The 
active process or consciousness. This again is in harmony with 
the ideas of those philosophers, such as Royce, who say that 
meaning is function plus object indicated. 
In this discussion of symbols and meaning, we find that the 
philosophers who stress the social aspect of communication, and 
the publicity of experience such as Burns, Baldwin, Dewey et al, 
define meaning as interpretation, intention, function, relation, 
and they tend to accept the theory that minds communicate facts 
or particular objects. On the other hand, philosophers, like 
Rynin, Sapir, Urban, etc., who emphasize the singularity and 
privacy of experience, tend to think of meaning as forms or uni-
versals exemplified by the particulars of experience and re-
vealed through the similarity of concepts. Rynin, de Laguna, 
67. Pratt, PR, 11. Cf. Alexander, ST.D, II, 15-17. 
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and Sap ir agree: 
The elements of language, the symbols that ticket off 
exp erience, must therefore be a s sociatedwith who le 
groups, d elimited classes, of experi ence, rather tnah 
with single experiences t h emselves. Only so is com-
munication possible, for the single experience lodg e:il 
in an individual consciousne ss i s, strictly speaking , 
incommunicabl e . To be communicated it needs to be 
referred to a class which is tacitly accepted by the 
community as an identity .•• In other words, the speech 
element 'house' is the symbol, first and foremost, 
not a single p ercep tion, nor even of the notion of a 
particular obj ect, but of a concep t; in other words, 
of a convenient c apsule of thought that embraces a 
thousand distinct exp eriences that is ready to take 
thousands more.68 
Rynin is very s p ec i fic in telling us what he considers 
these concepts or "capsules of thought" to be.69 He says that 
we communicate forms of facts, not facts t h emselves. The form 
of a fact is not s omething common to many contents, as quality 
immanent in them, but rather a set ~ a class of similar enti-
ties. For instance, if we say that t his is a case of red, or 
even a case of r elation, like 'between', we mean that it is one 
I of a set of similar forms of redness or betweenness, no t wo be-
l ing identical. Since there is no identity of particulars, veri-
fication in c01mnunication must rest on the observation of the 
behavior of the recip ient. 70 If the hearer acts as if he under-
stood the mefu~ings intended, then it may be said that the com-
munication was successful. There is no guarantee of success. 
68. Sapir, LAN, 11. Also quoted by and accepted by de Laguna, 
in SFD, 18-19. 
69. Cf. Rynin, Art. 9. 
70. Rynin, Art. 9, 512-513. 
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"Communication occurs when following certain acts of one person, 1 
another responds in certain ways." 71 Meaning is also based on i 
practical life situations. A proposition has meaning, he s ays, 
"if it is possible to describe the state of affairs which would 
make it true, and the situation that would falsify it. 1172 
Rynin's theory has two fundamental fallacies. 
p lace, by stating that we can only communicate form, and not 
content, particularly when the form is only in a class of simi-
lar entities, rather than a quality in a particular, he is 
violating the log ical demand at times for intensive as well as 
extensive meanings of words. The minds of cowaunicators are 
creative as well as active. In the process of communication, 
the symbols or words used may change from a very limited, inten-
sive meaning to one applicable to the particular situation and 
variable to speaker and hearer. For example, two persons might 
be discussing the value of art in life, and one might quote the 
lines by Browning: "Then out of the three sounds he framed, not 
a fourth sound, but a star", 73 and according to Rynin, the word 
star would always refer to one of a set of entities in a class, 
but in this context, the star does not mean one of the astral 
bodies, but has a symbolic significance, understandable to the 
two in conversation. Other examples may be cited. 
71. Rynin, Art. 9, 512. 
72. Ry:.nin, Art. 9, 516. Rynin bases his definition of meaning 
on that attributed to Prof. Moritz Schlick by L. Wittgenstein 
in Tractus Logico-Philosophicus, Prop. 4.024. 
73. Browning Abt Vogler. 
II 
I 
i 
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Urban, who also says that form, rather than specific con-
tent, is communicated, escapes Rynin's fallacy, by his defini-
tion of form. The form of a content is the universal which is 
tacitly recognized by all minds in a like situation; these uni-
versals make for the 11mutuali ty of mind. 1174 Thus because of 
these universal categories, minds function in similar ways. 
Similarity is thus not only one of class, but .also of function, 
and allows for the creativity of mind in evolving new ~anings 
out of experience. 
Form alone cannot give meaning, for meaning does not come 
from single words which may be said to have form, but from the 1 · 
combination of words, and the combination becomes an individual 
or unique statement at that particular moment, though it may 
have reference to universal truth. We cannot logically speak 
of the form of a sentence; sentences are particulars. Meanings 
are not static objects, but vary and change according to the 
persons communicating, to the environment, where the communica-
tion takes place, and to the purpose for which communication is 
carried on at the time. If as Rynin says, form has similarity 
as belonging only to a set of similar entities, then communica-
tion and meaning would be impossible. The situation becomes 
much like Kant's thing-in-itself, and meaning becomes utterly 
unknowable. Cooperative activity, for which, we have · said over 
and over again, communication exists, would be a farce. For 
74. Urban, Art. 14, 570. 
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instance if we wish to communicate the value judgment: Honesty 
is the best policy, what guarantee have we that honesty, and 
policy, mean the same to the speaker and hearer~ We have no 
certainty that understanding has taken place, and hence we shoul ' 
be liVing in isolated worlds with no ground for united action on 
any subject or principle. Rynin, himself, is conscious of the 
problem for he says that response is our only clue to under-
standing, and even then "we may possibly never be absolutely 
certain we are understood." 75 Rynin's theory does not seem 
sound from a logical point of view, and also it does not fill 
the emotional need for communication. Mankind is constantly 
throwing out filaments as it were to anchor somewhere and bridge 
the gaps of life; 7 6 communication is a tool man uses to find 
wholeness in life. People communicate for the sake of security 
l and not insecurity, and insecurity is what Rynin is offering. 
The confusion among philosophers on the definition of 
meaning is not surprising. It is due to the fact that meaning 
I 
is so vital to communication and the process of co~nunication is 
so complex that no simple analysis of the term can be made. 
Philosophers who have had special interests in one system of 
thought or other, and who have .tried to define meaning in the 
terms of their interests have tumbled into many pitfalls. Mean-
ing is. not the object of communication alone, nor the process, 
nor the relations involved in the process, nor the symbols, nor 
75. Rynin, Art. 9, 512. 
76. Cf. Whitman's A Noiseless Patient Spider. 
133 
the function. Meaning is really all of these together. As 
Schiller, Royce, Baldwin, Burns, et al. have said, m~aning im-
plies both the process and t:te object of the process. 'lhis is 
valid, for meaning is essentially personal, and involves the 
complex activity of the p erson as a whole, not merely his in-
tellectual c apacity. 77 We find that, in reality, meanings are 
values accep ted by persons and made objective through communica-
tion. Process is basal to the achievement of values, for values 
act as causes or motiv e forces in the activity of communal liv-
ing to produce other values. We found in Chapter II that values 
were not solely subjective and made objective through social 
intercourse, but objective from the start. 'lhey are discovered 
and achieved through the community. Thus, meaning is a demand 
we make upon experience. We pay attention to the flux of ex-
pe rience, because we expect it to be meaningful. Dewey is right 'I 
with a certain qualification, when he says: 
Now when we turn to the social we find communication 
to be an existential occurrence involved in all dis-
tinctly conrrnunal life, and we find that corrnnunication 
requires meaning and understanding as conditions of 
unity or agreement in conjoint [experience] • 78 
77. Schiller, Art. 10, 392. 
78. Dewey, PC, 87. In this quotation we have eliminated the 
word 'behavior' which Dewey had used, and inserted the term 
'experience'. Ex perience gives the necessary connotation of 
free activity, which behavior does not. Behavior suggests a 
mechanistic response to an existential or physical stimulus. 
Though, it is true that experience is not in reality meaningless 
or blind from the start, yet it is the activity of mind which 
produces the meaning. Sense perception as mere flux of exper-
ience, without the mind at work, could not disclose meanings. 
134 
The rang e of meaning s in communication, Spaulding tells us, is 
limitless: 
••• Since I know nothing that I cannot think about 
and examine rationally, I also k now nothing concern-
ing which I cannot communicate with another mind. The 
range of facts, then, or the kind of facts, which name 
meanings true or false is perhaps without limit.79 
Without meaning s, communication would be impossible. Theref·ore, 
for the second presupposition, we can say: Si gns and s ymbols 
denote and connote meanings. At the same time we can postulate 
a third presupposition: Facts which can be verified and confirm-
ed a s true or false, as well as forms can be communicated. 
Since me aning is so closely connected with the activity of 
minds, the fourth presupposition can b e advanced: Consciousness 
accomp anies all instances of communication. The word conscious-
ness is seemingly avoided by those who have written on the sub-
ject of communication. Perhaps they think like McDougall that 
it is a "thoroughly bad word."80 Wnether bad or not, philoso-
phers cannot avoid the term, for though, strictly speaking, 
consciousness cannot be defined81 except in terms of itself, it 
is an ultimate and irreducible fact of exp erience. 82 To be con-
scious means to be thinking, to be exp eriencing , to be aware of 
meaning s. Rynin attempts to say that consciousness is not abso-
lutely necessary for communication, yet he admits that conscious 
79. Spaulding, woe, 5. 
80. McDougall, OP, 16. 
81. Lei ghton, MC, 315. 
82. Supra. p. 6lff. of this dissertation. 
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understanding is essential in awarenes s of me anings coming from 
a r eceived stimulus. Observ a tion of b ehavior is all that is 
n ecessary to show if the stimulation has been received; con-
sciousness may or may no t accomp an y ov ert behavior. 83 If con-
sciousness is necessary in understanding , then it is necess a ry 
a s a p resupposition of communication, for communication is a 
p rocess of interpretation, one might say, an interchang e of un-
derstanding s. A communication situation is not a one -way 
p roces s of stimulation g iven and received; it is a continual 
interaction of activity and p assivity of mind. The passivity 
in this case is one of attention rather than complete cessation 
of activity and mi ght be called p assive-activity. There is al-
ways a flow of energy and interaction; the subject acts upon the 
object, and the object in turn becomes the subject or beg ins a 
new series of action. There is no static, unchang ing element in 
communication. Richards, in discussing what he terms the g ifts 
of comraunication, bring s out the ever-moving process in a 
rather unique manner. 
The special communicative g ifts ••• can be described in 
activities ••• The use of past similarities in experience 
and the control of these elements through the dependence 
of their effects upon one another make up the speaker's, 
the active communicator's gift. Discrimination, sug-
gestibility, free and clear resuscitation of elements 
of p ast experience disentangled from one another, and 
the control of the irrelevant person al details and 
accidents, make up the recipient's gift.84 
83. Rynin, Art. 9, 514. 
84~ Richards, PLC, 180. 
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To return to our criticism of Rynin's view of consciousness. 
Dewey would disagree with us. He would say that what we have 
termed consciousness need not be that at all. True, the process 
of communication is activity, but the activity, says Dewey, is 
one of adjustment and readjustment, as suggested by Richards, an 
activity of coordination and assimilation; it is a process of 
mind, and mind is a much broader term than consciousness. Con-
sciousness is merely the brute fact of 1 isness' ; 85 mind is the 
comprehensive system of operative meanings.86 Dewey does not 
eliminate consciousness, though he tries hard to so do. 87 He 
says that "it is a reasonable belief that there would be no 
such thing as consciousness if events did not have a phase of 
brute and unconditioned 1 isness 1 • 1188 Yet, later, he implies 
something more than "unconditioned 'isness'" when he shows the 
ne ed for consciousness in comraunication • 
••• Consciousness in a being with language denotes 
awareness or perception of meanings; it is the per-
ception of actual events, whether past, contemporary 
or future, in their meanings, the having of actual 
ideas.89 
The expressions "awareness or perception of meanings" and "the 
having of actual id.eas 11 would suggest systematic and coherent 
85. Dewey , EN, 86. 
86. Ibid, 303. 
87. Ibid, 7. 
88. Ibid, 86. 
89. Ibid, 303. 
I I 
137 
thinking, but any such interpretation is soon dispelled by his 
definition of' idea, "an idea is just what it is when it oc-
curs",90 the brute 'isness' referred to bef'ore. We wonder why 
Dewey deliberately i gnores the historical connotation of' the 
word. Through the years, idea has denoted an ordered event. 
He might reply that he is not rejecting tradition at all, but 
following Locke's definition of' the term. An idea is a "term 
which ••• serves best to stand f'or whatsoever is the object of' 
the un:lerstanding."91 Agreeing with Bishop Worcester, we say to 
Dewey, the use of' the word in that sense should be "censured as 
of' dangerous consequence. 1192 
· The more Dewey talks about idea and consciousness, the more 
he f'inds himself' in the bogs of' ambiguity. The confusion of' 
terms is very evident in his treatment of' idea and meaning. If' 
idea is that which, he says, is presented as mere event in sense 
perception, then how can meanings be f'ound in ideas, a point of' 
issue he accepts, when in other contexts he definitely states 
that meanings evolve out of' experiences which prove to be usef'ul 
in conjoint activity~ 93 Conjoint activity certainly implies an 
exchange of' meanings through interaction and mediation, much 
more so than in pure 'isness' of' presentation. 
90. Dewey, EN, 304. 
91. Locke, Essay, 4 (Introduction). 
92. Ibid, 5 (Note at end of' chapter). 
93. Supra, p. 5lff. of this dissertation. 
Cf'. Dewey , EN, 174-175, 178, 185f'f'; LOG, 46-53. 
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At times Dewey realizes the dangers which his definitions 
are heir to, and suggests discarding words which trouble him, 
in fact words which have troubled many philosophers through time 
such as consciousness and experience, and substituting in their 
places more exact terms. 94 A step in that direction is taken 
when he advocates the use of intent for consciousness because 
intent brings out both the active and receptive aspects of ex-
p erience. No matter what terms he may employ, h~ does hold· that 
consciousness, as intent, is a pre-requisite of communication. 95 
Intent implies the activity of the will, and will is necessary 
for the d ouble function of mind, the sending and receiving or 
meaning s. As a receptive being, the attentive consciousness is 
the result of the impact of an extern al object as the stimulus; 
as an active being, the attentive consciousness is produced by 
the self-direction of the will. In either case, consciousness 
is an important factor, and is evidenced by communication, the 
~anifestation of the attentive consciousness. It is because of 
this that Dewey says that "communication is the condition of con-
sciousness."96 We can reverse the stat ement without losing its 
meaning ., and say that consciousness is the condition of 
94. Dewey, EN, 7-9. Note- 11 ••• Experience is something quite 
other than consciousness." 
95. Dewey, EN, 180. Cf. Urban, Art. 14, 571. Urban also makes 
intent basal for · communication, and thus, indirectly, imp lies 
the need for consciousness in communication. 
96. Dewey, EN, 187. 
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communication. 
Spaulding, more reluctantly than Dewey, suggests the possi-
~ility of eliminating consciousness a s a necessary presupposi-
tion of communication. He attempts to deny, and yet at the same 
time to admit the n eed for it by saying that consciousness may 
not be absolutely essential, but if no t consciousness then some-
t h ing similar such as disclosure. 97 · Al s o, whenever he lists 
the factors of communication, he includes awareness as an item. 
Note the following quotation: 
••• There are involved in any genuine communication 
of one mind with another, even in any instance in which 
an opposed position is formulated, maintained, and com-
municat ed, a number of distinct factors, namely, (l) 
words or other symbols; (2) meaning s and propositions 
"denoted" by words or symbols. There may also be, and 
in most cases there are, ( 3 ) facts which form the "locus 
of verification or of falsification of tpe propositions. 
Indeed, perhaps there are in all cases such facts ••• 
Th e re may al s o be, ( 4 ) what is by many called conscious-
ness or an awareness of, {a) the words, {b) the meanings, 
and, {c) the facts, but in the analysis I have mad·e, I 
have thus far been indifferent to this possible fourth 
factor. fuether one accepts 1~8or not, depends, perhaps, upon one's general philosophy. 
Awareness is consciousness, and a better term than disclosure. 
Perry, who mi ght have eliminated consciousness from his 
system of thought, does not do so, but gives mind or conscious-
ness a sort of causal efficacy, particularly in his treatment of 
truth and error. 99 
97. Spaulding , WOC, 18. Supra, 
! 98. Ibid,l7. 
99. Supra, p. 123ff. of this dissertation. 
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Baldwin and Royce show the importance of consciousness by 
defining communication as interpretation. The triadic relation 
necessary for interpretation, the relation of subject, object, 
and minds, indicates the activity of consciousness.lOO The ob-
,ject is the meaning which evolves out of the relationship of 
subject with other minds. 
Similarly, Price implies the activi~y of consciousness by 
!speaking of the triadic relationship necessary for the receiving 
of new information which subsequently can be interpreted. In 
his theory, the symbol becomes an object for a mind.101 
Ducasse goes a step beyond Price by showing that in communi 
cation there is a tetradic rather than a triadic relationship, 
a relationship of interpreter, content, content stimulating as 
cause, or the process of communication, and the effect or mean-
ing intended.l02 The content, or object, or symbol in his the-
ory is not like the object in Ogden and Richards, or that of the 
neo-.realists, producing change through causal activity inherent 
in itself, but rather the impact of stimulation. The causal 
efficacy does not lie in the object as a physical event (Ogden 
and Richards), · or as a subsistent (neo-realists), but in the 
mind of an active agent, stimulated by the impact of the object. 
100. Supra, p. 126ff. of this dissertation. 
101. Price is primarily interested in the process of receiving 
information, rather than the actual process of communication, · 
for communication is in reality an interchange of information, 
and therefore would be a tetradic relationship as Ducasse says, 
rather than a triadic one. 
102. Supra, p. 112 of this dissertation. 
Ducasse makes this clear: 
Interpretation is a kind of_Fental event consisting in 
this, that consciousness of something causes us to be-
come conscious of something else ••• My reason for defin-
ing interpretation as a relation between consciousness 
of something and consciousness of something else, rather 
than as a relation between certain physical events and 
certain others, is that I believe the notion of physical 
event is one ultimately itself definable only in terms 
of interpretation of certain states of consciousness.~03 
Burns : implies the need for consciousness in communication 
by saying that the contact between minds does not proceed or 
succeed the distinction between minds. The contact exists 
"whenever and wherever there is mind." 104 
Pratt is perhaps the most explicit in saying that cons.cious 
! ness is necessary for communication. 105 He says that sounds, 
marks, and words get their meanings through the mind-activity 
of con.s cious beings. A symbol in its elf, contrary to the think-
ing of Ogden and Richards, cannot be the cause of its meaning. 
He agrees with Ducasse and Schiller that "what anything means 
depends on ~means it, when, where, why, and on what occasion, 
in what context, with what success. 11106 
In order to give a coherent picture of the communication 
process, it must be admitted that consciousness is a necessary 
presupposition of communication, or, for that matter, for expe-
rience in general. But consciousness alone, without a definite 
103. Ducasse, Art. 23, 42. 
104. Burns, CM, 66. 
105. Pratt, PR, 21-22. 
106. Schiller, Art. 10, 392. 
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ob j ective reference, would not be adequate to explain experience, 
If there were nothing objective and public to two or more minds, 
there would be no reason for the existence of communication; the 
mind would not need to transmit meaning s, and would be whirling 
in its own subjectivity. The fact that we can communicate shows I 
that there are thing s common to several minds, and that these 
act as the propelling forces for efficient, cooperative action 
for worthy ends and pu rposes. What are these objective things? 
Can we explain them in terms other than objects or things? What 
is the ground for the publicity of any object? 
In Chap ter I, we s ay that the world of phy sical space is a 
common ground for the me eting of minds. Space alone is not 
enough to explain fully the interaction of minds. Something morE 
than t h is is necessary to make communication possible, for com-
muni c a tion is a mental process involving more than contemporan-
eous existence, that is, several minds being located in the same 
time and p lace, and the mere pointing to objects in a particular 
s pot, saying , "this". Cormnunication is an interchange of ideas, 
minds? 
In the process of e xperiencing , we find that some of our 
p ercep tions are similar in certain respects, and others differ-
ent. For instance, through experience we find that men may be 
red, y ellow, white, black, brown, and y et they have one quality 
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in common, namely the quality, manness. As we experience more 
and more this similarity with the difference, we abstract the 
quality which two or more have in common and with the help of 
language g ive it a name. The name thus becomes a concept or 
universal standing for similar quality in a class of objects. 
The process of abstracting a similar quality from an object is 
a difficult and sophisticated activity. As civilization advan-
ces, and language is made more specific, the concepts are in-
creased indefinitely through communication. Through evolution 
the concepts become race heritages as universals. The universal 
thus come to have common meanings because they refer to actual 
particulars which have been experienced sometime or other. The 
universals, of course, are not the particulars, nor are they the 
mere empty forms of the particulars. They are possible objects 
of thought because they refer to individuals showing significant 
similarities in existing classes. 107 In the process of finding 
the universals, the qualities of the particulars are not super-
added. The particulars and the universals are discovered to-
l gether. As Burns says, "the universal may be said to bring 
forth the p articular and the particular to realize the univer-
sal."108 We understand the statement: Mongolians belong to the 
yellow race because Mongolians as a term becomes a universal 
concept standing for individuals having a certain quality, 
107. Pratt, PR, 42. 
108. Burns, CM, 9-10. 
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yellowness, and belonging to a class o.f yellow race, containing 
1 other individuals with a similar quality, and so on with each 
! word in the statement. We can make others understand us because 
we communicate through cownon conc epts which are comparable be-
1 caus e o.f their similarity to known objects in a class. Univer-
sals bring out the similarity; therefore, without univers als in-
telligible communication would be impossible.l09 Thus we can 
postulate our .fi.fth presupposition: Universals tacitly recog-
nized by all are necessary .for the promotion of understanding in 
communication. 
Most of t he philosophers who have written on communication 
make the fifth presupposition very vital in their thought. Urban 
agrees with Sapir who says that "a tacit recognition of univer-
sals is the p rimary and minimum requirement of intelligible com-
munication."110 Likewise, Lewis thinks that a certain mutuality 
of concepts is necessary for understanding . 
A relatively meager mutuality of concepts, given human 
powers of discrimination, abstraction and relation, 
and our human social habits, would be sufficient as the 
initial function for our actua l and most mutual under-
standing .lll 
Price intimates the need for common universals by his 
statement that new information can be conv eyed from mind to mind 
only through symbols which are understandable by more than one 
109. It is conceivable that behavior communication, which is a 
cue to b ehavior and points to the here and now, can take place 
merely t hrough similarity of an object in space and t ime, -with a 
few pointer symbols, such as this, that, here, there -, etc. 
110. Urban, Art. 14, 570. 
111. Lewis, ~~vo, 96. 
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mind.ll2 I 
Then again, a group or philosophers, among whom we rind I 
Rynin, Urban, de Laguna, stressing the singularity of experience ! 
say that communication breaks down the privacy of experience by 
the transference of universal forms from one individual to 
another. 
We communicate the form of facts. A fact is g iven in 
content, but when we try to specify what we perceive, 
the particularity of the perception is lost, for we 
have no words for the unique.ll3 
A tacit recognition of universals may be the minimum re-
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
is.. based upon and presupposes jll 
another, the sixth presupposition: Minds in communication must 
I 
quirement of communication, but 
b e alike in structure and function. 
The term structure suggests systematic order which is re-
vealed through function. It is the inherent structure of coher-
ent function which harmonizes the flux of experi ence, and trans-
forms what seems to be mere -particulars into wholes possessing 
meaning. 114 
Price implies this presupposition in his statement that 
knowledge ultimately depends u pon faith in the rationality of 
the universe. 115 
112. Price, Art. 8, 446. 
113. Rynin, Art. 9, 548. 
114. cr. Whitehead, PR, 36. Also, AI, 160, 354, 381. 
115. Price, Art. 8, 446. I I 
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When Urban speaks of the nmutuality of mind11116 he means 
that minds in communication are alike in structure because of 
similarity of function in relating, discriminating and abstract-
ing from experience given, common concepts. 
ing: 
Lewis brings out the need for this presupposition by say-
In the end it can hardly fail to be the case that the 
possibility of having concepts in conunon is conditioned 
by two things; first, by the fact that we are creatures 
fundamentally alike, having in the large the same needs · 
and interests and powers of discrimination and relation; 
and second, that we are confronted by a comrnon reality~ 
mediated to us in sense-experience which is comparable.ll7 
The above passage is usually interpreted from the point of 
view of behaviorism. "Creatures fundamentally alike" is taken 
to mean "similarity of organism", B.nd "conunon reality" to mean 
"similarity of environment". 118 This may be a correct interpre-
tation, but we think that Lewis transcends behaviorism by his 
phrase "powers of discrimination and relation. 11119 If Lewis 
were wholly behavioristic in his theory, he would have empha-
sized verification through observation of behavior. On the con-
trary, he says·: 
. I 
I 
I 
116. Urban, Art. 14, 574. Urban here says that the ter.m is one 
first employed by Lewis. Nowhere did we find the exact phrase . 
used by Lewis. He speaks of' the "mutuality of' concepts" (MWO, j 
113), and "mutuality of human understanding" (MWO, 96). Of cours . 
I 
the idea is similar. These phrases mean what Urban means by the 
"mutuality of mind." 
117. Lewis, l~iO, 91. 
118. Urban, Art. 14, 573. 
~ 
119. Lewis, Uv!WO, 91. 
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The methods of verifying community of meaning are prin-
cipally two, neither of which depends on any proposed 
community of feeling or imag ery. Either we define our 
terms, or by our behavior we exhibit their denotation. 
The second p rocedure is less conclusive.l20 
We think that by the definition of terms, he really intends 
to say that we are creatures fundamentally alike, having like 
need s and values, with minds that function similarly because 
behind the empirical concepts lie 
which are objective and universal 
of exp eri ence. His definition of 
verifies our interpretation. 
categories of intellig ence 
and help in the discrimination ! 
what he means by like-minded 
"Like-mindedness" consists primarily of three thing s: 
the possession of like needs and of like modes of be-
h avior in satisfying them, second, the possession of 
common concepts, represented in behavior by discrimi-
nation and relation, and third, the capacity ••• of 
transcending our individual limitations of discrimina-
tion by indirect methods. This last is a considerable 
item in what is me ant by "intelligence" ••• Such like-
mindedness requires either a considerable community of 
order directly identifiable in experience Q£ a consider-
able degree of intelligence by which disD~rity in the 
first respect mi ght be compensated for.l2l 
e object to Lewis's use of either- or, and say that order 
in experience comes from both intelligence or mind and exper-
ience itself. The categories act as the pattern of relation 
in uniting the object with mind. By the structure of mind, we 
mean, therefore, the ability of mind to use categories to or-
ganize meanings. The impact of experience forces the mind to 
120. Lewis, MWO, 78. 
121. Ibid, 113-114. 
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become active in a certain relational way because of the innate 
tions making use of coherence, rationality and necessity. 'Ihe 
question arises: Are categories something other than concepts 
discussed under the fifth presupposition? If so, are categor-
ies more necessary to communication than concepts? 
I 
Categories and concepts spring essentially from the same I 
I I source, namely the interaction of mind with object, and are the 
1 
result of the logical implications of particular experience. ·1 
They are the forms of thought, and the empirical conditions for 11 
em pi ric al reality .122 Thus both cone epts , and what we call cat •1 
gories, are necessary for thinking because their necessity is 1 
derived from logic. It is this necessity and universality that 
makes communication possible. As Alexander has said, categories 
I are "pervasive" and apply to all things in a univei•se of dis-
course. 123 Concepts, categories, or universals are the common 
! ground where minds meet, for effective communication needs an 
· 
11 agreeable degree of organization and mutual dependence of 
I 
1122. 
123. 
Leighton, MC, 137. 
Stace, 'YICE, 31. 
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concepts"124 to p romote understanding and to transfer meanings. 
Roy ce has b r ought out this idea. 
Each of us, in every new effort to communicate with our 
fellowmen, stands, lik e the trav eller cros sing the 
boundary of a new country, in the presence of a largely 
strang e wo r ld of percep t i ons and conceptions. Our · 
nei ghbor's percep tions, in their immediate presence, we 
never q~ite certainly sha re. Our nei ghbor's concep tions, 
for varlous reasons which I need not here enumerate, are 
so largely communicable that they can often be reg arded, 
with a high degree of probability, as identical~ in 
certain aspects of their meaning with our own.lG5 
If categories and concepts have the same function and 
/I d 
I 
I 
s p ring from the s a~e source, t hen why mak e a distinction, it I 
mi ght b e asked, as we seem to be doing by the use of t wo diff er- !! 
. il 
en t terms~ T.he distinction is valid, for although concepts and 1 
ses of discourse. The latter may vary with individuals accord-
ing to environmental conditions, training , ability to comprehend 
I 
the community of action, etc. For instance, we can deny the 
ex istence of some of' the concepts without contradiction the 
reality of much of our exp erience. On the other hand, if we 
deny certain others, we contradict a whole system of thought. 
124. de Laguna, SFD, 193. 
125. Royce, POC, II, 133 . 
! 
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For example, if we deny space, we contradict the whole world of 
sense exp erience; but, if we deny the existence of domestic cats 
we contradict our experience of a class of animals, but still 
have the possibility of exp eriencing others in the same species, 
I such as lions, tigers, leopards, etc. 
!concept, the more important to thought 
The more extensive the 
in general, yet from the 
point of View of exp erience in its particularity, importance is 
really measured by the s p ecific universe of discourse engaged in 
at the moment. If our universe of discourse includes domestic 
cats, and we deny the existence of domestic cats, then we con-
tradict our whole exp erience of domestic cats, and make this im-
possible. Domestic cat in that universe of discourse becomes as 
necessary as cats which is a more inclusive term. 
However, some concepts have wide a pplication to all alike. 
We are limiting the term categ ory to those concepts without 
which any universe of discourse would be impossible. From this 
point of view, the laws of symbolism, discussed earlier in the 
chapter126 mi ght be calle d the fundamental laws of logic; the 
universals discussed under the fifth presuppositionl27 of com-
munication might be called the emp irical principles , and the 
categories might be c a lled the basic metaphysical concepts of 
experience. In the remainder of the chap ter, we shall attempt 
to give a table of categories which we consider essential to all 
126. Sup ra, p. ll?ff. of this dissertation. 
127. Supra, p. 135ff. of this dissertation. 
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possible experience and communication. 
In attempting to g ive a set of categories, we are aware of 
the fact that such tables are arbitrary. There is no other 
topic upon which philosophers disagree more than upon categories 
No two philosophers h&v:e. given the same table. The pragmatists 
and the nominalists tend to dismiss the subject as being unim-
portant. They consider a distinction between concepts and cate-
gories, no matter upon what basis the distinction may be made, 
as artificial. Hegel, though he has given three basic cate-
gories, and only three - being, essence, motion - insists at the 
same time that every concept is ~s necessary and universal as 
any so-called category. Aristotle changes his mind with the 
progress of his thought, moving from the idea of the grammatical 
structure as forming the fundamental concepts of experience, to 
more metaphysical ones such as quality, quanti·ty, relation, sub-
stance, etc. Kant has made a distinction between the regulative 
and constitutive, between the noumenal and phenomenal. The 
noumenal or regulative concepts are the real categories. He J 
has listed twelve of them under four general headings, quantity~ ~ 
quality, relation, and modality. Alexander has made a distinc-
tion between what he calls the "variable" and "pervasive exist-
ents. 11128 The "pervasive" are what we call the categories for 
they "belong in some form to all existents whatever", 129 and 
128. Alexander, STD, I, 184. 
12 9 • Lo c • cit • 
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are the essential and universal constituents of whatever is ex-
perienced ••• "130 In other words, they are the bonds which unite 
the mind with the physical or non-mental things because they are 
commo~ to both as belong ing to a system of space-time. They are 
the "determinations of space-time itself, not taken as a whole, 
but in every portion of it.rrl31 
Stace makes a similar distinction by saying that categories 
that are pervasive are logically necessary, and concepts which 
make experience consistent are empirically necessary. The lat-
ter are not real, but are only constructs of mind. Quality, 
being , unity and plurality, and diversity and relation, come 
under the first classification, while substance, existence, 
identity, possibility, causality, and reality come under the 
second.l32 
We a g ree wi th Alexander and Stace that categories are p er-
vasive and hence logically necessary. Ex p erience or communica-
tion would not only have no meaning but would be impossible. 
In every knowing or communicating situation we must have minds, 
objects as imp acts of stimulation, and logical relations, cate-
gories. n~e categories unite and synthesize particulars into 
wholes and form the backg round for all possible experience, or 
we mi ght say that categories are the framework of the rea~ of 
130. Alexander, STD, I, 185. 
131. Ibid, 189. 
132. Stace, TKE, 335. 
possibility in communication. With the categories, mind acts 
upon mind, meaning s are transferred from person to person; 
through the categories reason is able to operate. 133 
Since categories are relational qualities, and as we have 
said before, belong to both subject and object, they are pre-
dictive of meaning s rather than regulative or constitutive.l34 
The table of categories we have given here, varies somewhat 
from any listed. We feel that our revision of the categories 
fits closer with the symbolism of communication. Language as 
symbols of p articulars cannot as mere signs express reality or 
s h ow the connection of form, as g eneralities, and content,as 
p ar t iculars. Language must be supplemented by additional s y m-
bols, so that subject and predicate, substance and quality, 
p articular and universal can be expressed without doing violence 
to either form or content. 
The categories given h ere are not necessarily new, but are 
revised into new molds where the flux of the particulars and 
the permanence of the universals are equally emphasized, and 
both are shown to be necessary in every instance of experience 
or communication. 
In previous tables of categories, substance was the crux 
upon which others were built. Here we have subordinated sub-
stance to activity , subs ti tu ting 11 states 11 and 11 thinghood 11 to 
133. Cf. Spaulding , WOO, 19. He g ives the three principles 
which communication discloses. 
134. Leighton, MC, 1 33. 
change, prog ress, and movement.l35 
In order to show the evolutionary nature of the categories, 
we are p lacing them in a tabular arrang ement. 
I. TIME-BEING. Thi s is the category of categories. Neither 
time nor being can be separated one from the other. Process 
or time has a content from the b eginning. In communication 
the content is meaning expressed by symbols and found in 
objects. The content can exist only as objects are related 
through unity and identity to self-consciousne ss. Conscious 
ness evidenced by communication is the manifestation of time 
TIME-BEING is composed of: 
1. Quality. The content is possible because of the 
identity which persists through definite charac-
teristics of qualities. In communication this 
might be brought out by similarity of symbols or 
meanings. Quality shows: 
a. Reality. The content is the reality of 
being and mi ght be called filled time. 
A judgment or proposition in communica-
tion might fall under this heading . 
b. Negation. The content not only changes 
and grows, but finds itself in · opposition 
to something other than itself, and this 
something might be called empty-time. The 
validity of a judgment is often tested by 
its contradictory [136] in a communica-
tion situation. 
c. Limitation. The opposition against another 
forces activity. Hence there is what is 
called the emptying and filling of time. 
In a communication situation, if consist-
ency is violated in the testing of a 
judgment, the laws of symbolism are em-
ployed to establish coherence either by 
discarding some symbols through limitation, 
or exp anding the meaning to gain clarity 
through the addition of other symbols. 
135. We are indebted to Kant, Hegel, Bowne, and Alexander for 
our final arrang ement. 
136. ·supra, p. 143ff. of this dissertation. 
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2. Chane e. The movement of time brings about change. 
In applying this to communication, we find that 
when the laws of symbolism are employed to ciarify 
a proposition, inconsistencies are resolved, and a 
change takes place in the original judgment or 
proposition. 
3. Order. This is the form of time itself. Change 
does not take place haphazardly. "Its essential 
elements are antecedent and sequence, and its 
dimensions are past, present, and future." [13l7] 
Without order, without a beginning , middle, and 
end, meanings cannot be transferred; communica-
tion cannot take place. Also all propositions 
show an ordered sequence of ideas. 
II. SPACE. Space is the shap e time assumes in the physical 
world of sense impressions. Space is composed of: 
1. Motion. Motion is the movement of time in space. 
In communication this is evidenced by the actual 
movement of the physical organs in verbal and 
vocal communication, and by the series of words 
occupying particular spaces. 
2. Quantity. Since TIME-BEING is the ultimate cate-
gory, quantity must be thought of in tenns of 
process, and movement, and thus be redUced to 
points and instants. The words, sounds, signs 
in communication are therefore motive forces for 
the conveyance of meanings. Quantity reveals: 
a. Unity. This consists of one moment and 
implies the union of points and instants. 
In communication the whole is more im-
portant than the parts. 
b. Plurality. This consists of several mo-
ments. A proposition or judgment or mean-
ing is made up of several symbols. There 
must be a plurality of symbols for conno-
tation to be evident. 
c. Totality. This consists of all moments 
as a whole or a system or unity. The many 
symbols must be in ordered sequence form-
ing one consistent idea so that minds can 
conununica te values and meaning~. 
137. Bowne, TTK, 66. 
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3. Number. From the idea of quantity we get the · 
idea of number, of an a ggr egate of quantities. 
The symbols form a series in a proposition and 
become the a ggregate of quantity in the commu-
nication process. 
4. Necessity. Number shows that there is a defi-
nite order and sequence. The series of symbols 
in any one proposition must not violate - the 
log ical laws of identity, contradiction, and 
excluded middle. 
5. Substance. Finally the idea of substance emerges 
because in the changing flux, we find an unchang -
ing concept or universal which preserves the per-
sistent identity. In communication every meaning 
is a particular embodying a universal or common 
concept. 
COMMUNITY. Substance becomes the real in space-time and 
p rocess implies the interaction of organic reals. A 
community is composed of persons capable of transmitting 
meanings; without persons, communication would be un-
necessary and impossible. Community is possible because 
of: 
1. Identity. The interaction among substances pro-
duces the concep t of the other with definite and 
distinct qualities and characteristics. The op-
position of like and unlike produces identity. 
In the communication process, the other is tacitly 
recognized. Identity would be impossible without: 
a. Inherence and subsistence. Identity shows 
that some qualities are permanent and 
exist through time. This is brought out 
in communication b y the fact that some 
values are recognized by all minds to be 
objective. Th.ese values become social 
heritages and are transmitted throuf~ 
communication. 
b. Causality and dependence. Interaction 
shows the necessary dependence among the 
reals in space-time. The evidence of this 
in communication is shown by the fact that 
social experience is the heritage of man, 
and only through organizational units of 
partial or complete understandings can 
civilization advance, and values be 
achieved. 
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2. Activity. Motion in time becomes more than -mere 
movement when identity has been established. 
Identity is possible only in a conscious being . 
Motion in time become s activity of mind in a per-
son. Consciousness in a being is a prerequisite 
of communication. 
--
3. Purpose. In a community this is the driving force 
of activity. The activity of reals in space-time 
points to goals and ends. Communication is the 
tool of a community in achieving the ends purposed. 
IV. SYNTHESIS. This is the category of relations. Its end-
result is unity with discreteness or difference preserved. 
Its terms are always found in pairs. Communication is the 
outward and visible si gn of the underlying unity or syn-
thesis in the community of action. Synthesis is the re-
sult of the interaction of opposites. 
1. Possible and impossible. Once a conscious being 
has been posited, activity assumes positive and 
negative aspects. Time ' begins to have a scope. 
Reality is viewed dial ectically and manifested 
through communication. 
2. Existence and non-ex i s tence. Possibility takes 
the form of existence a t a definite time. vvnen 
meanings are communicated, existence is revealed. 
3. Freedom and necessity. This shows the possibility 
of ex istence at all times. Without freedom, mean-
ings cannot be transmitted through communication 
for every instance of transmission of meanings 
is a tacit recognition of choice, and choice is 
possible only in a free agent. 
4. Value and disvalue. In values the possibility of 
conscious purpose is discovered. Communication 
is a direct outcome of the need to achieve value 
in a community of action. 
The categories may be subdivided indefinitely. We have 
tried to show how they may be deduced from the four ultimate 
ones - TIME-BEI NG, SPACE, COMMUNITY, and SYNTHESIS. The first 
category is a s tress on wholes; the second, on parts; the third, 
I 
I 
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The categories are the mode 
through which the subject consciousness penetrates the 
world, and reduces it to ideal content, and objectively, 
as the form which the world or not-self is obliged to 
assume in order to present itself to and in conscious-
ness and become a content.l39 
In the course of the analysis of connnunication we discover 
six regulative postulates or presuppositions without which com-
munication or thought would be impossible. These are: 
1. Signs and symbols are necessary tools of communication. 
2. Signs and symbols denote and connote meanings. 
3. Facts which can be verified and confirmed, as either 
true or false, as well as forms, can be communicated. 
4. Conscious ness accompanies all instances of communication 
138. Ormond, FOK, 113. 
139. Ibid, 117. 
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5 • . Universals tacitly reco gnized by all are necessary 
for the promotion of understanding in communication. 
6. Minds in communication are alike in structure be-
cause of similarity of function in relating, · dis~ 
criminating, and abstracting from experience, given 
universal concepts. 
These presuppositions are interdependent and inter-related 
one upon another. Communication presupposes and involves all 
six at once. Only for the sake of analysis are we able to dis-
cuss them as isolated and separate items in the communication 
process. 
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CHAPTER V 
COMMUNICATION AND EPISTEMOLOGY 
In the previous chapter, we discovered that communica-
tion is the tool with which individuals through social 
intercourse, arrive at an understanding of existence and 
value. Communication thus becomes the means of knowing, 
for, as Plato intimates in the Theaetetus, all knowledge 
is in the last analysis discourse. A coherent theory of 
knowledge, then, becomes a necessary prelude to a real 
understanding of t he conditions of intelligible communi-
cation, or vice versa. Here we get a circular process. 
Communication becomes the means of knowing, and through 
the knowing activity, we come. to understand intelligible 
communication. As H8ffding has said, "Verstehen heisst, 
ein bisher unbekanntes auf Bekanntes zurUckfllhren."l It 
shall be our task, therefore, to investigate the field of 
epistemology in order to see if either of the two well-
known and widely accepted theories of knowledge, monism, 
1. H8ffding, REL, 16. ("To understand means to reduce a 
hitherto unknown to t he known.") 
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both idealistic and realistic, and dualism2 can be compatible /i 
I' with the presuppositions of communication. 
Under the general heading of epistemology, two distinct 
problems arise: (1) What are the sources of knowledge, and 
(2) what are the methods of knowing? How is knowledge pos-
sible? Nowadays, very few people are particularly inter-
ested in the first, for ordinarily they do not feel the 
necessity to plumb the source or knowledge, since they 
have a store or body of knowledge which fits their wants 
the world around them, mathematical principles, moral ideas, 
etc. Then again, traditional philosophy has given them a 
number of theories of the source of knowledge, which sat-
isfy the various questing minds. For instance, some accept 
the theory of innate ideas, such as that of Leibniz, and 
claim that ideas are inborn, and that knowledge is given 
innately. Others adh_ere to the theory of rationalism as 
developed by Kant, and say that knowledge comes from the 
function of reason. Those believing in mysticism and 
intuitionism are convinced that true knowledge results from 
2. The terms are used in the traditional sense. Realism 
claims that reality (in metaphysics) or the object (in 
epistemology) is extra-mental, other than mind; idealism, 
that reality, or the object of knowledge is mental or idea. 
Dualism here refers to the subject-object distinction in the 
knowing process. Monism refers to the lack of distinction 
in the subject-object relationship in knowing. 
- -----__ -_-_-_ :-.-==---_-
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direct insight. Many agreeing with the theory of empiricism, II 
II 
,I as that of Locke, and sensationalism, as that of Hume and 
Mill, say that ideas come through sense perception. Dis-
ciples of Dewey and James follow the pragmatic tradition 
and insist that knowledge arises from practical activity 
which leads to successful consequences. As for us, in our 
analysis of social and individual experience3 we intimated 
that the theory we accepted as an explanation of the source 
of knowledge was a synthesis of the aspects of all the 
theories combined which could be mutually compatible and 
implicatory. With Hegel and others, we are convinced that 
knowledge comes from a dialectic process. The truths of 
each of the traditional theories are accepted by us, and 
are woven into what we call the coherence theory for the 
source of knowledge. 4 For example, we think that the 
theory of innate ideas contributes the original intuition 
with which all knowledge must begin. It is the ground for 
the assurance we feel in the clarity and distinctness of 
ideas. The categories, as the structure upon which knowl-
edge is built, are the prime contribution of rationalism~ 
The emphasis on the need of an object for inference and 
thought to take place, is the outstanding contribution of 
3. Supra, Chapters II and III of this dissertation. 
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empiricism. Finally, the basic faith in the perfection of 
the universe, the core of the theory of mysticism and 
intuitionalism, turns the process back to the initial start-
ing point, the feeling of assurance found in intuition. 
This dialectic theory of the source of knowledge is more 
for the activity of knowing is not an either •••• or process, 
but a both •••• and one, ·for in it are included the two nee-
essary elements of experience, content and form, or sensa-
tions and thought, or immediacy and mediation. 
As we have said, our chief objective in this chapter 
will be to analyze the traditional theories of knowledge so 
as to find a tenable epistemology of communication. Though 
there are several theories, skepticism of several kinds, 
subjectivism of many forms, and objectivism of one type or 
another, we are going to deal mainly with the positive t.ypes, 
monism and dualism. A word or two on some of the other 
types will be sufficient for the purpos~s of this paper. 
The most natural and uncritical epistemology is that 
of naive skepticism which holds that nothing can be known. 
This attitude of mind is not surprising in view of the many 
conflicting and often contradictory aspects of experience. 
However, it does not take long for a serious thinker to 
question the assumption of thorough-going skepticism. If 
real knowledge is impossible, and nothing can be known, how 
-------
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can the point of view of the skeptic be known? How can the J' 
skeptic disprove the argument that knowledge is possible, 
for any attempt at refutation is a tacit recognition that 
something is known. The flat denial of all knowledge or 
possibility of knowledge is self-refuting. 5 
Some skeptics who see the. fallacy of na!ve skepticism 
admit the possibility of some knowledge, and say that such 
knowledge comes through the senses and is relative to the 
individual. There is no such thing as absolute truth. 
David Hume and other sensationalists, and Comte, and the 
followers of positivism, uphold this position by stating 
that sensations alone furnish positive knowledge. Positi-
vistic skepticism, if carried to its logical conclusion, 
leads to solipsism, for if all knowledge is relative, then, 
there is no room for communication or social experience 
wnich is based upon publicity of meanings. In order for 
experience to take place, common objects6 with which minds 
can interact are necessary. Knowledge is an act of mind, 
and that which is known is other than mind. 7 Thus ·all 
thought must refer to something other than itself. And 
since we found in our investigation that knowledge of the 
5. Brightman, ITP, 69-70. 
6. The definition of object as given by Burns in CM, 83 is 
accepted. "If its being is distinct from its being known, 
it is an object." 
7. Brightman, IT~, 67. 
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existence of other selves is possible, that objective values 
are real, that universal principles of science exist, and 
that the self is able to transcend its own immediacy and 
recall past events or anticipate future ones, then we must 
admit the impossibility of solipsism. Knowledge may start 
with sensation, but by the very nature of the activity of 
mind, goes beyond sensation to become real knowledge. The 
obstinate acceptance of the skeptical position is inconsis-
tent and illogical, but a reasonable skepticism, the skep-
ticism of the questing mind, is of value as a tool for the 
sifting and weighing of evidence. Doubt a 'cts as a check 
to the uncriticised and dogmatic assumptions which unthink-
ing mind ls heir to. 8 By questioning the truth of an 
accepted idea, the skeptical attitude will awaken the rea-
soning faculty to compare, contrast, and analyze the data 
of experience and reach a more comprehensible decision. 
Skepticism is valuable as a means of reasoned control, 
rather than an adequate theory of knowledge. 
Many who reject skepticism, accept what is called 
epistemological monism. The idea of immediatism, found in 
the theories of the positivists and sensationalists has 
led them to this theory. Knowledge is possible say the 
8. Cf. Royce, SMP, ?lff. 
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monists because the idea or experience and the object are 
numerically and qualitatively the same.9 ¥llien an object 
is perceived, say a table, that object actually enters into 
the experience or perception of the self. 10 A table which 
cannot enter into the consciousness of a percipient, a 
kind of thing-in-itself, would be utterly meaningless and 
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unknowable. 11 ii Perry, who is one of the stanchest supporters 11 
of epistemological monism, gives a clear definition: 
Epistemological monism means that when things are 
known they are identical, element for element, 
with the idea, or content of the knowing state. 
According to this view, instead of there being a 
fundamental dual division of the world into 
ideas and things, there is only the class of 
things; ideas being the sub-class of those things 
that happ~n to be known. That which is commonly 
called the 'object' of knowledge merges •••••• 
with the idea or is the whole thing of which 
idea is a part. Thus when one perceives the 
tulip, the idea of t he tulip and the real tulip 
coincide element for element; t hey are one in 
color, shape, size, distance, etc. Or, if one so 
desires, one may reserve the name of 'real tulip' 
for the whole of the tulip, as distinguished 
from whatever po~ition of it is actually embraced 
within the idea. 2 
9. The terms dualism and monism and t heir definitions 
which will be given in the course of the chapter are taken 
from the report of the Committee on Definitions expounded 
at the Eleventh Annual Meeting of the American Philosophi-
cal Association. Cf. Woodbridge, Art. 27, 703. 
10. Lovejoy, RAD, 9. 
11. Brightman, ITP, 25. Cf. Lovejoy, RAD, 6-8. 
12. Perry, PPT, 126. 
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In this definition of monism by Perry, there is an 
element of inconsistency. If, as he says, we are able to 
make a distinction between a "real tulip" and a particular 
position of that tulip which might be embraced by the mind, 
do we not have a dualism, a distinction between the subject 
and object? Does not monism break down? Perry would reply, 
No, all is one, but the whole object might be ~ualitatively 
richer than a particular aspect of that object. This leads I 
I 
us to ask: if the idea and the object are one, what are they? ~~I 
Are we to suppose as the definition given above implies, 
that they are object? In answer to this ~uestion, we find 
two types of monists, the idealistic and the realistic. The 
epistemological realists would reply, Yes, . idea and object 
are one, and they are object. {The object may be a material 
object or a neutral entity.} Consciousness is the after-
effect of the stimulus of the object in the nervous system 
carried to the brain. 
This theory opens serious objections which will be dis-
cussed shortly. Suffice it to say now, that realistic mon-
ism rules out the possibility of the existence of minds and 
personalities as ultimate entities or unanalyzable wholes.l3 
13. Lovejoy, RAD, 1-9. It is interesting to note that mon-
ism as a criticism of dualism arises from two sources, a 
desire to emphasize the reality of consciousness, and a de-
sire to eliminate consciousness. G. E. Moore thinks that 
dualism results from a confusion of misunderstanding the 
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Immediately we can see that such a position is absolutely 
out of harmony with any theory of communication. Communica-
tion is an undeniable fact, and is one of the strongest evi- j 
II dences for the existence of persons as concrete individuals. 
A thorough-going realistic monism would make communication 
impossible. It seems to us that in order for any meanings 
to be exchanged from mind to mind, the stimulus and response 
activity of realistic monism would have to be transferred 
from one biological organism to another. Can this be done? 
A group of thinkers who wish to avoid the implications 
o~ materialism, and yet wish to stress the causal efficacy 
of mind, at the same time upholding monism, say that idea 
and object are one, and they are idea. Idealistic monists 
say that we can experience immediately only our sensations. 
Objects exist only for consciousness. To be, means, to be 
perceived. 
There is some danger in an adherence to idealistic mon-
ism for it often leads to narrow subjectivism and forces 
II 
I 
its believers to take a solipsistic or absolutistic position. 1 
II 
ji 13. (cont.) nature of consciousness as distinguished from 
content. William James on the other hand rejects the exis-
tence of consciousness as a concrete entity and tends to 
accept objective monism of the behavioristic brand. 
Lovejoy, RAD, 7-8. In connection with this compare the con-
cept of Bewusstheit Uberhaupt of Moore's as contrasted with 
the content of experience. The Bewusstheit llberhaupt is an 
unanalyzable activity or state, and yet is much more abstract j 
as a unity than the self of the idealists. I 
II 
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It is no wonder that critics of Berkeley interpret his esse 
is percipi as a solipsistic idea. Those of us who are sym-
pathetic to his theory do not feel that such an interpreta-
tion is warranted. Berkeley does not mean to imply that 
existence depends upon perception. The logical and causal 
relations that bind the individual bits of experience into 
a whole is independent of the particular mind experiencing 
an object, but is universal to all minds. 14 
Nevertheless, there is room for some criticism of ideal-
istic monism, especially when the privacy of experience is 
emphasized. If the experiences of each self are unique and 
private, how is the privacy pierced in the interchange Qf 
ideas which we find in social intercourse? Communication 
shows us that we do share experiences, and the symbols of 
communication reveal a common, public world.l5 
Those who see the fallacy of pluralistic idealism say 
that in ultimate reality there are not many selves having 
private experiences, but all experience is the self-experienc 
of the One, the Absolute. There are not many private worlds 
to pierce, but one world to understand. Absolutism is in no 
14. Montague, WOK, 274. 
15. Supra, p. l33ff. of this dissertation. 
Cf. Lovejoy, RAD, 24. 
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better position. In fact, its chief difficulty, the problem 
of explaining the existence and possibility of error, is the 
outstanding inconsistency of any form of monism. If knowl-
edge comes from immediate experience, how does error creep 
in? We think we see a man, and upon closer observation, we 
find it to be a tree. If idea and object are one, why do we 
not see the tree in the first place? 
The upholders of absolutism, with a few exceptionsl6 
say that there is no error. Error is only the impartial 
view of truth seen by a finite mind. If the Absolute is 
One Perfect Whole, embracing all the experiences of the uni-
verse, how can it have and not have perfect knowledge of the 
same object at one and the same time? As a finite being, 
the Absolute has imperfect knowledge; as an infinite being, 
it has perfect knowledge. How can the two be reconciled in 
the same mind? 
In reply, the absolutists say that our confusion is due 
to the fact that we are consciously or unconsciously attempt-
ing to limit the Absolute by time. Time is only an appear-
ance in the finite world and does not affect the .Absolute. 
16. Hegel and Royce are two exceptions. They believe that 
evil or error is necessary as a tension to set the movement 
of the dialectic progressing. They say that the Absolute 
is continually producing perfection out of imperfection. 
The tension is caused by the conflict of matter with mind.-
Whitehead has a similar view. He says that force is always 
in a struggle with persuasion. 
I 
Therefore, "at the same time'' is a meaningless phrase when 
· applied to the Absolute; the Absolute . transcends all time. 
Error occurs in the temporal process of finite beings. 
It seems to us that removing the Absolute from the 
movement of time does not resolve the problem, but only in-
creases its complexity. If the finite world is a part of 
the Absolute, and if change and decay is the sign of fini-
tude, how can the Absolute be in time, and yet transcend 
time? No adequate solution has been given. 
The hypotheses of error given by the realistic monists 
are no more convincing . Some claim that there is no error, 
for error is "true acquaintance with the realm of contra-
diction,"17 and as much a truth as any fact. The world of 
being includes all actual O! possible objects of thought.l8 
It is, in short, equivalent to the realm of "pos-
sibles" of t he orthodox metaphysical tradition. 
It contains ·fairies, hobgoblins, false gods, golden 
mountains, the square root of minus one, as well 
as trees, tables, and organic bodies and atoms and 
electrons. While some of these are not "real," 
i.e., do not "exist," all alike "subsist"; they 
are, whether any mind chances at any moment to be 
aware of them or not.l9 
This explanation does not seem to be true to the facts 
of experience, and therefore, does not satisfy us. When we 
17. Brightman, ITP, 91. 
18. Lovejoy, RAD, 56-58. 
19. Ibid, 56. 
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experience anything, we suppose our spontaneous judgment re-
sulting from our experience to be true, until upon further ex-
perience, and upon comparison with past events, we discover 
that we have erred in our judgment. If there were a realm of 
contradictions, we should experience error as error, and know 
automatically that the facts of experience contradicted an 
accepted truth. For example, we look up from a book we are 
reading and think that we see a bug moving on the wall opposite. 
Upon closer inspection, we discover that the bug is nothing 
more than a particle of black wool. Now, if what the monists 
say is true, then we ought to know without additional investi-
gation that what looks like a bug is a speck of wool. But this 
Jl 
I
I 
I 
I 
I 
is not the case. We think we see a bug, until we examine the 
object of our experience and find that we have erred in our 
judgment. I 
Other monists give a different account of error. '!hey say J 
I 
that: 
••• Delusions, dream content, the creatures of imagi-
nation and the like are not additions to the physical 
objects recognized by science or common sense, but I 
are the same objects, or parts of them, somehow ap- /I 
prehended as present in the wrong places.20 I 
Professor Lovejoy's criticism is apropos. He says that if 
illusory objects are the real physical objects dislocated by 
the mind, then physical objects must possess a surprising mobi-
lity. For exrunple, if in a dream one builds a church which has 
20. Lovejoy, RAD, 70. Cf. Alexander, STD, II, 216-217. 
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the facade of a church in Boston, the nave of a church in New 
York, surmounted by the dome of the Capitol Building in 
Hartford, have the physical realities, the facade in Boston, 
the nave in New York, and the dome in Hartford, really dislo-
cated themselves and are in two places at one and the srune time? 
The question seems absurd, but it is difficult to know just what 
the monists mean by saying that illusory objects are the real 
objects apprehended in the wrong places. The monists might 
reply that the word 'apprehended' gives the clue to the answer. 
There is no real physical dislocation but only duplication in 
thought. 21 If these illusory objects are only duplicates, and 
they are assigned to the real world, then they are additions to 
the world recognized over and above the commonly accepted ob-
jeexs of science. The ambiguity of their position is self-
evident. 
The pragmatists attempt to remedy the situation. They 
claim that error arises from an incorrect interpretation of 
immediate knowledge. There are two types of knowledge possible, 
knowledge by acquaintance, and knowledge about or knowledge by 
description. Knowledge by acquaintance is immediate or intui-
tive knowledge, and knowledge by description is inferential, 
indirect knowledge. Error is found in the interpretation 
21. Lovejoy:, . RAD, 72. 
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is given with what is not given is necessary for the movement 
of thought. Urban and Lewis are emphatic about the need for 
mediation in knowing, Lewis primarily because of the need for 
the successf'ul interaction of person with person in practical 
pursuits, and Urban because of the necessity of breaking the 
vicious prison of solipsism to allow for the sharing of exper-
ience through communication. Lewis says: 
••• there is no knowledge merely by acquaintance ••• 
Knowledge always transcends the immediately given. 
The merely contemplated or enjoyed may possess 
aesthetic significance, but if it is to have cogni-
tive meaning this immediacy must become the subject 
22. The distinction between knowledge by description and 
knowledge by acquaintance was originally made by John Grote 
in his Exploratio Philosophica in 1865. The terms were popu-
larized by William James, and adopted by Bert:Dand Russell, 
Sorley and others. In 1911, Russell introduced the term 
knowledge by description for knowledge about in his POP, 
Chapter V. 
23. Ladd, POK, 287. 
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r of an interpretation which transcends it; we must take toward the given some attitude which se~es practical action and relates it to what is given. 
Urban takes up the cudgel to fight for mediation: 
An individual may spealc of a knowledge by 'simple 
acquaintance' if he will -- although I personally 
know or no case of knowledge without an element of 
description -- but in simple acquaintance he knows 
nothing; he simply has sense data or f~5lings ••• 
M0 re verification is for me an Undi~g. 
thought is necessary in every instance of real knowledge, does 
not rest in this enjoyment. If it did, there would be no co-
herent evidence that other people existed. Validity of any 
immediate truth is obtained by something more than the psycho-
I 
I 
lr I 
I 
I 
I 
logical process of perception. In gaining knowledge, we are 
forced to make a distinction between the object and subject of I 
experience, for only when we have made such a distinction are I 
we able to analyze and compare experiences. In fact, even in ~· 
24. Lewis, MWO, 119. 
25. Urban, Art. 14, 590. 
26. For the definition of enjoyment, supra, p. 69 (footnote 
The term is adopted from Alexander. 
I 
18) .J, 
I 
I 
self-experience or self-consciousness, the most immediate 
knowledge possible, for we cannot deny that we . are or that we 
think, 27 there is need for self-transcendence, or looking off 
from the self as if the self were an object, to know that we 
are. 'Ib_ere may be a monism of self-consciousness, but there is 
always a dualism in self-knowledge or consciousness of the 
self. 28 
Swabey .upholds the theory of mediation in obtaining 
knowledge on the ground that in every knowing situation, the ob-
ject:, rather than the idea, is the focus of attention. There 
may be an immediate awareness of idea, but knowledge comes 
only through retrospection. He says: 
Knowledge ••• is not primarily conversant with 
ideas but with things. There is an immediate aware-
ness of idea; this, however, is not knowledge but 
only an instrument of knowledge. Our attention is 
primarily upon external things. When we pronounce 
that the earth is round we are thinking -- indeed, 
the matter is self-evident -- not of the idea of the 
earth, but of the earth itself. But in retrospect 
we become aware of the difference between our ideas 
and things ••• When I think of the moon am I aware 
of my idea of the moon? Or is the idea present un-
consciously? The answer would seem to be that in 
such cognition the idea is the intended object --
simply as an intended object. We are not conscious 
of the idea as an idea in such awareness but only 
in a later secondary consciousness in which the idea 
is made an object. 29 . 
At times he sounds as if he were upholding epistemological 
27. Supra, p. ?lff. of this dissertation. 
28. Brightman, ITP, 88. 
29. Swabey, BBK, 126. 
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monism of the objective or realistic type, idea and object are 
one and they are idea. Nevertheil.esf.!, we are certain that dual-
ism is more basic because knowledge for him comes- through re-
trospection, and in retrospection there is always a distinction 
between idea and object. The distinction is ultimately based 
upon the difference between the "epistemological object" and 
the "ontological object", a distinction between perceptual 
knov,r ledge and concep tual knowledge. Sensation produces a copy 
of an object and the active intellect, the intellectus agens, 
frees the sensible copy .tr·nom its materiality .and produces an 
intelligible copy. The intelligible copy becomes the con-
ceptual o~ "ontological object." Conceptftal knowledge is, 
for Swabey, the only real knowledge. Error nrises from a dis-
crepancy between the sensible and the intelligible copy of an 
·object. 30 
The new realists were right in maintaining that in 
true perception idea and thing , "epistei:lological ob-
ject"- and "ontological object", may coincide, but 
the possibility of discrepancy, i.e., of error shows 
that the tvw can be distinguished. This may be made 
clear by means of a geometrical example: a single 
point can be the center of two circles, one larger 
than the other. If the circles move relatively to 
each other the one point becomes the two; in the 
same way, in error the epistemological object (the 
idea) and the ontological object (the thing) part 
company.31 
30. The thing as it i s thought to be is the "epistemological 
object", and the "ontological object" is the thing as it is. 
Cf. Swabey, BBK, 26ff . 
31. Swabey, BBK, 27. Cf. Lovejoy, RAD, 23. 
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I. 
And again, we find him r e jecting monism on the ground of 
not only dogmatism, but also because of the impossibility of 
accounting verid1oally for illusions appearing in dr.eams and 
delirium: 
Direct perceptionism, however, runs the risk of 
being dogmatic~ If in perception, we are in 
immediate contact with the object, it would seem 
that perception must be regarded as infallible. 
Infallible perception, however, leads at once 
to na!ve realism and pan-objectivism. To appear 
means to be and all the monsters of dream and 
delirium are to be taken as objectively real.32 
Although the real impossibility of explaining the existence I 
of error is the crucial problem of monism, one other vital 
difficulty has been implied in our criticism. Any form of 
immediatism is ultimately invalidated, it is rightly said, 
because direct acquaint-ance fails to account for experiences 
relating to past and future events. For monism the idea and 
object must coincide, but how can all ideas coincide with 
their events? For example, I know that I broke a cup yester-
day. Surely, the event of the breaking of the cup yesterday 
can never coincide with the idea of the event in my mind 
today. Yesterday's act is in the irrevocable past, and my 
idea of the act is in the present. The tVIo, event and idea, 
can never come together and become numerically , one. All 
knowledge contains some reference to the past. 
32. Swabey, BBK, 110. 
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It is partly to account for events of the past that the 
pragmatists, and some realists, employ the concept of knowl- J 
edge by acquain ta.nce and knowledge by description. They say j 
that in every idea. of the past and future, there is an element l1 
of knowledge by description. Past and future are known througp 11 
the immediacy of the present. K~owledge by descr:i.ption rests 
upon and ~merges from direct perception. Here again we must 
repeat what we have so often said previously. Knowledge 
does bridge the gap between the idea and the object, but the 
very possibility of description shows that the two are dis-
tinct and can be differentiated. One basic reason for this 
is the power of the self to have trans-temporal and trans-
spat~al experiences. The self is not only able to transcend 
itself, but also to transcend the present moment of time, 
and the particular location in space. In experience the mind 
is continually moving from the here and now, to the then and 
there. 
Finally, monism is untenable on one other ground. Its 
tntth is weakened considerably by the fact that the same 
theory in one form upholds, and in another form rejects, con-
tradictory theories of reality. Idealistic monism exalts 
mind, and glorifies God; realistic monism destroys mind by 
explaining it "in terms of objects". 33 
33. Brightman, ITP, 77. 
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The distinction between the thought and object leads 
many philosophers to accept what is termed epistemological 
dualism. This is the theory which holds that in every know-
ing situation, there are two numerically distinct elements, 
idea and object, neither of which can be reduced to the 
oth~r. 34 Whenever we experience an object, the idea is other 
than the object experienced, though the object may be mental, 
such as an imaginary picture; mathematical, such as the 
principles universally recognized to . be true; logical, such 
as the valid propositions of thought, physical, such as a 
table or chair. The idea may represent the object in every 
quality, or the object may differ from the idea in some 
quali ti·es. 'Ihe idea either describes, refers to, or knows 
35 the object. As Ladd says, dualism is the outcome of the 
recognized differentiation or underlying opposition between 
Self and Things. It points to an actualized distinction, 
without which knowledge would be impossible. He writes: 
It and I are two separate and independent beinga. 
We are separate and independent, because the very 
terms of our acquaintanceship, so to speak, are 
such as to show that we actually can separate 
and yet each retain its own existence. I continue 
to live as a Self, after this particular thing 
ceases to be my object. It continues to be a 
thing, after I have withdrawn from it my cogni-
tive activity.36 
35. Brightman, ITP, 78. 
36. Ladd, POK, 579. 
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Epistemological dualism has no intrinsic bearing upon 
the metaphy sical character of the sense data or their 
causes.
37 It is s~lely concerned with the relation of per-
ception and understanding to the objects of knowledge. The 
theory- merely claims that the thing we perc.eive is numeri-
cally and at times essentially other than the cause of the 
perception38 or fact of understanding. Any view of the 
nature of sense data is applicable to the theory. Four dif-
ferent metaphysical theories are possible: (1) It may be 
said that both object and subject are physical or material 
in character, and that percepts are nothing more than the 
result of the function of the biological organs, the brain 
and the nervous system; (2) that both are mental; (3) that 
the percepts are mental, but the causes of the percepts are 
physical; (4) finally, that percepts are physical, but their 
causes, spiritual.39 
Throughout the history of thought, one or the other of 
these metaphysical views has been held by epistemological 
37. Lovejoy, RAD, 26, 34. Lovejoy tells us that some critics 
have objected to dualism on this very ground. They claim 
that 11 its theory of knowledge granted you no actual access 
to the reality in which7ou believed and about which you 
desired to know." 34 
38. Montague, WOK, 248. 
39. Ibid, 248-249. 
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due.lists. This fact does not Validate or invalidate dualism, 
although it does indicate its lack of dependence on any 
one metaphysical system. What value the theory has stands 
on other ground. The View is the acceptable presupposition 
of the sciences and of critical common sense40 and has been 
approved by most personalists, critical realists, new real-
ists, and some pragmatists. Of course there are many 
philosophers, primarily absolutists and intuitionists who 
reject dualism as ordinarily interpreted, with enough basis 
for their objection to convince us that we must reinterpret 
dualism in the light of their criticisms so as to make the 
theory more coherent. That this can be done is not unimagi-
nable. 
The objections to epistemological dualism might be 
divided into two groups, the external, resulting from the 
feeling that there is an irreducible gap .between the object 
and subject in dualism, and the internal, or causal,4~ com-
ing from an analysis of the causal relationship of objects 
to percepts. 
The external objections to dualism come principally 
40. Montague, WOK, 249. 
41. Both types of objections are, in reality, based upon 
the chief difficulty of dualism: If idea and object are 
numerically two, how are they united in knowing~ 
183 
from those who tend to overemphasize the unity of the uni-
verse from a metaphysical point of view. The objections 
arise from a misunderstanding of the dualistic distinction 
of subject and object. It is said that dualism is not a 
method of knowing, but only a statement of the problem of 
knov1ledge. Dualists, say the critics, ln guarding ·against 
a too hasty or too narrow unification of what seems to be 
diverse phenomena, create an unbridgeable gap between the 
subject and object and remove all possibility of ever unit-
ing the two. Dualism really destroys the unity between man 
and the world, it is claimed, and this is in direct opposi-
tion to the purposes of nature. The world is the stage for 
man's activity, and it is his inalienable right to feel him-
self one with it. 
This criticism is based upon the fallacious presupposi-
tion that there is no relation between the terms. In dual-
ism, the object means merely the numerically independent · 
entity which causes perception, and that to which thought 
refers; subject, the perceiving and thinking agent. Although 
.the subject and object exist in their own rights, it is in-
correct to suppose that they are necessarily":different, Jthat 
they "do not causally interact, or even that they may not 
42 be mutually implicatory." In the dialectic process we 
42. Lovejoy, RAD, 315. 
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find that thought is the result of the interaction of being 
with non-being. In the process of the movement, the iden-
tity between the two is .revealed, and a concrete unity formed. 
Thus, in the struggle to understand the universe or to find 
the identity between cognoscendum and datum, is man able to 
find himself in the world. 43 
The second external criticism offered against dualism 
is a continuation of the first, rather than a new one. It 
is said by Absolutists, on sheer assumption, that since 
reality is One, there is no ultimate distinction between 
idea and object. All reality is the Self-Experience of the 
Absolute. Until the existence and the unity of this One all-
embracing Self is understood, no adequate theory of knowl-
edge can be established. 
We can readily see that this, like the first criticism, 
has no real ground to stand upon. There may be an Absolute 
self which contains within itself all the finite selves, 
but the existence of that self does not invalidate the ne-
cessity for a differentiation of subject and object in the 
knowing process. The distinction is in the act, and not 
in the quality of the One from a metaphysical point of view. 
43. Lovejoy, RAD, 16. 
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Third, it is claimed that if there is a gap between the 
subject and object, then the possibility of knowledge is nil. 
Direct perception is the solid foundation of all knowledge, 
the monists insist. "What [we] know by acquaintan~e is so 
true that no other knowledge could add to the certainty.n44 
They continue, of course, we do not deny that there is some 
knowledge by description or inference, but such l{nowledge is 
only direct knowledge interpreted. All knowledge in the 
beginning starts from the immediate union of subject and 
object. Otherwise, we would be surrounded by the shadows of 
Kant's Dinge an sich, and living in a landof illusion. 
In answer to this criticism, it must be said that epis-
temological dualists do not hold that there is no interaction 
between the subject and object of experience. There is an 
internal unity which makes the interaction possible, and 
relates the subject and object. In the dialectic process, 
"one thing may without contradiction be a member of two or 
more classes.n45 Lovejoy gives us a clear explanation of 
what is meant by this. 
The physical object and the datum may thus be 
regarded as one and the same entity; but qua ob-
ject, this entity is related to one context or 
group of associates that constitutes the "imper-
sonal" or "objective world," and qua datum it 
is related to another context, constituting 
44. Brightman, ITP, 84. 
45. Lovejoy, RAD, 46. 
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"the inner history of a person." Thus the real 
duplicity which characterizes the perceptual 
situation can be admitted •.•• 46 
Also if the union between the subject and object were one of 
merely direct acquaintance, the temporal process would elim-
inate the possibility of any knowledge. We experience 
objects successively, and some mediati.on is needed for the 
self to bind the moving moments of exp~ience into one whole. 
Communication shows that there is transcendence, for communi-
cation refers to meanings which are other than the subjec-
tive experiences of the moment. Communication gives evi-
dence of the internal unity underlying the subject and 
object ~f experience, for in the social relationship of sub-
ject to subject, there is always a reference to the subject 
as the object or 'other' of t hought. 
The internal objections to dualism arise also from the 
fact of duality. Lovejoy reiterates this: 
The primary, and almost conclusive objection to 
dualism ••••••• is simply that it is dualistic. It 
is, on its face, a negation of that assumption of 
the eventual unifiability of our understanding of 
t hings, the continuity and fundamental homo-
geneity of nature.47 
In fact, the desire on the part of the monists to establish 
the continuity and homogeneity of nature, is the direct or 
indirect source of all the internal criticisms. The first 
objection is based on the supposed impossibility of comparing 
46. Lovejoy, RAD, 46. 
47. Ibid 35. 
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experienced sense-data with their inexperienced causes. If 
subject and object are two independent realities, the subject 
being the experiencing agent or self, and the object an exter-
nal entity caus ing the experience, how is truth to be obtained~ 
Truth is defined : ~J the dualists as the agreement of an idea 
with its object. It is said that when an idea copies an ob-
ject in every detail, then that idea is true, and when the 
idea fails to copy the object, then the idea is false. 48 How 
can the dualists discover the agreement or disagreement of an 
idea with its object, when the cause of that idea is external 
to, and qualitatively different from, the idea? For the 
dua lists the realm of ideas is in the subjective, and realm 
of facts in the objective world; the ideas are in perceptual 
time and space, and the objects in physical time and space. 49 
In order to compare and analyze the data of experience, the 
objects to be compared must be available in the same space and 
time. 
Underneath this criticism, there is a misunderstanding 
of the meaning of correspondence as the ground for the veri-
fication of experience. For the dualists, correspondence may 
be a definition of truth, but not a criterion of truth. There 
can be no absolute verification through correspondence; indeed, 
idea and object cannot be directly compared in any sense. 
48. Montague, WOK, 257. 
49. Loc • cit. 
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The atomic percepts of the moment can not and do not ev·+de·rtqe 
their causes. Correspondence as a definition of truth rests 
upon the criterion of coherence. The interpretation of sense 
data and the comparison of one experience with another is a 
I 
temporal process. Only when the experiences of the present I 
are compared through similarity with a rich background of 
1 past experience, is there real verification. The experiences 
reaffirm previous hypotheses. Verification, thus, really 
rests upon confirmation through continuous social experience. 
Correspondence as a definition of truth is based upon a grow-
ing process rather than an analytic, atomic conclusion. 
The second causal objection to dualism is based upon 
the supposed qualitative distinction between the perceptions 
and their causes. This objection does not necessarily arise 
from the theory of epistemological dualism itself, but from 
the distinction which the natural scientists and such philos-
ophers as Descartes and Locke have made between what is 
called primary qualities, attributed to physical objects, 
and the secondary qualities attributed to sense data. Thus, 
when a physical object consisting of qualities like size, 
shape, impenetrability, motion, and position, becomes the 
cause of sensations like color, taste, sound, smell, etc., 
that which began as a numerical distinction assumes a new 
form and becomes a distinction of qualities. And since the 
I 
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primary ones are different from and in no way resemble the 
secondary. ones, there is no ground for comparison through 
similarity and difference.50 
Thi s criticism has no weight, for few, if any philoso-
phers today, make any ultimate distinction between the pri-
mary and secondary qualities.51 Lovejoy corroborates this 
statement: 
When ••••• the dualist has called the secondary 
qualities subjective, he has not meant that there 
is any caprice about them. The color a visual 
observer sees he cannot help seeing, be it what 
it may; its presence in his experience is pre-
sumably as rigorous52 determined causally as any 
other natural fact. 
Even the natural scientists correlate the secondary or quali~ 
tative, and the primary or quantitative qualities.53 The 
tendency among t he thinkers is to make all the qualities 
either wholly mental or wholly physical. 
The third internal objection to dualism centers around 
the distinction of space and time as perceived, and space and 
time as inferred through experience of sense objects. The 
50. Montague, WOK, 250-261. 
51. Lovejoy, RAD, 3?. It is interesting to note that Des-
cartes, the philosopher who is thought to have made a dis-
tinct division, really does not. "Tout ce que nous conce-
vons comme etant dans les objets des idees, tout cela est 
objectivement ou par represent ation dans les ide!es mgmes." 
Meditations: R6ponse aux secondes objections. ( ~uoted by 
Lovejoy.) In the seventeenth century objectivement meant 
"subjectively'." 
52. Ibid, 126. 
53. Cf. ibid, 265. 
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critics feel that this distinction between the subject and 
object in the knowing process is artificial, and means in 
reality a spatio-temporal difference. For instance, in the 
experience of an object, say a table, the idea of the table 
is the datum of the present moment, the now, and exists only 
as a state of consciousness. At the same time, the cause of 
the idea is external to, and exists independently of, con-
sciousness. The idea is in perceptual space and time; the 
cause in inferred space and time. The idea can and may 
change in time and space; the experience of the table in 
Boston may be recalled next day in New York, yet 
cause of the idea may remain in the same spot in 
the physical J 
Boston, I 
apparently possessing the qualities of the table perceived 
previously. In this case there seems to be no internal rela-
tionship between the cause and the effect; the effect cannot 
become the cause, and vice ve~·sa. Now in any cause and 
effect series, say the monists, continuity of some sort is 
nece~sary. In this instance, there is no continuity between 
the internal; subjective idea in perceptual space and time, 
and the external; physical object in inferred space and titne. 
Hence all possibility of unity disappears for there is no 
meaning to space and time discontinuous from the space and 
time of perception. And if the dualists really make a 
clear-cut distinction, then knowledge becomes impossible. 
I 
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The gap is too great to be bridged for always some identity 
is needed to establish a contact between the subject and 
object of experience.54 
To the third causal objection that there can be no 
correspondence between the internal space and time and physi-
cal space and time, if the idea and object are two totally 
different entities, the dualists reply that the objection is 
really verbal • 
•••• Though things exist in their own places and not 
elsewhere, they may get reported elsewhere; and the 
being-known of a thing _is its getting reported where 
it does not exist -- and its getting reported there 
as existing at the locus or region in which it does 
exist. Any theory of knowledge which does not recog-
nize both these distinctive peculiarities of the 
cognitive phenomenon, fails to prov5ge either for 
actual knowledge or possible error. 
Then again, as we have said before, existential inde-
pendence does not necessarily imply a difference of kind or 
quality of substance. The dialectic process shows that 
there is an internal unity underlying the structure of the 
universe. The activity of the self is an evidence of this 
unity, for the self is the synthesizing agent of the objec-
tive and subjective factors of experience. As soon as con-
sciousness meets a datum, it immediately builds a trestle 
with symbols between the here and now to the then and there. 
The communication situation is an excellent example of the 
54. Montague, WOK, 261-264. 
55. Lovejoy, RAD, 315-316. 
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unity formed between the apparent difference of physical time 
and space and mental time and space. Minds in communication 
are able to transcend the particular moments of experience 
and the particular spatial spans they occupy. Every time a 
meaning is ~ransferred from one mind to another, a bridge be-
tween the mental and physical elements of experience is formed 
and crossed. 
In the light of the foregoing discussion, we can see that 
neither monism nor dualism, without some qualifications, will 
account for communication. Each must be supplemented by ideas 
which will help to eradicate the inconsistencies found within 
the theory. This 'is not as hopeless a task as it may seem. 
Both theories contain truths which can be synthesized into a 
coherent view of epistemology. We shall attempt to point the 
way to such a synthesis, and hope that future writers on the 
subject will follow the trail. 
Although dualism is more fundamentally true, 56 as an 
epistemology of communication, than monism, we cannot ignore 
the valid suppositions of the latter. We must accept the 
fact of the initial feeling of c~rtainty, emphasized by the 
monists, as a sign of the psychological, if not the logical 
union of idea and object. Also, through the idea of idealistic 
immediatism which affirms the qualitative likeness of exper-
ience, monism shows that nature is one continuous, homogeneous 
&.q. Ladd, POK, 581 
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whole. 
Many writers, among whom might be named H8ffding, Macin-
tosh, Montague, Lovejoy, and Swabey, have attempted a re-inter-
pretation of epistemology. Swabey accepts the merits of each 
theory and develops what he calls the intentional view. In this ! 
view, he says, experience reconciles monism and dualism. The I 
directness of perception reveals the 'what' of an object, and I 
existence, the 'that' of the object. There is always a dualism I 
I 
when the existence of the object is considered, and a monism I 
when the being of an object is emphasized. The view is analo- I 
gous to scholastic dualism. 
On the whole, Swabey's theory is sound, but we are some-
I 
I 
what in doubt as to what really makes the connection between the / 
ideas and the object, or from what source the qualities origi-
nate. Are they wholly mental or physical? He is indefinite 
on the subject: 
It is to be noted that we infer the existence of the 
object from the existence of the sensation, but that 
this gives no ground to believe that the one resembles 
the other ••• From our point of view, sensations are 
not revelatory of the nature of the outer world; they 
are mere signs or indices of the existence of things 
and processes.57 
He continues. In epistemology there must be a distinc-
tion between the intentional object and the representational 
one,58 for in experience there is an ineluctable element of 
truth in what the realistic monists claim, namely that, when 
---- --------
57. Swabey, BBK, 111. 
58. This is a view held by Brentano and St. Thomas also. 
we consult experience, the mind, in a sort of direct fashion, 
goes to the object. The mind is not primarily concerned 
with a mental object. When we think of a chair, for instance 
we think of a particular chair out there, and not the idea 
of a chair. In fact, the idea is the chair as intended or 
meant by the mind. It may seem as if this were mere tau-
tology: we perceive what we perceive. But this tautology is 
necessary, for in every knowing situation, there is a direct-
ness of perception, a 'what' which is perceived and the exis-
tence of the 'what' which is never infallibly and positively I 
known. The existence of an object is always problematic, 
and an inference from the experience of sensation.59 
Montague, in his attempt at a synthesis, is much more 
eclectic than Swabey, and exemplifies the danger of eclec-
ticism. By accepting all, he seems to accept nothing. He 
tries to reconcile the bifurcation of dualism, the horror 
of monism, with the undifferentiated unity of monism, the 
anathema of dualism. Through antinomic propositions, he 
develops what he terms adequate definitions of "critical 
objectivism, critical dualism, and critical subjectivism." 
These revised theories he "combines" to form a "complete 
and self-consistent solution of t he epistemological prob-
lem."60 It seems to us that his attempt is more or less 
59. Swabey, BBK, 110-111. 
60. Montague, WOK, 292. 
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unsatisfactory. In the end he does not have one theory, but 
i~ reality three, none of which seems to differ very much 
from the traditional theories he criticizes. 
H8ffding previously had given a more rational synthetic 
theory than Montague in what he called "cri tica.l monism. 1161 
Though the theory is primarily metaphysical, it has important 
epistemological implications. H~ffding attempts to show the 
underlying unity in the universe and yet asserts "the rea~ity 
of time, and hence the permanent unfinishedness of both Being 
and of Knowledge." 62 The idea of the multiplicity in the 
flux of time, implied by the thought of the permanent unfinish-
edness of knowledge is· of particular ve.lue. By emphasizing 
the connection and continuity63 without undervaluing the flow 
of the particulars in the stream of experience, H8ffding is 
acknowledging a distinction between the knowing subject as 
,, 
1/ 
I 
I 
I 
a being and the objects of knowledge for that being. The 
1
/ 
particulars of sensation become the experiences of a subject. 11 
I 
Macintosh, following H8ffding, developed "critical monism" 1 
into an epistemology with metaphysical implications. Both I 
men feel that in the revaluation of traditional monism they 
61. H8ffding, Art. 26, 85-92. Macintosh, POK, Chapter XIV, 
310-356. Montague, WOK, Part. II. H8ffding used the term in 
1905 in an article in the February 16th issue of the Jour. of 
Phil. Pay. and Scien. Meth. His chief concern was metaphysics 
with epistemological implications. Macintosh used the term in 
1915 and applied it particularly to epistemology with metaphysi-
cal implications. Montague used the term in 1925 to mean a re- 1 
vised view of traditional monism as a theory of knowledge. I 
62. H6ffding, POP, 137. 
I 
63. HBffdin Art. 26 85. I 
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have established a theory of knowledge which strives to 
maintain the thought of unity "without dogmatism."64 
The chief difficulty, however, in their theory is the 
metaphysical approach to the problem of knowledge. Since 
knowing is an empirical relationship, a satisfactory explana-
tion of knowledge should be possible without a sojourn in 
the realm of ultimate being and reality. Both H8ffding and 
Macintosh to a lesser degree, are more interesting in estab-
lishing the Oneness of reality than in developing a theory 
which will explain the process of knowing, regardless of 
whether reality is one or many, matter or mind. It is im-
po·ssible to escape metaphysical implications in dealing with 
monism and that is why we feel that dualism, rather than 
monism, should be considered as more fundamental in epistem-
ology. In the knowing situation, multiplicity and particu-
larity are more important than unity; whereas, in metaphysics 
the opposite might be said to be true. Much of our knowl-
edge comes through communication of some form or other, and 
communication is impossible without the interaction of mind 
with mind. Interaction implies inference, and inference is 
the differentiation of the subject from the object. 
We need a theory of knowledge which will leave meta-
physical issues out of the question, and account for the 
64. H8ffding, POP, 144. 
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plurality of experience, and at the s~~e time show evidence 
of the dialectic connection or coherence, rather than the 
bare homogeneity of reality. Communication is the outward 
sign of this internal union of the like with the unlike. No 
brand of monism will do, for monism does not coincide with 
I 
i 
I 
I 
the presuppositions of communication. 
will preserve the · 
I We need a dualism which 1
1 
spatial externality to the knower's body, temporal 
externality to the date of the event of perceiving 
or remembering, causal independence of that event, 
the identity of the objects known by many observers, 
and the actual "otherness" of our neighbor's exper-
ience.65 
I 
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definite aptl 
of communi-
Traditional dualism would fit our need if more 
plication had been made by its exponents to a theory 
cation and to the psychological processes of knowing. As it 
stands, there is no explicit explanation of the connection of 
the subject and object. Historical dualism, without some of 
the important truths of monism, would lead to agnosticism or 
skepticism because the object and subject of experience are not 
connected definitely enough so as to remove some of the basic i 
questions of doubt. Without a real unity, the object of exper- 11 
II ience would remain an ultimate unknowable or ding an sich. Then 
again, monism in its purest form, without the valid claims of 
dualism would lead to solipsism or Absolutism as we have 
65. Lovejoy, RAD, 25. 
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said. In order to have a working epistemology which would 
be true to all the facts of experience and thought, we must 
have a theory synthesizing monism and dualism. Such a 
theory must harmonize with our previous conclusions in Chap-
ter IV. It must allow for the transference of meanings 
through symbols; it must . account for the plurality of minds 
1 with the continuity and homogeneity of nature; it must explaiiJ 
satisfactorily the source of the initial feeling of certainty 
in every instance of experience, and finally it must describe 
adequately the relationship between the internal aspect of 
experience with the external spatiality and temporality of 
experience. 
We think that our treatment of the laws of symbolism will 
be a helpful factor in our revision of dualism. At the time 
we discovered a close correlation between sense data and 
symbols. Symbols turned out to be the significant instrumentE 
of meaning , .and hence of cornrnunica tion or knowledge. The 
area of knowledge is said to be co-extensive with the area 
of significance. n66 Symbols, thus, become a genuine part of 
perception and play an important role in the cognition of 
objects. Without symbols there can be no presentation of 
objects, and without the presentation of objects there can 
be no symbols.6? 
66. Eaton, ST, 10. 
6?. Ibid, 32. 
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This interdependence of symbols and perceptions gives us 
a clue to a working epistemology, an epistemology which we 
68 
shall call social dualism, dualism to show the distinction 
between subject and object in the knowing process, and social 
to emphasize the interactivity of minds with each other and 
v1i th objects in the knowing or communication s 1 tua tion. Social 
dualism is not a repudiation of historical dualism, but a re-
interpretation of it with a special application to creative and 
social experience. 
Social dualism brings out the unity between immediacy 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
(presentation) and mediacy (representation). It shows that at I 
I 
the moment of perception there is a feeling of union between 
I 
the subject and object of experience. Now this feeling does not i 
really arise from the fact that the chair I experience out I 
I there actually becomes numerically identical with my experience, !! 
but rather is due to the fact that the experience I have is 
qualitatively identical with the chair out in space. The quali-
tative identity arises from the creation of a symbol represented 
by the idea produced, a creation which is possible only with 
the joint interaction of the object out in space which stimu-
lates activity, and the activity of the mind or self. The 
symbol so closely resembles and is so directly connected with 
68. The term "social dualism" was suggested by Professor Edgar 
Sheffield Brightman to replace the term "radical dualism", 
originally used. 
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the object, ror without the object, there would be no symbol, 
that the idea in the mind, not only becomes a prototype of the 
object, but even seems to be the object in space. This is only 
69 seeming, however, for the object is never the idea, or sym-
bol, and the symbol is never the object. There is always a dis-
tinction between the idea and the object as two existents, but 
the feeling of immediacy is produced, because at the moment of 
experience, there is a close correlation or even resemblance 
between the symbol and the object. The immediacy is psycholo-
gical rather than actual. 
If the identity between the object and symbol were actual, 
I 
I 
I 
II 
I 
then there would be absolute identity, complete in every detail; JI 
but this is not the case for social dualism. The sJnnbol does i 
not and cannot absorb or represent every single quality which 
may be a possibility in the object. The symbol only represents 
the datum or pattern70 of the present moment abstracted from an 
indefinite whole. This discreteness is a fundamental part of 
I 
I 
I 
I 
experience, for the mind selects data with certain "predisposi- / I 
! 
I tions or intentions, which predetermine to a large extent what 
is nerceived. 1171 The predispositions are controlled, more or 
69. Here it might be asked if' we are identii'ying symbol and · I 
idea. We might say that all ideas, in so far as they are vehic-1 
les of knowledge, are symbols, but that all symbols are not I 
ideas. cr. Eaton, ST, 10. I 
70. Cf. Macintosh, POK, 311. Also, the Substitution Theory 
advanced by Strong in Art. 25, 171-172. 
71. Eaton, ST, 17. 
I 
I 
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less, by symbols which have been established by past experiences 
and verified by social experience. As the symbols are created !: 
through interaction with the content of experience, they are \ 
I 
sifted out of the context from which they originate, and througH 
I 
constant usage "acquire significance"72 and become habits of 1
1
1
1 reference. They are employed to represent existential objects 
when these objects are not immediately before consciousness. 7 3 II 
Thinking thus becomes the substitution of symbols in the field 
of presentation for the objects or things intended by the sym-
bols.74 It is this capacity of mind to substitute symbols for 
objects that makes possible "deliberate recollection .and ex-
pectation."75 Symbolic reference is necessary for knowledge. 
In the process of experiencing or knowing, the mind is con-
stantly moving from presentation to representation. Symbols 
are created in the process, and the differentiation of the ob-
ject and subject is preserved in this very mo~ement. It is 
through the ability of the mind to transcend the immediately 
given that we have what might be called purely symbolic 
knowledge, knowledge in which the objects meant are not given 
with the symbols. · Under purely symbolic knowledge we might 
classify ideas which have objective validity, independent of 
72. Eaton, ST, 26. 
73. Ibid, 17. 
74. Ibid, 29. 
75. Dewey, LOG, 57. 
I
I 
! 
d 
'I 
I 
I 
the particular moment of experience, such as mathematical 
principles, scientific laws, judgments of the past and future, 
re.cognized ideals and values. Thus, to "know about things is 
to refer to them through symbols when they are not presented, 
while to know things immediately is to have them before the 
~76 where the symbolic reference"77 originates. Thus sym-
bols form the unity between the experiencing subject and the 
object experienced without obliterating the distinction between 
the two. Nevertheless, since the mind is not a tabula rasa, 
we cannot distinguish too sharply between what is given78 and 
the process that selects and appropriates the given. 79 
The significance of symbols in the knowing ~ituation is 
one of the most important contributions to epistemology made by 
social dualism. Through symbolism the theory eliminates the 
surface contradiction found in the statement that all knowledge 
is mediate knowledge, and that in every knowing situation 
there is a moment of immediacy. As we have said before, imme-
diacy in social dualism does not mean absolute identity of 
subject and object. The identity is one of similarity through 
representation and likeness of quality rather than numerical 
merging, which would imply that the subject and object of ex-
perience are one, qualitatively alike in all respects. The 
76. Underlining is ours. 
77. Eaton, ST, 12. 
78. 'Given' in this instance means 'present as content.' 
79. Cf. Eaton, ST, 38. 
I' :I 
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immediacy in social dualism is in reality a psychological feel- ! 
ing, a feeling of certainty that an object placed before con-
sciousness and interacting with it, is capable of producing 
a symbol which represents that object in some respects. The 
certainty is immediately transformed through the activity of 
mind in the flux of experience into a mediated thought, where 
the distinction of the subject and object is recognized and 
preserved. 
The mental act is thus the conscious response to 
some non-mental existent finite which is its object • 
••• What is e~ential is that there is no mental 
act without its appropriate object, and that this 
object is a distinct existence from the mental act, 
and may, as we have seen, exist without the mental 
act.80 
Thus the symbols become the mediators81 between the 
private world of the agent in acting, and the public world of 
perception. Knowledge arises from the union of subject and 
object. Communication becomes the means of the transference 
of meanings from mind to mind by the symbols which have become 
public property in social experience. Since all minds function 
alike through objective, universal categories, the symbols, as 
instruments of meaning become understandable by more than one 
mind. Our public world is created in part in response to the 
so. Aiexander, STD, Vol. II, 117-118. 
thought, here, we do not wish to commit 
'non-mental' as having any metaphysical 
accept the term to mean an object other 
of the experience. 
81. Eaton, ST, 12. 
In accepting Alexander's 
ourselves to the term 
connotations. We 
than the mental act 
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need of individuals to understand one another and to co-operate 
in the realization of values, 82 and in part by construction 
from the given83 elements of experience. 
The advantages of social dualism over the traditional 
forms of epistemology are many. First, by its theory of sym-
bols as the mediating tools of the union between the subject 
and the object, the theory escapes both agnosticism and solip-
sism. It avoids agnosticism because of its claim that the 
symbols become the prototypes of the objects presented in ex-
perience84 and make the objects knowable entities. 
Solipsism is averted on the same premise, for solipsism 
eventually resolves into agnosticism. The symbols, not only 
allow for comparison through identity of qualities, but also 
through difference, exemplify the distinction between the sub-
ject and object. The constant interaction of the subject and 
object shows both the unity and the distinction of the two. 
In the interaction we find a subject determined by the object, 
and an object determined by the subject. 85 The qualities of 
82. Lewis, MWC, 21. 
83• 'Given' here means "existent as experience". Strong, Art. 
25, 187. 
84. Lovejoy, RAD, 79. 
85. Cf. H8ffding, POP, 111-112. Here he speaks of an "ob-
jectively determined subject", and a "subjectively determined 
object" to show the inexhaustibility of Being as a metaphysical 
reality, which gives rise to the complexity of the problem of 
knowledge. We use the idea to clari·.fy the meaning of the syn-
thesis of monism and dualism. 
-__ - _-_-_-_-H--.=-.-_-__ -_-_-_-_----=---_-
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the object cannot be explained by the concept of the subject 
alone, as the Berkeleian idealists tend to do, and the proper-
ties of the object cannot be known without the activity of the 
subject. Also contrary to the belief of the materialists, the 
attributes of the object belong to the object only when the ob-
86 ject is in relation to a subject. In this way the Cartesian 
division of qualities into primary and secondary is eliminated. 
~ualities are not wholly subjective, nor wholly physical, but 
objective possibilities revealed through the interaction of 
subject and object. This explains variations in the perceptions
1 
of subjects, and accounts for errors which arise through the I 
I 
defects of the sense organs. For instance, a color-blind personj 
may see gray, where another may see green. Now the object per-
ceived possesses indefinite possibilities of qualitative ap-
pearance, and the mental activity of the color-blind person will l 
produce the gray possibility, and 
. I 
the normally sir)lted person, 11 
the green. I 
The symbols, thus form the connecting link between the 
object as the cause, and the idea as the effect, because of I 
their close relationship to both mind and objects. 
,I 
J i 
The symbols 1 
are related to mind in that they are created by mind and are 
subjective elements of experience; they are related to objects 
in that, once created, they can become objective factors of 
experience. 
Cf. Macintosh, 
! 
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Finally, social dualism presents a logical theory of the 
existence of error in knowledge. Monists create an artificial 
. I 
I explanation of the causes of- err·or by saying that there is no 
error or that error is true perception of a realm of. contra-
dictions, both of which seem equally incoherent to us. The 
fact of error is a reality which cannot be escaped through 
verbalism. Social dualism elucidates the causes of error and 
adds to the valid truths already propounded by traditional 
dualism. It is true that error arises from incoherent inter-
pretation or inadequate understanding of the data of experience, 
but there is a cause for inaccurate analyses. As the objects 
in space stimulate the mind to create symbols for the trans-
ference of meanings, sometimes a confusion arises between the 
new elements in experience, and the similarity of the new to 
past experienc~s. The confusion is the source of error in 
understanding. Also , in · the movement of thought from presenta-
tion to representation, there is what is called the twilight I I 
I 
zone,87 where the vagueness of consciousness often causes error / 
I 
throug~ lack of clarity and distinctness in perception. Or 
again, incorrect recollection, because of poor memory, produces 
error in the interpretation of data which rests upon purely 
symbolic representation. And lastly, the very complexity of 
the knowing activity, involving the four-term relationship 
between (1) the given object, {2) the sign or symbol 
87. Eaton, ST, 18. 
I' 
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representing the object, (3) the mind rererring to the object 
meant by the symbol, and (4) the creation or appropriation 
of symbols by the mind in transmitting meanings, gives rise to 
most of the errors or understanding. 
The advantages of social dualism are many and convince 
us that the theory is the logical epistemology of communica-
tion. It is consistent with both the truths of monism and 
traditional dualism. It harmonizes with the presuppositions 
of communication. It fits with the facts of both individual 
and social experience by allowing for the creative activity 
of the self, and at the same time recognizing the necessity 
for the existence of many minds in the interchange of ideas. 
It shows the need for objective values and meanings as common 
or public ground where minds can meet. The theory as devel-
oped here is not complete in every detail, but indicates the 
course to follow in future analysis and application. 
,I 
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In this · dissertation communit:ation is treated as an intelligible result of 
.. the social interaction of mind with mind, manifesting a deep-seated unity 
underlying the sociality. An attempt is made to discover the epistemological 
presuppositions which make communication and knowledge possible. Social 
experience is found to be the ground, and individual experience the unifying 
factor, of communication. Communication becomes the sign of shared ex-
perience, co-ordinating the behavior of individuals in social relations. 
Sociality arises ·from the·· biological necessity of preserving the race, and 
of man's need for mutual aid in the achievement of values. Communication 
is the tool man uses to attain his ends. Society is characterized by ' a certain 
degree of voluntary co-operation a.nd reflection; 'and is recognized as an 
organization of understandings. Social cohesion is the outcome of a dialectical 
movement involving psychological, logical, ethical, and religious factors and 
showing three progressive stages. The first is the instinctive or gregarious 
mode of association resulting from the biological functions of life; activity is 
unintelligent, unprogressive, and uniform. The second is the plastic period 
where quasi-social impulses, such as rivalry, competition, and play, come into 
prominence; the activity of the individual is imitative, and learning occurs 
through trial and error. The third is the reflective state where community is 
obtained through intelligent behavior and responsible thinking. Here a dis-
tinction is made between the concept of solidarity (external unity) and that 
of community (internal unity). The community is the concrete universal of 
Hegel, of Royce, of Whitehead, a whole having parts which are inter-related, 
and actively engaged in fiulfilling a common purpose. The unity is maintained 
through tensions among the differences in the like through the media of social 
and individual forces. 
The instruments of communication are ( 1) language; consisting of sym-
bols voluntarily produced for the translation of emotions, desires, and ideas, 
and (2) the world of nature and physical things, forming the common en-
vironment for public action. Universial values, as ideal objects of desires, 
promote group co-operation and activity. 
Communication shows progress parallel with the development of society. 
The instinctive period reveals a behavioral communication of gestures and 
simple sounds ; the plastic period, a lower intelligible communication, where 
gestures become fewer and sounds increase. Comparisons are made through 
similarity of reference based upon objective values rather than physical wants. 
The reflective period shows a higher intelligible communication; symbols as . 
mere pointers become fewer, and meanings revealed through symbols become 
more important. At this level, the mind is able to make correlations and to 
move from the now, the expressed, to the then, the unexpressed. The values 
of both the individual and society are ascertained to be necessary for group 
experience; it is seen that society generalizes what the individual has already 
particularized. 
Social experience rests upon and presupposes individual experience. The 
individual self is found to consist of the datum, the present moment of ex-
perience, and the subattentive, the background of all past experiences. The 
unity and identity of the self rest upon the activity of the datum in tran-
scending its own immediacy in time and space; the permanence and continuity 
rest upon the subattentive. The mind includes both the datum and the sub-
attentive. A person is a whole self capable of feeling, thinking, willing, and 
acting. In the concept of the person, the idea of control and purpose emerges. 
Social experience forms the ground for the interaction of persons in a common 
world. 
In communication other persons become objects of knowledge, and knowl-
edge is obtained through the interaction of subjects and objects. Objects fur; 
nish the data with which the concepts of the whole self and the universe are 
built. The contact between one mind and another is unlike the contact be-
tween a mind and a physical object. In the latter, there is appr6priation and 
selection or rejection, while in the former there is mutual stimulation, the crux 
of creative activity and persona( growth. In this joint interaction knowledge 
of self grows with knowledge of the other. 
No existing theory of the knowledge of other selves accounts for all the 
facts of interaction. Each theory makes valid contributions. The intuitional 
theory gives a basis for postulation and inference; the analogical reaffirms the 
transcendental power of the self, and shows the underlying unity of experience 
in its search for the like. In stressing bodily behavior, it reveals a common, 
public,: environment. The language theory, advocated by recent writers, par-
ticularly Price and Urban, is perhaps the most comprehensive. It is primarily 
significant for its evidence of other minds in co-operative activity for worthy 
ends, and gives this evidence without reference to bodies. 
Through language the objects of knowledge acquire meanings ; the mean-
ings become the cultural heritage of the race and are transmitted by symbols. 
Meanings are understandable by more than one mind because they adhere to 
universal laws of symbolism- the Laws of Singularity, of Substitution, of 
Expansion, of Impartiality, and the Law of Coherence, which subsumes and 
systematizes· all the other laws. Meanings in a system form judgments showing 
a plurality in an ordered synthesis. The synthesis is obtained through cate-
gories which act as mediating relations between consciousness and the influx 
of objects. The basic categories are ( 1) time-being, emphasizing wholeness 
in experience; (2) space, revealing discreteness in experience; ( 3) community, 
involving the interaction of organic reals, and ( 4) 'synthesis, showing the 
coherence of reality. The category of synthesis distinguishes between totality 
as a sum and unity obtained through relational combinations. · 
Since communication is a means of knowing, the direction toward which 
a coherent epistemology must move to be compatible with the facts of com-
munication is indicated. Neither monism nor traditional dualism is wholly 
adequate. Monism is rejected because it leads either to solipsism or Absolut-
ism, both of which ignore the need for the plurality of minds necessary to 
communication. Dualism tends toward skepticism and ·agnosticism. To obtain 
a working epistemology some synthesis is required. Macintosh, Hoffding, 
Montague, Lovejoy, and Swabey have tried to establish a synthetic episte-
mology, but their approaches have been primarily metaphysical, and they have 
overemphasized a monistic view of knowledge. Dualism is found to be more 
basic, but dualism needs to be modified and made definitely applicable to the 
communication situation. Also, it is impossible to overlook the validity of the 
initial feeling of certainty pointed out by the monists, as an indication of 
psychological if not actual unity of subject and object. 
A clue to an acceptable epistemology is discovered in the four-term 
relationship found in communication between (1) the given object, (2) the 
sign or symbol representing the object, ( 3) the mind referring to the object 
meant by the symbol, and ( 4) the creation or appropriation of the symbol by 
the mind in transmitting meanings from mind to mind. This clue leads to a 
social dualism, which includes both a distinction between the subject and 
object, and also a unity between the two, obtained by the creative activity of 
the mind in producing symbols. These symbols so closely resemble the object 
that at the mometit of experience, the qualitative identity bE;:tween the symbol 
and Jhe object, produces a feeling of immediacy; the object in space seems to 
be the idea in the mind. A distinction is preserved because the symbol is only 
the datum or pattern of the moment, whereas the object is independent and 
possesses possibilities of other qualities besides those represented by a par-
ticular symbol in a knowing situation. 
Symbols are tools of unity because they are related to both mind and 
object. They are related to mind in that they are created by mind, and they 
are related to objects in that, once created, they become objective factors of 
experience. Social dualism eliminates the possibility of agnosticism by its 
postulation that the symbols as public ·instrument of thought become the 
prototypes of objects and thus make them knowable. It removes the possibility 
of solipsism on the ground that symbols allow for comparison of experience 
through identity of qualities, but it maintains a distinction between the subject 
and object through the principle of difference necessary for successful com-
tenable epistemology of communication. 
The conclusions of the dissertation may be summarized as follows: 
L Communication between minds is essential ·to knowledge. To account 
for communication six regulative presuppositions are posited: 
a. Signs and symbols are necessary tools of communication. 
b. Signs and symbols denote and connote meanings which becoJ.l?.e 
public property for minds in an organization. 
c. Facts which can be verified and confirmed, as either true or 
false, as well as forms, can be communicated. 
d. Universals and values accepted by minds in a social group 
produce understandings. . 
e. Consciousness accompanies every instance of communication. 
f. Minds in communication are alike in structure because of 
similarity ~f function in relating, discriminating, and abstract-
ing from experience, ·given, common concepts. 
2. Social experience signified by communication promotes creative ac-
tivity and personal growth. 
3. The epistemology of social dualism is basic for communication be-
cause it ( 1) stresses the interactivity of minds, (2) preserves a dis-
tinction between the subject and object in knowing, (3) reveals a 
common world, and ( 4) accounts for the apparent identity of idea 
(symbol) and object. 
Additional copies may be obtained on application to 
DEAN HowARD M. LESouRD 
Boston University Graduate School 
· Boston, Massachusetts 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Ames, Edward Scribner--REL 
Religion. 
Books 
New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1929. 
Aristotle--POL 
Politics. 
(Tr. Benjamin Jowett.) 
Oxford: The Clarendon Press (1905), 1926. 
Ayer, Alfred J.--LTL 
Language, Truth, and Logic. 
New York: Oxford University Press, 1936. 
Babcock, Donald C.--MSA 
Man and Social Achievement. 
New York: Longmans, Green and Co., 1929. 
Baldwin, James Mark--DPP . 
Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology. 3 vols. 
New York: The Macmillan Company, 1902. 
--TT 
Thought and Things - A Study of the Development and Meaning 
of Thought or Genetic Logic. 3 vols. 
New York: The Macmillan Company, 1906, 1908, 1911. 
--SEI 
Social and Ethical Interpretations in Mental Development. 
New York: The Macmillan Company, 1906. 
--IS 
The Individual and Society. 
Boston: Richard G. Badger Co., 1911. 
--GTR 
Genetic Theory of Reality. 
New York: G. P . Putman's Sons, 1915. 
Berkeley, George--Works 
Berkeley's Complete Works. 
(Ed. Alexander Campbell Fraser.) 
Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 18?1. 
I' 
II 
[' 
I 
Berkeley, George--CB 
Commonplace Book. 
(Ed. G. A. Johnston.) 
London: Faber and Faber, Ltd. (1705-1?08), 1930. 
Bowne, Borden Parker--TTK 
Theory of Thought and Knowledge. 
New York: The American Book Company, 189?. 
Brightman, Edgar Sheffield--ITP 
An Introduction to Philosophy. 
New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1925. 
--P6IC 
The Proceedings of the Sixth International Congress of 
Philosophy - 1926. 
New York: Longmans, Green and Company, 1927. 
Burns, Cecil Delisle--CM 
Contact between Minds. 
London: Macmillan and Company, 1923. 
Coover, John Edgar--EPR 
Experiments in Psychical Research at Leland Stanford Junior 
University. 
Stanford: At the University Press, 191?. 
Croce, Benedetto 
Aesthetic - As Science of Expression and General Linguistic. 
{Tr. from Italian by Douglas Ainslie.) 
London: Macmillan and Company, 1909. 
de Laguna, Theodore and Grace Andrus--DE 
Dogmatism and Evolution. 
New York: The Macmillan Company, 1910. 
de Laguna, Grace Andrus--SFD 
Speech - Its Function and Development. 
New Haven: Yale University Press, 192?. 
Descartes, Rene--Oeuvres 
Oeuvres Choisies. 2 Tomes. 
Paris: Libraire Garnier Freres, 1930. 
--Works 
Works, 2 vols. 
(Tr. Elizabeth s. Haldane and J. R. T. Ross.) 
Cambridge: The University Press, 1931. 
Dewey, John and Others--CI 
Creative Intelligence. 
New York: Henry Holt and Company, 191?. 
l 
I 
,, 
217 
- ·.====tt=====================--====#====j 
-------·----------------
Dewey, John--HNC 
Human Nature and Conduct. 
New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1922. 
--EN 
Experience and Nature. 
Chicago: Open Court Publishing Company, 1925. 
--PP 
Public - Its Problem. 
New York: Henry Holt and Company, 192?. 
--PC 
Philosophy and Civilization. 
New York: Minton, Balch and Company, 1931. 
--CF 
A Common Faith. 
New Haven: Yale University Press, 1 934. 
--EE 
Experience and Education. 
New York: The Macmillan Company, 1938. 
--LOG 
Logic - The Theory of Inquiry. 
New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1938. 
Eaton, Ralph Monroe--ST 
Symbolism and Truth. 
Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1925. 
Giddings, Franklin Henry--EOS 
Elements of Sociology. 
New York: The Macmillan Company, (1889), 1922 . 
Green, Thomas Hill--PE 
Prolegomena to Ethics. 
(Ed. A. C. Bradley.) 
Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1883. -
Grote, John--EP 
Exfloratio Philosophica. 2 vols. 
Vol. II, Ed. Joseph Bichersteth Mayor.) 
London: Cambridge University Press, (Vol. I) 1865, 
(Vol. II) 1900. 
Heard, Gerald--HY 
These Hurrying Years. 
New York: Oxford University Press, 1934. 
218 
-----
--- -
I 
I 
I 
I 
219 
=== ==========-=-=---------=--=-=-=======H==== 
Heard, Gerald--SOC 
The Source of Civilization. 
New York: Harper and Brothers, 1937. 
Hegel, Georg Wilhelm F. 
sHmtliche Werke. 21 Bande. 
(Herausgegeben von Georg Lasson) (Band V, Encyclopldia) 
Leipzig: Verlag von Felix Meiner, 1913-1938. 
Hocking, William Ernest--TOP · 
Types of Philosophy. 
New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1929. 
H8ffding, Harald--REL 
Religionsphilosophie. 
Leipzig: o. R. Reisland, 1901. 
--POR 
The Philosophy of Religion. 
(Tr. B. E. Meyer.) 
London: Macmillan and Company, Ltd., 1906. 
--POP 
The Problems of Philosoyhy. (Tr. Galen M. Fisher. 
New York: The Macmillan Company, (1905), 1906. 
James, William--MOT 
The Meaning of Truth. 
London: Longmans, Green, and Company, 1909. 
--ERE 
Essays in Radical Empiricism. 
New York: Longmans, Green and Company, 1912. 
Johnston, George Alexander--BOB 
Berkeley's Commonplace Book. 
London: Faber and Faber, Ltd., 1930. 
Kant, Immanuel--KrV 
Kritik der Reinen Vernunft. 
Leipzig: Felix Meiner (1781, 1787), 1930. 
Knudson, Albert C.--VRE 
The Validity of Religious Experience. 
New York: The Abingdon Press, 1937. 
-~=-=-~- ~=--==----~--==~=-~--==. =-=======-=-==--~--------=-~=====================~= 
Ladd, George Trumbull~-POK 
Philosophy of Knowledge. 
New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 189?. 
Leighton, Joseph Alexander--Me 
Man and the Cosmos. 
New York: D. Appleton and Company, 1922. 
Lewis, Clarence Irving--MWO 
Mind and the World Order. 
New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1929. 
Locke, John--Essay 
An Essay Concerning Human Understanding. 
New York: George Routledge and Sons, 1690. 
Lovejoy, Arthur Orcken--P~D 
The Revolt A~ainst Dualism. 
New York: • w. Norton and Company, 1930. 
Macintosh, Douglas Clyde--POK 
The Problem of Knowledge. 
New York: The Macmillan Company, 1915. 
Maritain, Jacques--DOK 
The Degrees of Knowledge. 
(Tr. Bernard Wall and Margot R. Adams.) 
New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1938. 
McDougall, William--OF 
Outline of Psychology. 
New York: Charles Scribner's Sons (1923), 1926 • 
.... eSP 
An Introduction to Social Psychology. 
Boston: John W. Luce and Company, 1926. 
--EM 
The Energies of Men. 
New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1933. 
--FP 
The Frontiers of Psychology • 
. cambridge: The University Press, 1934. 
Montague, William Pepperell--WOK 
The Ways of Knowing. 
New Yor~: The Macmillan Company, 1925. 
Morgan, Barba-ra Spofford--ICW 
Individuality in a Collective World. 
New York: W. W. Norton Company, 1935. 
220 
Murchison, Carl, Ed.--PSY1930 
Psychologies of 1930. 
London: Oxford University Press, 1930. 
Ogden, C. K. and Richards, I. A.--MOM 
The Meaning of Meaning. 
New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company (1923), 1936. 
Ormond, Alexander Thomas--FOK 
Foundations of Knowled~. 
London: Macmillan and Company, Ltd., 1900. 
Perry, Ralph Barton--PPT 
Present Philosophical Tendencies. 
New York: Longmans, Green and Company (1912), 1925. 
Phaedri (Phaedrus)--Fables 
Fabulae Aesopiae. 
Oxonii: Clarenioniano, 1919. 
Prall, David Wight--AA 
Aesthetic Analysis. 
New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1926. 
Pratt, James Bissett--PR 
Personal Realism. 
New York: The Macmillan Company, 1937. 
Reichenbach, Hans--EP 
Experience and Prediction. 
Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1938. 
Rhine, J. B.--riTM 
New Frontiers of Mind. 
New York: Farrar and Rinehart, 1937. 
Richards, I. A.--PLC 
Principles of Literary Criticism. 
New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, Ltd., 1926. 
Royce, Josiah--SMP 
The Spirit of Modern Philosophy. 
New York: Houghton, Mifflin and Company, 1892. 
--POC 
The Problem of Christianity, 2 vols. 
New York: The Macmillan Company, 1913. 
Russell, Bertrand--POP 
The Problems of Philosophy. 
New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1911. 
221 
'I 
1 222 
~~-=-==~==============================================~F====== 
Sapir, Edward--LAN 
Language - An Introduction to the Study of Speech. 
New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1921. 
Seligman, Edwin R. A., Editor-in-Chief--ESS 
Encyclopedia of Social Sciences. 15 vols. 
New York: The Macmillan Company, 1930-1935. 
Sheldon, Wil~on Henry--80S 
Strife of Systems and Productive Duali~. 
Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1918. 
Sinclair, Upton--MR 
Mental Radio. 
New York: Albert and Charles Boni, 1930. 
Smith, Norman Kemp--PITK 
Prolegomena to an Idealist Theory of Knowledge. 
London: Macmillan and Uompany, 1924. 
Spaulding, Edward Gleason--woe 
A World of Chance. 
New York: The Macmillan Company, 1936. 
Stace, Walter Terence--TKE 
The Theory of Knowledge and Existence. 
Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1932. 
Strong, Charles Augustus--V~lliB 
Why . the Mind Has a Body. 
New York: The Macmillan Company, 1903. 
and Others--EPP 
--=----Essays Philosophical and Psychological in Honor of William 
James. 
London: Longrnans, Green and Company, 1908. 
Swabey, William Curtis--BBK 
Being and Being Known. 
New York: The Dial Press, 1937. 
Thomas, Milton and Herbert Schneider--BJD 
A Bibliography of ~ohn Dewey. 
New York: Columbia University Press, 1929. 
Urban, Wilbur Marshall--LR 
Language and Rea~it~. 
London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1939. 
Weyl, Hermann--MN 
Mind and Nature. 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
====~P=h=· ~ilader-hraT Universi~ of Pennsylvania, 1934. 
----·---· =========================ii====d 
~====~================================ 
Wieman, Henry Nelson and Bernard Eugene Meland--APR 
American Philosophies of Religion. 
Chicago: Willett, Clark and Company, 1936. 
Articles 
Cox, William S.~-Art. 1 
"An Experiment in Extra-Sensory Perception." 
Jour. Exp. Psy. 19 (Aug., 1936}, 129-455. 
Dewey, John--Art. 21 
"The Need for a Recovery of Philosophy." 
Creative Intelligence, 3-?0. 
New York: Henry Holt and Company, 191?. 
--Art. 2 
"Conduct and Experience." 
Murchison: Psychologies of 1930, 409-423. 
London: Oxford University Press, 1930. 
Ducasse, C. J.--Art. 23 
"Symbols, Signs, and Signals." 
Jour. Sym. Log., 4 (June, 1939), 41-52. 
Duddington, Nathalie A.--Art. 20 
"Do We Know Other Minds Mediately or Immediately?" A Dis-
cussion. 
Mind, 30 (Apr., 1921), 195-19?. 
Gregory, Joshua C.--Art. 19 
"Do We Know Other Minds Mediately or Immediately?" 
Mind, 29 (Oct., 1920), 446-45?. 
Groos, Karl--Art. 22 
"The Problem of Relativism." 
(Tr. Edgar S. Brightman.) 
Forum Philosophicum, 1 (May, 1931), 468-4?3. 
Hoffding, Harald--Art. 26 
-"A Philosophical Confession." 
Jour. Phil. Psy. Scien. Meth., 2 (Feb. 16, 1905}, 85-92. 
Kaepffert, Waldemar--Art. 3 
"Searching out the Mind's Mysteries." 
New York Times Magazine, Oct. 1?, 193?, 8 
Kallen, Horace M.--Art. 5 
"Value and Existences in Philosophy, Art, and Religion." 
Dewey, CI, 409-46?. 
New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1922. 
I\ 223 
I 
I 
I 
'I I 
----- -·-
Kellogg, Chester E.--Art. 4 
"Our Evidence (?} for Extra-Sensory Perception." 
Scien. Mon., 44 (Oct., 193?}, 331-341. 
Montague, William Pepperell--Art. 6 
"Consciousness a Form of Energy. " 
Woodbridge, EPP , 103-135. 
Overstreet, Harry A.--Art. 7 
"Building the Communal Mind." 
Brightman, P6IC, 146-154. 
Parsons, Talcott--Art. 18 
"Society." 
Seligman, ESS , 225-232. 
Price, H. H.--Art. 8 
"Our Evidence for the Existence of Other Minds." 
Philosophy, 13 (Oct., 1938}, 425-456. 
Rynin, David--Art. 9 
"The Nature of Communication." 
Jour. Phil., 29 (Sept. 15, 1932}, 505-516. 
Sapir, Edward--Art. 17 
"Communication." 
·Seligman,ESS, Vol IV, ?8-80. 
Schiller, F. C. S. and others--Art. 10 
''The Meaning of Meaning ." A Symposium. 
Mind, 29 {Oct., 1920), 385-414. 
Sheldon, Wilmon Henry--Art. 11 
"Immaterial Non-Mental Reality." 
Brightman, P6IC, 13?-146. 
Smith, J. A.--Art. 12 
"The Nature of Mind and the Reality of Genuine Intercourae 
between Minds." 
Brightman, P6IC, 128-13?. 
Stout, G. F.--Art. 13 
"Experience." 
Baldwin, DPP, 360-361. 
Strong, Charles Augustus--Art . 25 
"Substitutionalism." 
Strong, EPP, 16?-193. 
Urban, Wilbur M.--Art. 14 ~ 
"Intelligible Communication: Its Nature and Condit ion." 
Phil. Rev., 4? (Nov., 1938), 565-594. 
224 
' 
===J:i=======j= 
Weinberg, Berenda--Art. 15 
"Protocols, Communicability, and Pointer Readings." 
Jour. Phil ., 35 (Nov •. 24, 1938} , 651-656 . 
Wheelwright, Philip E.--Art. 16 
"The Category of Self Transcendence as an Essential 
Element in the Concept of Personality . " 
Brightman, P6IC, 121-128. 
Woodbridge, F. J. E. and Others--Art. 2? 
"Report of the Committee on Definitions of the American 
Philosophical Association." 
Jour. - Phil. Psy. Scien. Meth., 8 {Dec. 21, 1911) ?01-?06. 
- -·----- ----------------==- -~------=---=-----~--=---=----=--- =----~---__ -__ -
225 
BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH 
Born in Harpoot (Armenian), Turkey in 1902. Migrated to 
America in 1906. Attended public school in Lynn, Massachusetts 
until 1916, at which time entered Perkins Institution, Water-
t own , Massachusetts. Graduated from its high school in 1923. 
Attended Lowell Teachers' College, Lowell, Massachusetts, 
from 1923-24. Completed practically two years' work in one 
and received certificate for work accomplished. Accepted 
summer position as head worker in one of the wards at the 
Marblehead Island Hospital for Crippled Children in 1924 . 
Taught in the Connecticut School for the Blind from 1924-29. 
Resigned from position to matriculate for a degree in Boston 
University, School of Education, 1929. Given one-year ap-
pointment to re-organize the work of the Educational Depart-
ment of the Arthur Sunshine Home for Blind Babies, Summit, 
New Jersey, and to act as Head Teacher, 1930-31. Re-entered 
Boston University, School of Education in 1931 and received 
a B. s. in Ed., 1933. Entered Graduate School, Boston Univer-
sity, in 1934. Received a fellowship in the Department of 
Philosophy from 1934-35. Received the Master of Arts degree 
in 1935. Held Assistantships in the Department from 1935-38. 
Taught at Perkins Institution, 1938-40. Received Ph. D. in 
1940. 
